

Teaching Loyalty in the Late Ottoman Balkans: Educational Reform in the Vilayets of Manastir and Yanya, 1878-1912

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Over the past thirty years scholars have paid a great deal of attention to how late-nineteenth-century educational reform affected the development of modern identities in Europe and the United States.¹ Historians of the late Ottoman Empire have recently documented that the same theories of pedagogy that attracted much interest in Western Europe and America also influenced Ottoman thinking about education.² Due to factors that I will discuss below, the Balkans in particular were the focus of educational reforms instituted during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909).³ The schools built in the Balkans, much like their European and American counterparts, were meant to inculcate a level of homogeneity over otherwise culturally diverse populations. While this interest in state-led education has subsequently influenced our understanding of the period, it may have obscured any potential appreciation for the very processes required for schools to actually complete their task of indoctrinating an entire population.⁴

To better understand the nuances of educational reform in the late Ottoman Balkans and how locals may have frustrated Istanbul's "social engineering" goals, this article will specifically focus on the empire's Albanian-speaking population based in the regions of Manastir and Yanya.⁵ These two areas are particularly interesting because Albanian-speaking Orthodox Christians and Muslims coexisted with other Christian communities there, creating the pretext for what would prove to be a substantial effort to distance Albanian speakers from each other along religious lines.⁶ As I will explain, schools built in the region became a central point of confrontation between local communities and their imperial patrons. Some historians have suggested that these battles over the regions' schools and school curricula marked a decisive period of constituting the modern identities of the Balkans. Contrary to the claims of Albanian historians, however, the activities of the local Albanian-speaking population were not limited to resisting the Ottoman and *Rum* Orthodox institutions that actively sought to subjugate them.⁷ On the contrary, Albanian speakers actively lobbied Istanbul to construct these Ottoman and *Rum* Church schools in their communities, not their closure.⁸

Such lobbying was used by local Albanian speakers to forge greater individual and group roles in regional political and economic affairs. However, as the frequent shifts in the focus of these local efforts will suggest, the activities of local communities should not be exclusively interpreted as "nationalist" in nature. Ultimately, therefore, this article disputes the association between schools, school curricula, and the mechanics of national development. At the same time, it suggests that we should be skeptical about the effectiveness local schools had in securing the "moral norms" or "loyalty"

sought by the sultan and *Rum* patriarch. Simply put, schools proved incapable of inculcating the loyalty Istanbul-based officials had envisioned. Knowing this, locals often used these "colonizing" institutions to dictate the terms of state penetration in their lives and thus maintain a balance of power between themselves and the outside world.

The Imperial Order of the Balkans: Pretext for Intervention

The factors that shaped the Ottoman Empire's policies on local education gained unprecedented significance during the latter half of the nineteenth century, as was the case with other empires during the period.⁹ The assertion, however, that these policies could have effectively and uniformly been realized in regions as diverse as the southern Balkans ignores the fundamental tensions surrounding the provinces in which schools were built.¹⁰ Much like other empires, which sought to assert greater central control over their diverse populations, the reformers in Istanbul frequently could not sustain their goal to create a uniformity in how the empire's citizens traded, communicated, or acted.¹¹

Often, the impediments to the empire in the Balkans have been identified in terms of sectarian (and later ethnic) loyalties—Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim—among local communities. These assumed loyalties have thus been used by historians to explain the extent to which some people "resisted" Ottoman reforms, while others, supposedly did not.¹² Unfortunately for the historians, the loyalties of many Balkan communities in the late Ottoman period were not based on a strict link between one's religious affiliation and one's apparent ethno-national identity. In view of this, important distinctions remain within sectarian and ethnic categories, at the time identified in Ottoman bureaucratic parlance as *millet*, which deserve greater attention.¹³

The aggressive efforts of the *Rum* Church to build schools in the empire after the 1870s best reflects the schismatic nature of the region's population and the motivations behind the educational reform of both the Patriarch and the Ottoman state. At the time, the *Rum* Church was actively creating a cultural monolith that sought to eliminate the particularistic loyalties of the many southern Albanian-speaking Orthodox communities in the region in order to move them away from the dangerous trajectory on which Serbs, Bulgarians and Vlachs had recently traveled.¹⁴ Paradoxically, it was due to the fears of Albanian separatism that the Porte backed the *Rum* Church's fight against, among other things, Albanian Orthodox Christian demands for the creation of an Albanian church.¹⁵ According to European observers sympathetic to the region's Albanian speakers, Ottoman "reforms" were nothing more than tools meant to thwart the expression of the "natural" ethno-linguistic identities of these communities.¹⁶ As noted by European consuls based in the region, the

sultan actively prohibited the establishment of institutions such as nondenominational schools that used Albanian as the language of instruction.¹⁷

The shared *Rum* Church and Ottoman policy of restraining possible nationalist ambitions of Albanian-speaking Catholics, Muslims and Orthodox Christians had its origins in the Slav uprisings in Bosnia and subsequent the Russo-Ottoman conflict in 1876-1877. It was a consequence of the new frontiers imposed by the subsequent Berlin Peace Treaty (1878), that the Ottoman state sought to cultivate a new generation of Ottoman citizens who would be loyal to "Ottoman values," and not those of Albania, Greece, or Serbia.¹⁸ At the time, this problem of loyalty was highlighted by the success of Catholic and Sunni Muslim Albanian speakers in resisting the frontiers established by the Berlin Congress.¹⁹ In addition, Russian success in redirecting the loyalties of Slav Orthodox Christians towards St. Petersburg posed a serious threat to the *Rum* patriarchate and Hellenism in general. In reflecting on the subsequent clashes over these issues, some historians have thus explained Albanian actions as manifestations of an "awakened" sense of ethno-national identity.²⁰ As a consequence, these historians assumed that the Ottoman state and *Rum* Church attempted to fortify collective loyalties at the expense of possible Albanian national ambitions through the establishment of schools.²¹

A potentially controversial but helpful way of understanding this process of "making Albanians into Ottomans (and Greek Christians)," to borrow from Eugene Weber, is to put it into the larger context of European colonization. Despite the reluctance of most Ottoman scholars to recognize this parallel to European colonialism, a recent study clearly demonstrates that the same notions of cultural superiority and, more importantly, the ambitions to centralize power found in France and Britain also informed Ottoman reforms.²² Much like their colonial counterparts elsewhere, *Rum* Church and Ottoman state schools were meant to monitor, supervise, and manipulate local populations that had been previously neglected by Istanbul. It is by appreciating the colonizing ambitions of Istanbul that this study can provide greater insight into the tensions of empire throughout the period. What makes the case particularly important is that Istanbul appears to have reacted to events on the ground in equal measure to its attempts to dictate policy.

The *Rum* Church and sultan's fears of Russian "penetration" into the region are particularly emblematic of the reactionary dynamic taking place after 1878 throughout the world. Russian-financed Orthodox seminaries and churches emerged throughout the region after 1878, creating what one scholar has characterized as a "spirit of competition" between rival imperial powers seeking to win the minds of locals.²³ Such factors ultimately forced the *Rum* Church, and later Sultan Abdülhamid II's regime, to dedicate resources to "reform" the region's educational system out of fear of "losing" large numbers of what were assumed to be vital components to Istanbul's dwindling capacity to reign in the Balkans.²⁴ In the end, little could be done to directly resist Russian pan-Slavic efforts to gain a foothold in the region at the expense of both the Porte and *Rum* Church.²⁵ On the other hand, institutions that were not protected by capitulation treaties, such as schools funded by the Albanian diaspora, American and British missionaries, or private Italian interest groups, were ac-

tively targeted.²⁶

In one case reported in the Manastir vilayet in 1905 by Ottoman authorities, villagers in Bihiliste began sending students to a recently opened school operated by an unidentified Protestant group. In response, the local Metropolitan in Görice threatened to excommunicate the Vlach and Albanian families of Bihiliste who sent their children to the school despite the fact that no alternative Orthodox school existed in the area.²⁷

In another case, *Rum* Church tactics in regard to the Italian-funded "scuola professionalla," which opened in June of 1902 in the town of Yanya offers an even clearer example of the Church's fight to eradicate "incursions" on its ever-shrinking theological, political, and cultural sphere of influence. As the French consul based in Yanya reports, more than sixty local students, fifteen of whom were Muslim Albanians, studied masonry and watch-making from Italian craftsmen sent from Italy. In response, representatives of the Yanya Metropolitan, as well as the inspector-general of the Greek consulate in Yanya, M. Gennadis, threatened the excommunication of those families who had children attending classes.²⁸ In a campaign that was clearly coordinated between the Greek state and local Church officials, threats of violence were printed in local and Athens-based newspapers; in some articles the threats were even directed towards school staff and the Italian consul.²⁹

While it would be wrong to suggest that there was an airtight alliance between the patriarchate and Greece, the appearance of such a close relationship in the joint efforts to close down the Italian trade school carried a great deal of political weight in the region. For one reason, it instilled a perception of political ascendancy that was important in the Church's relationship with the local population during the 1870s and 1880s. As will be demonstrated below, it was often through Church and Greek state officials that local Albanians issued complaints, sought patronage, and educated their children. For many, therefore, the Ottoman state, at least until the late 1880s, had at best a distant claim to authority among the region's Muslim and Christian population of the region.³⁰

What some characterized as "Greek" ascendancy would inspire accusations from the Ottoman Muslim opposition against the Sultan. In July of 1909, the most influential Young Turk newspaper (*Tann*), for example, exposed the discrepancy between the number of Greek-language schools in operation (supposedly inculcating Greek nationalism) and Ottoman-funded schools. The editorial reported that at both the primary (*Iptidai*) and intermediate levels (*Rüşhdî*), Greek-language schools outnumbered Ottoman state schools 663 to 135.³¹ *Tann* argued that the *Rum* leadership had successfully convinced the Ottoman state to concede the right to educate the region's Orthodox children to the *Rum* Church, despite the apparent contradiction with Ottoman attempts to instill greater loyalty to the sultan and Ottomanism.³² On these grounds, *Tann* accused the Abdülhamid regime of ultimately allowing the marriage between the Orthodox Church's claim to a monopoly on the spiritual education of the *Rum millet* and the Greek nationalist claim of *megale idea* to gain leverage inside Ottoman territories. Not only were these accusations themselves revealing, but the fact that the Young Turk regime put so much weight into the threats posed by the "Greek" schools is also suggestive of its own efforts to address the

question of the survival of the Ottoman state through educational reforms.³³

Hijacking “Education” to Resist Church and State Hegemony

How the institutional alliances discussed above translated on the ground as far as Albanian speakers were concerned is also instructive. For locals who we may assume resented “Greek” incursions (initially at least) the large discrepancy in the number of *Rum* Church institutions and Ottoman state-funded schools did not necessarily prove to be of central concern. In fact, the large-scale construction of schools taking place in the region after 1870 may be seen partially as a product of locals lobbying Istanbul, Athens, and the outside world for them. As I will demonstrate below, the discrepancy in school construction noted in *Tann* goes a long way toward explaining the dynamics of local politics and offers a good chance to counter previous scholarship, which has tied far too much significance to the “ethno-religious” foundations of those institutions.³⁴ In other words, rather than thinking of the hundreds of schools built during the period as exclusive products of state or Church ambitions, we can interpret this productivity as a partial result of the manipulation of shifting ideological and political currents by locals.

We can gauge this by recalling the impact the Berlin Congress had on perceptions among Ottoman policymakers. It became clear to a number of well-established Albanian-speaking members of the Ottoman elite that imperial fragmentation and political intrigue in Istanbul had serious consequences for their home areas in the southern Balkans.³⁵ As often noted, these elite responded with a series of demands made of the Porte. Initially, however, schools were not seen as a political or cultural end in themselves and were excluded from these demands.³⁶ It is instructive, therefore, that schools would eventually become an important part of future local demands, a reflection of the evolving nature of regional political and economic structures, and, perhaps more importantly, the shifting parameters of the debate in Istanbul. In other words, the more education became an issue of interest to the state, the more locals came to adopt the theme, ultimately soliciting state funds to construct schools in their communities as they searched for greater local power.³⁷ Significantly, rather than demanding the construction of “Albanian schools,” something to which both the patriarchate and the Porte were adamantly opposed, local Albanian speakers actively lobbied first for Orthodox, and subsequently for Ottoman state schools. That is to say, the locals clearly understood their limitations and worked within the confines of the current rhetoric for educational reform in order to solicit institutional funding.

As noted above, the clear discrepancy in power on the ground in the 1870s and early 1880s resulted in an initial period in which the *Rum* Church was ascendant in the region. An early report from the French consul, for instance, suggests that the Ottoman state was all but invisible in the Yanya region in the early 1880s. This was most apparent in the number of schools built in the area, of which 665 “Greek” schools were teaching 23,368 students in 1882, while there were but a few Ottoman counterparts.³⁸ To explain the political consequences of this discrepancy requires a better appreciation for how locals interpreted it, and perhaps ties in the lack of interest in Ottoman schools to a local perception that *Rum* Church and Greek schools better suited their interests.

What is key to understanding why Albanian speakers initially sent their children to “Greek” schools and actively lobbied for their construction is that, in the end, these schools could not effectively manufacture loyal “Greek” Orthodox subjects as intended. Instead, these institutions appear to have provided the social context and networks that were instrumental to the development of a number of future Albanian nationalists and, more immediately, to have provided access to circles of power in the region otherwise closed off to locals. The most famous example was the *Zosama* school in Yanya, which attracted Albanian-speaking students from all over the Balkans.³⁹ Many of the Albanian-speaking elite who have historically been portrayed as the force behind the Albanian national consciousness, such as the Frashëri brothers, Ismail Kemal Bey, Daut Boriçi, Hodo Sokoli, and Jusuf Tabaku, attended this Greek state-funded high school. This is significant on two fronts. First, a large number of Muslim students voluntarily attended a decidedly Orthodox school at a time when growing fears of Orthodox ascendancy circulated throughout the empire. Second, the school’s stated goal was to halt the development of the Albanian written language, which was beginning to appear in Greek-lettered newspapers and illegal textbooks.⁴⁰ Despite this agenda, it was precisely out of *Zosama* that some of the late Ottoman period’s most prominent Albanian national heroes—Sami Frashëri (Sem-saddin Sami) and Ismail Kemal Bey—graduated.⁴¹ To explain this paradox, a far greater appreciation of the local context and the motivations of the region’s inhabitants, and not merely Hamidian or Church ambitions, is necessary.

Interestingly, by the late 1880s there is a clear shift in perceptions about the Ottoman school as Istanbul actively sought to establish a foothold in the region by engaging local interests. This can be observed first in the number of schools built in the region and, more importantly, in which communities. If we compare the situation in Yanya as reported by the French consul in 1882 with the *Tann* report of 1909, in twenty years the Ottoman state built more than 130 state schools in the Yanya region. While many would explain this by exclusively citing imperial ambitions to indoctrinate the population, I would suggest locals played a leading role in the process by initiating a reaction from Istanbul as opposed to being passive targets of Ottoman reform.

This is apparent in the active lobbying by locals of the Ottoman state to build schools in their villages. It appears that locals manipulated the pseudo-nationalist fears expressed by Ottoman reformers who saw “Greek” hegemony in the numerical discrepancy of schools in their areas. The Ottoman school, as articulated by local demands, was to serve as an impediment to “Greek” expansionism. Among the many means of attracting Istanbul’s attention was the evocation of Islam, a particularly effective method of soliciting state money for the construction of schools in a given village.⁴² While there is evidence of an assertive Islamization policy in operation in such “mixed” regions as Manastir and Yanya, there is another way to interpret Istanbul’s heightened attention to the plight of its Muslim subjects. A documented attempt by local ulama soliciting Ottoman protection from “abusive Christian outsiders” in Manastir, for instance, could be read as an example of how locals understood their opportunities and activated current themes of imperial concern to maximize state attention and funding.

The chief of the ulama in the Manastir and Prizren districts, Abdül Halim wrote a letter that local Muslims needed immediate state assistance to help thwart “growing Christian influence” in the area. Using language that stressed their loyalty to the sultan, in particular by reiterating Abdülhamid’s claims to be the “Caliph of all Muslims,” the local ulama clearly knew which rhetorical terms would resonate loudest in Istanbul. The end result was state money for the construction of new religious schools in these areas and large stipends for Abdül Halim.⁴³

This explicit and successful use of Ottoman state rhetoric to lobby officials in order to fund schools was not restricted to Muslims. A joint “Latin and Orthodox” commission set up in April of 1893, also in Manastir, sought assistance from the Ottoman state in order to construct village schools that would operate free of Greek state or *Rum* patriarchate influence. In order to balance the power of the patriarch, this search for Ottoman state money in the 1890s suggests a shift in perceptions among locals that had serious consequences for the *Rum* Patriarch. As locals came to realize that the Porte’s articulated concerns about loyalty to the Ottoman project could result in the funding of local projects if promoted in the right language, local Christians and Muslims redirected their lobbying energies to keep the *Rum* Church institutions at arm’s length.⁴⁴

Locals in search of autonomy often used similar tactics in soliciting European support for the construction and maintenance of locally run schools. In September of 1903, the request for 150 Napoleons a year by a Draç (Dures/Durrazio) Orthodox school’s administration is indicative of such efforts to lobby outside powers.⁴⁵ In sum, these local (Albanian-speaking) Orthodox Christians solicited French (Catholic) assistance in order to maintain a school that would operate free of *Rum* Church interference. Interestingly, the priests who signed the request promised their French interlocutor that they would teach students attending the school in the French language, a strategy that revealed an appreciation for French desires to gain a cultural foothold in what was an Austrian sphere of influence in the Balkans.

We see such manipulation of imperial concerns in a number of other examples, including the case of Hussain Bey Dima, brother of Abbedine Pasha, a former foreign minister. Through his family’s Istanbul connections, Dima proved capable of securing funds to build a number of schools in villages surrounding his base of Preveza. What is curious about this case is that Dima actively solicited funds from both the Church and the Ottoman state over a period of twenty years. In the beginning, he sought funds to build Orthodox-run schools that would be operated by local Orthodox clergy. By the 1890s, however, as the Porte began to dedicate more funds to building its own schools, the same opportunities noted above enabled Dima, a Muslim, to use Ottoman state fears of losing its Muslim subjects to Hellenism. Dima began to solicit funding to build those Ottoman schools envisioned by the Porte, often side by side with the “Greek” schools he had built a decade earlier.⁴⁶ What Dima’s case best highlights are the shifting political fortunes of the Porte in the region and the capacity of locals to lobby Istanbul for, in Dima’s case, an extensive investment of state funds to a region that had been previously neglected.

The Dima example also suggests, however, that we are

not necessarily talking about a single “Albanian” effort to resist the cultural hegemony of two colonizing entities. Rather, the cases noted above are better understood as examples of local Albanian speakers seeking to develop their regions in ways that assured economic and political autonomy, while satisfying personal ambitions. This is key to appreciating the role educational reforms played in the region and perhaps throughout the colonized world. Simply put, reform in the Balkans frequently reflected the influence of particular communities who lobbied for state money to be spent in their districts at the expense of others. How this translates in the Balkans is clear when we compare the rate of state activity in the regions under this study to that in the *vilayets* of Kosova and Iskodra.

State financed schools appeared in disproportionate numbers throughout Manastir and Yanya beginning in the 1880s, reflecting the greater influence that southern Albanians had in Istanbul in comparison to Albanian speakers further north.⁴⁷ As noted earlier, over 130 government schools were built in Yanya by 1908. In Kosova, on the other hand, there were only seven Ottoman state-funded primary schools built in all of the Prishtina Sancak by the turn of the century.⁴⁸ Throughout the Northern regions, in fact, schools were primarily built in administrative centers as opposed to in villages, despite the clear importance the region had for Ottoman hopes in maintaining a presence in the Balkans. In Manastir and Yanya, on the other hand, schools were built in a large number of villages, replacing traditional madrasas as the principal rural site for education. My explanation for this discrepancy is that while Istanbul feared the expansion of nationalist sentiments in Kosova and Iskodra, the south received a majority of Ottoman state development money largely because of those who lobbied the state. In a report from the interior ministry in 1880, for example, it is noted that the Bucharest and Sofia based newspapers *Shqiptari* and *Drita* were agitating local Albanians in the south to resist the educational hegemony of local “Greeks” by lobbying Ottoman officials for the construction of Ottoman schools in their villages.⁴⁹ The audience of these papers was exclusively southern Albanian speakers based in Istanbul and in the region’s main towns, suggesting a clear recognition of the collective lobbying power of this geographically situated interest group.

The educational “reforms” demanded by some Albanian speakers, therefore, must be considered a partial reflection of the political currents circulating in Istanbul at the time.⁵⁰ Again, by the 1880s, there was an appetite for reform in Istanbul, and money was readily available to those who knew how to access it. Because southern Albanian speakers were very much a part of Istanbul’s power circles, their growing manipulation of Ottoman state concerns resulted in the rapid construction of schools in their home areas. This capacity to divert large amounts of state funds to their home districts created, in the end, a political (and economic) dynamic that greatly affected how reform throughout the empire would be implemented during the period and would have a tremendous impact on how the post-Ottoman Balkans would develop. That said, it was not only through the physical construction of schools that locals were able to balance the colonial ambitions of the *Rum* patriarch and Ottoman state. Albanian-speaking Christians also demonstrated an ability to become integral parts of the Orthodox and imperial educational system in

ways that often thwarted Istanbul's colonialist goals.

Infiltrating the Colonial School

Observers have suggested that the driving force behind the boom in the construction of Orthodox schools of the period was the quest to eradicate Albanian sensibilities.⁵¹ Armed with the power to excommunicate prominent locals who did not comply with Orthodox policies and with the Ottoman military at its disposal, the various metropolitans of the region engaged in what one visitor described as a "politics of occupation."⁵² Despite the impressions of outsiders who expressed surprise over the lack of a violent resistance, many among the local population did not acquiesce to this form of cultural colonialism. Rather, as is often the case in such situations, locals adapted to and used the very institutions meant to eliminate their respective localisms in ways that maximized their resistance to *Rum* (and Ottoman Turkish) hegemony.

Looking at how this adaptation took place in the operation of schools, therefore, may prove helpful in illuminating this point. It was often the case, for instance, that after the construction of a school, the *Rum* Church appointed a local trained in Greece to teach the local students.⁵³ In fact, the use of locals trained in the "metropole" was a common tactic practiced by colonial powers everywhere at the time. Indeed, the Ottoman state adopted similar strategies by establishing military, medical, and professional academies in Istanbul and other major cities.⁵⁴

Ironically, these tactics of using locals to help indoctrinate the indigenous population often provided a prime vehicle to the resistance of state and church hegemony. It can be observed that despite *Rum* Church and Greek consular efforts, many of the instructors who taught in the "Greek" schools of the region were advocates for communal "rights" that contradicted Church claims of Greek cultural superiority. An early example is the case of Koto Hoxhi (1824-1895), a teacher at the Greek state-funded teachers college in Qestorat near Ergiri (Gjirokaster). While the teachers' college was meant to build a cadre of like-minded "Greek" Orthodox teachers, Hoxhi secretly taught the Albanian language and history to his students, among whom were the important future activists Paneli Sotiri and Petro Nini Luarasi. Ultimately, the metropolitan of Ergiri excommunicated Hoxhi, but his ability to conduct such classes for several years demonstrates the educational limitations in performing the intended colonizing duties.⁵⁵

One can partially explain the failure to indoctrinate the region's Orthodox population by the fact that there had developed a veritable network of like-minded individuals involved in educating local children. While it is impossible to discuss the socio-cultural dynamic of this network further in this paper, the active participation of large segments of the community in this process of defying the *Rum* Church in its Hellenization program is frequently noted in archives. In addition, parents felt confident that their children would receive both a superior education by attending *Rum* Orthodox schools while gaining access to important circles of power.⁵⁶

In time, the Ottoman state, with the help of local representatives, recognized this dynamic and actively sought to improve the drawing power of its own institutions by increasing the inducements for those who attended their schools.⁵⁷ Lake Ohrid native Ibrahim Temo, for example, one

of the four founders of the anti-Hamidian Committee for Union and Progress (CUP), became a student at the Imperial Medical School in Istanbul as Istanbul actively recruited promising students like Temo away from "Greek" or "Italian" alternatives.⁵⁸ Ironically, these schools provided the social environment for many future Albanian nationalists to meet and organize as well as the ideal forum for the creation of the Anti-Hamidian CUP itself, demonstrating in a dramatic way the failure of these institutions to instill loyalty in their students.

There are important sociological factors involved in this dynamic. The fact that education became increasingly important in the eyes of locals probably increased the necessity (or perhaps the hopes) to engage locals in the process of inculcating Church or state values.⁵⁹ The marked rise in students being sent to schools, however, also empowered local agitators who were eager to more openly resist the colonial policies of Istanbul. Moreover, it enabled locals to capitalize on this rising interest in education. In the case of *Rum* schools, not only did that mean that more Albanian-speaking students would infiltrate the teaching cadre educated by the Greek state, but it also meant that more Albanian speakers became members of the Orthodox clergy. Papa Kristo Negovani, a priest who received his secondary education in Athens on a Greek state scholarship, is a good example of the consequences of this demographic influx.

What Negovani's generation of agitators did was change the fundamental content of the "Greek" schools and create a new political site in which the cultural wars of the Ottoman Empire could be fought. More specifically, Negovani represented an important vanguard in efforts to institutionalize the Albanian language by secretly teaching it in Church-financed schools. Eventually, Negovani attracted thousands of supporters, leading him to openly preach the liturgy in Albanian, an act of defiance against Church propaganda that at once disturbed claims of Greek cultural superiority as well as instigated a harsh campaign against these Albanian-speaking clergy.

Negovani's actions caused institutional responses that ultimately intensified the contradictions facing the Church and its imperial patron. In the end, Papa Kristo Negovani was murdered for his acts of defiance to the explicit orders of the metropolitan of Kastoria, Karavangelis, concerning the use of Albanian during mass.⁶⁰ The subsequent list of southern Orthodox and Muslim Albanian intellectuals persecuted and murdered by the *Rum* Church during this heightened period of tension is a long one. Petro Nini Luarasi, Gjerasim Qiriazi, Nuçi Naço, Baba Duda Karbunara, Hamdi Ohri, Said Hoxha, Balil Tahiri, and Sotir Ollani all taught Albanian nationalist values or preached against Hellenism at *Rum* or Ottoman institutions. These men represented what could be called a southern movement that challenged the culturally hegemonic forces of Istanbul from the inside, ultimately leading to their persecution by both sovereign entities.⁶¹ Ironically, such persecution may have been the underlying force for inspiring future acts of resistance by a population not initially inclined to confront the state and Church.

The Albanian School

While most of the Albanian-speaking population continued to operate from within the institutional dynamics in Is-

tanbul, a small minority believed that the Berlin Congress signaled the opportunity to move beyond the clandestine use of Albanian. In 1885, with the assistance of influential members of the southern Albanian elite in Istanbul and Bucharest, local Albanian Christians in Görice (Korçë) founded the first Albanian school for boys. According to Faik Konitza, just as southern lobbying helped secure funds for the construction of Ottoman and patriarch schools in the region, Sami Frashëri's active pressure in Istanbul helped secure the necessary permits for the project.⁶² The school's first director was Pandeli Sotiri, who had been a student of Koto Hoxhi in the Greek teachers college in Qestorat and the editor of the first Albanian language newspaper of the Ottoman Empire, *Dituria*. In the first two years, the school would prove a success. As many as 200 local boys attended the school, suggesting to this small group of activists that there was a future for Albanian-language schools. In response to the initial success of the Korçë school, Petro Nini Luarasi, Sotiri's fellow student in Qestorat, raised money and helped establish Albanian schools in a number of villages nearby.⁶³ An elaborate educational infrastructure slowly developed to accommodate the material needs of these schools. Textbooks prepared by the Istanbul-based Society for the Publication of Albanian Writing (*Shoqëri e të shtypuri shkronja shqip*), directed by Sami Frashëri and published by the Bucharest group, *Drita*, were reportedly used by all these schools.

In response, Church authorities issued their usual threats of excommunication. At the same time, despite active support from the *Mutasarrif* of the city, native Albanian speaker Mahmud Pasha Elbasani, *Rum* officials successfully convinced Ottoman officials to intervene, ultimately resulting in the barring of Muslims from attending classes in 1887. Over time, the effects of *Rum* Church lobbying of the state left the school with little formal protection in Istanbul, resulting in the forced exile of Sotiri by the end of 1887.

Despite this fierce campaign, the school continued to operate, perhaps a sign of the level of influence supporters of the school in Istanbul had. Nevertheless, after Petro Nini Luarasi replaced Sotiri as director, the school had difficulty in attracting students. Eventually, the metropolitan of Kastoria, Philaretos, successfully forced Luarasi out of the region as well, charging him with supporting "free masonry and Protestantism" as well as teaching "a language that does not exist." In labeling Luarasi and others associated with the school an "enemy of the faith," a large-scale program of excommunicating Albanian Orthodox Christians involved in the school started in earnest.⁶⁴ While these attacks were effective, the Church's belligerence alone cannot account for the eventual failure of these schools.⁶⁵ Ultimately, locals found no clear advantage in sending children to an Albanian school that incited so much ire, and in all likelihood, opened few, if any, doors within the hierarchies of imperial power for those who graduated.⁶⁶

The perceptions of what were the limitations for locals to engage in an open confrontation with the powerful entities in Istanbul suggest a great deal about the nature of late Ottoman politics. Rather than supporting the project of Albanian-language schools, most locals recognized the importance of remaining firmly entrenched in an imperial system that was not necessarily seen as doomed to failure. Thus, by 1898 most advocates of Albanian education based in the south recog-

nized that there were few means of pressuring Istanbul for Albanian schools. In a revealing telegram sent to the Porte, advocates conceded the central role of the Ottoman state by demanding that Albanian be taught *within* the curriculum of those Ottoman state schools already built in Albanian territories.⁶⁷ This is a telling indicator of the limits of local agency and the parameters in which locals of empire could operate. It was clear to many that as long as Albanian speakers operated within the rhetorical confines articulated by Istanbul, there was room to maneuver. Once a community or individual drifted beyond those parameters, however, they were faced with the repressive powers of the institutions of state and church.⁶⁸

Conclusion

The story of these short-lived Albanian schools, glorified by Albanian historians as emblematic of an emerging Albanian national identity, clearly outlines the cultural wars that were taking place within Ottoman society. More importantly, however, the failure of these schools suggests that this particular anticolonial struggle was most effective when conducted from within the very institutions of the colonializing entities. In this sense, historians who have focused on the few Albanian schools erected in the period have missed the central animating force of the period.⁶⁹ Locals understood the repressive capacities of the Ottoman state and the *Rum* patriarch, and they countered Istanbul's centralizing ambitions by infiltrating the very institutions erected to "educate" them. In sum, the underlying goals of both state and church officials, along with like-minded "Albanian modernists" who advocated Albanian schools were largely unrealizable in the late imperial context.

More generally, the very confines of empire as determined by the institutions assumed by modern theories of state to best inculcate loyalty, shaped the extent to which suspicion towards Albanian speakers articulated policy in Istanbul. Albanian speakers in the south quickly learned the parameters of this new imperial matrix and with the exception of a few overly ambitious dreamers, practiced an effective policy of lobbying for schools from within the confines of the imperial order. The central lesson to be drawn from this story, therefore, is that practical limits to creating a "national" or "imperial" identity set by the empire or local agitators shaped the very values of both the local population and Istanbul.

This article has suggested our focus should be one that questions both the functionalist assumptions about the role schools play in creating political loyalties and anachronistic notions of a unified, monolithic "Albanian" national ethos. The question that this subject begs, therefore, is how regional tensions articulated themselves in institutions that often sought to sustain local differences. We must in the future explore the relations between the institutionalization of cultural expressions and the manifestation of local aspirations in the end of the nineteenth century while avoiding the automatic assertion of ethno-national significance to those acts. Upon taking such precautions, a study of this kind should pose a number of new questions that have comparative value to those who are studying other parts of the colonized world in the early period of modernity. This study may also help conceptualize a different path of analysis that actively engages local actors, an approach as of yet-neglected in Ottoman

studies.

NOTES

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¹One fine example is Gary B. Cohen, *Education and Middle-Class Society in Imperial Austria, 1848-1918*. (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1996). For an excellent survey of the influential American Progressive Movement and general issues pertaining to this period, see Mustafa Emirbayer, "Beyond Structuralism and Voluntarism: The Politics and Discourse of Progressive School Reform, 1890-1930," *Theory and Society* 21 (1992): 621-644.

²See for instance, Ali Çaksu, ed., *Learning and Education in the Ottoman World* (Istanbul: Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, 2001) and Benjamin C. Fortna, "Islamic Morality in Late Ottoman 'Secular' Schools," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 32, no. 3 (2000): 369-393. For examples of Italian and French influence on Ottoman intellectuals bent on "reform" see PAAA 733/3, Die Jungtürken, 198 (Bd.4-6) and Sabahaddin, *Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarılabilir? Meslek-i İctima' ve Programı* (Istanbul, 1918).

³This use of education as a tool of centralization was adopted with even greater enthusiasm by the Young Turk regime after 1908. Mustafa Ergün, II, *Mesrutiyet Devrinde Eğitim Hareketleri, 1908-1914* (Ankara: Ocak Yayınları, 1996), 157-354 and Abdullah Cevdet, *Dimag ve Melakat-i Akliyenin Fizyoloji ve Hijzisihbasi* (Istanbul, 1919), 352-359. For a helpful interpretation of Abdülhamid's intentions see Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909* (London, 1998), 98-111.

⁴Abram de Swaan, *In Care of the State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 52-117. For influential proponents of interventionist educational reform in the period, see Emile Durkheim, *The Evolution of Educational Thought*, trans. Peter Collins (London: Routledge, 1977); Edmond Demolins, *L'Éducation nouvelle: l'École des Roches* (Paris, 1898); and Reginald D. Archambault ed., *John Dewey on Education*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964).

⁵Feroz Ahmed adopted the notion of Ottoman "social engineering" to describe the late-nineteenth-century effort to inculcate collective loyalty to the state, a description that is particularly evocative of the ambitions of the Ottoman state since the late *Tanzimat*. It does little however, to explain whether or not they were successful. See Feroz Ahmed, "The State and Intervention in Turkey," *Turica* 16 (1984), 56.

⁶See French consular report for details of the Greek-speaking Bulgar and Vlach, and Muslim Albanian-speaking communities in the region. AMAE Nantes, Constantinople Série D Correspondence avec les Echelles, Janina, 1890-1913 no. 15, vice-consul of France in Janina to Chargé d'Affaires at the French Embassy in Constantinople dated Janina, 20 April 1894, no. 6.

⁷For an example of how Albanian historians treated the question, see Zija Shkodra, *Qyteti Shqiptar Gjatë Rilindjes Kombëtare*, (Tiranë, 1984), 73-88.

⁸It is suggested here that for much of the Hamidian period, the Rum patriarch (often misnamed "Greek") and the Ottoman state shared a common goal in establishing cultural and political hegemony over the Albanian-speaking population. This seemingly contradictory alliance had been noted by many at the time, including Federico Guicciardini, an influential Italian politician at the turn of the century. "Impressioni d'Albania, II" *Nuova Antologia*, XCIV (1 July 1901): 1-32.

⁹For a comprehensive summary of Istanbul's activities up to 1903 see Education Ministry Yearbook: *Salname-i Nezareti Maarifi Umumiye* (Istanbul, 1321).

¹⁰For Benedict Anderson, the very persistence of colonial "habits" instituted by schools led to the successful penetration of imperial values into subject populations, a conclusion that evidence provided here disputes. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. (London: New Left Books, 1991), 169.

¹¹As scholars of colonial Africa have clearly demonstrated, a number of local factors attributed for the divergence and specific lack of uniformity that frustrated idealist state-builders in Paris, London, and indeed, Istanbul. For a survey of this new generation of scholarship, see Frederick Cooper, "Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History," *American Historical Review* 99, no. 5 (1994): 1516-1545.

¹²Most recently, Tom Gallagher, *Outcast Europe: The Balkans, 1789-1989*.

(London: Routledge, 2001), 31-35.

¹³For an earlier critique of such methods see Isa Blumi, "The Commodification of Otherness and the Ethnic Unit in the Balkans: How to Think About Albanians," *East European Politics and Societies* 12 (1998): 527-69.

¹⁴See H.N. Brailsford, *Macedonia: Its Races and Their Future* (London: Methuen and Company, 1906), 188.

¹⁵For example, the Boston-funded *Görice Arnavut Ortodokslarin Kilise Ittifi* petitioned the Porte for formal recognition, which it failed to obtain after protests from the patriarch. BBA Bab-ı Ali Evrak Odası, 265991, 2 Saban 1325 [10 September 1907] and for the later repression of the *Arnavut Ortodoks Hristiyan Cemiyeti*, which continued to struggle for a national church, see BBA DH.MUI 31-2/25 1 Seval 1328 [6 October 1910].

¹⁶J. Matl, "Neuer Beitrag zur inneren Geschichte Südalbanien in den 60er Jahren des 19. Jr. s-Bericht des k.k. Consuls in Janina de dato 24 Juni 1868," *Südost-Forschungen* 16, no. 2 (1957): 414-443.

¹⁷This took place at a time when other communities were granted institutional, political and spiritual autonomy from Ottoman and patriarch controls. See AMAE Paris, Turquie, Politique intérieure, Albanie, 1897, vol. 1: Ledoux to Hanotaux, dated Manastir, 8 January 1897, No. 1; and HHStA, PA XIV/24, Albanien. "Mémoire über Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," Calice to Goluchowski, dated Constantinople, 16 November 1898, no. 49 B.

¹⁸This fear of separatism could also be linked to the activities in Istanbul of an Albanian elite who, in response to the Berlin fiasco, actively lobbied the Austrian consul in Istanbul, Zichy, for extensive autonomy of all territories inhabited by Albanian speakers. See Andre Novotny, *Österreich, die Türkei und das Balkanproblem im Jahre des Berliner Kongresses (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des Berliner Kongresses 1878)* (Graz-Köln, 1957), 335.

¹⁹Isa Blumi, "Contesting the Edges of the Ottoman Empire: Rethinking Ethnic and Sectarian Boundaries in the Malësore, 1878-1912," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, (forthcoming 2003).

²⁰Examples of this rhetoric may be found in works written by contemporaries of the period, Christo Dako, *Albania, The Master Key to the Near East* (Boston: Grimes, 1919) and Süleyman Külçe, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Arnavutluk* (Izmir: private edition, 1944), 247-264.

²¹A conclusion that can be drawn from the more general work on the subject by Bayram Kodaman, *Abdülhamid Devri Eğitim Sistemi* (Istanbul, 1991) and Necdet Sakaoglu, *Osmanlı Eğitim Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1991), 32-43.

²²M. Suku Hanioglu has done a remarkable service for the field by illuminating the extent to which popular European notions of social hierarchy were shared by Ottoman society's elite well before the revolt of 1908. See Hanioglu's *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 82-129, 289-311.

²³Benjamin C. Fortna, "Education for the Empire: Ottoman State Secondary Schools During the Reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909)" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1997).

²⁴See, for instance, reports on the construction of schools that Russia financed in 1897: BBA Irade-i Hususi 100/26.R.1315 (Serb school in Prizren) and Irade-i Hususi 53/21.N.1315 (Bulgar school in Ohrid).

²⁵It was under Tsar Alexander II's pressure that on 11 April 1872 the Exarchate of the Bulgarian Church was formed. Although the patriarch declared the Bulgarian Church schismatic the following month, under Russian protection, no further action was undertaken to disrupt its development. See Richard von Mach, *The Bulgarian Exarchate: Its History and the Extent of its Authority in Turkey*. (London, 1905), 10-22.

²⁶For an example of how the Rum Church blocked the construction of a Protestant church in Ohrid, Macedonia in 1903 by first putting pressure on local authorities then ultimately, on the sultan himself, see BBA, Irade-i Hususi 18/3.Z.1311 [9 May 1894].

²⁷See BBA TFR.1.MN 74/7333 3 Eylül [1]321 [16 September 1905].

²⁸French reports on Orthodox officials using sermons to "violently attack the Catholics" may be found throughout the period. See for instance, AMAE Nantes: Constantinople Série D Correspondence avec les Echelles, Janina, 1890-1913 no. 15, 1890-1913, vice consul to French Embassy, dated Janina, 26 February 1896 no. 48.

²⁹Within six months the school's staff, citing threats and a shrinking student-body, returned to Italy. See AMAE Nantes, Constantinople Série D Correspondence avec les Echelles, Scutari d'Albanie 1900/1911 [henceforth CCS, 1900/1911] Consul of France in Scutari to Ambassador Coustans in Constantinople, dated Scutari, 26 July 1902 report number 285. For an earlier example see AMAE Nantes: Constantinople Série D Correspondence avec les Echelles, Janina 1890-1913 no. 15, 1890-1913 vice consul of Janina to Linbert, dated Janina, 4 December 1890 No. 33 and vice consul of Janina to embassy in Constantinople, dated Janina, 30 June 1891.

³⁰In an extensive report on the education system in Yanya in the 1880s, the French consul notes that due to an utter lack of state schools, the Muslims of the area did not speak Ottoman Turkish. Rather, they spoke their native Albanian and the Greek and Italian languages in which they sometimes conducted trade. See AMAE Nantes: Constantinople Série D Correspondence avec les Echelles, Janina, 1890-1913 no. 15, 1890-1913 vice consul to Linbert dated Janina, 20 April 1894 no. 6.

³¹Mustafa Sufi, "Yanya vilayetinin ahval-ı umumiyesi," *Tanin* 16 Temmuz 1325.

³²Similar concessions in 1891 were given to Austria-Hungary as per the Empire's Catholic (Latin) population in the Balkans, primarily in the hope of separating Albanian Catholics from their Albanian-speaking Muslim neighbors. See BBA YA.RES 98/7 for a variety of exchanges between the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Austrian consuls as concerns these concessions.

³³That said, the new Young Turk regime continued to use the *Rum* Church in order to constrain the Albanian-speaking population in the region. See the order to build a *Rum* Church school in Çatalca, a town authorities acknowledged was "Albanian" in the subsequent report. BBA DH.MUI 49-1/7 16 Zilhicce 1327 [30 December 1909].

³⁴See for instance, P.M. Kitromilides, *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy: Studies in the Culture and Political Thought of South-Eastern Europe* (London: Ashgate, 1994), 64-69.

³⁵For background on the preponderance of southern Albanians in Ottoman power structures, see Isa Blumi, "The Dynamics of Identity: The Albanian in the Ottoman Empire," in *ACTA Viennensia Ottomanica Akten der 13 CIEPO-Symposiums*, ed. Gisela Prochazka-Eisl (Vienna, 1999): 21-34.

³⁶BBA YA HUS 159/109 5 Seval 1295 [2 October 1878]. The Kosova Vali (governor), Dervish Pasha, reported to the Sublime Porte that in southern Tosk lands, Albanians were demanding the creation of a single Albanian *vilayet* and political autonomy, he does not mention, however, any demands for Albanian-language schools.

³⁷For the Ottoman state, full-scale implementation of an education infrastructure began in 1881-1882. See for instance the declaration by the Education Ministry for the creation of *vilayet*-based education councils. BBA Ayniyat Defterleri, 1420, 1 Safer 1299 [23 December 1881] and specifically for the creation of a Meclis-i maârif in Yanya and Selanik, see document dated 16 Cemaziyellevvel 1299 [6 April 1882].

³⁸The consul notes that a total of 559 Muslim students were educated in Ottoman state schools in the entire province. See the annexes A, B, C and E in AMAE Paris: Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, 1881-1884, Janina, Vol. XI. Wiet to Freycinet, Janina, 3 June 1882, Report No. 81.

³⁹For a detailed report on the school and its role in educating the region's multi-confessional population, see AMAE Nantes: CCS, 1900/1911, Consul in Scutari to Ambassador Coustans, dated Scutari 19 March 1902 no. 207.

⁴⁰Shkëlzen Raça, *Marrëdhëniet Shqiptaro-Greke, 1829-1881* (Prishtinë, 1990), 123-271.

⁴¹For autobiographical reflections on studying in Greek-language schools see Sommerville Story, ed., *The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey* (London: Constable, 1920), 17-18.

⁴²Many historians of the period suggest that the key ambition of the Hamidian regime was the unification of Muslims, enacted by the symbolic claim to the caliphate. Cezmi Eraslan, *II. Abdülhamid ve İslam Birliği* (Istanbul: Ötügen, 1992), 23-76.

⁴³BBA Y.MTV 204/106 1316 [1899].

⁴⁴BBA Sura-yı Devlet Evrakı 1986/18 [April 1893].

⁴⁵The following men signed the request, Paul Terca (Albanian), Zessi Mangaritti (Albanian), A.N. Zanggevriddi (Albanian?), A. Manualli (Albanian?), A.I. Morsi (Albanian), and C. Spiroulis (Greek). AMAE Nantes: CCS, 1900/1911 Consul of Scutari to Ambassador Coustans, dated Scutari, 13 September 1902 no. 243

⁴⁶In either case, as the French consul reports, these schools were used by local Albanian clergy and teachers to secretly instruct students in Albanian. See AMAE Nantes: Constantinople Série D Correspondence avec les Echelles, Janina, 1890-1913 no. 15, 1890-1913, vice consul to Linbert dated Janina, 20 April 1894 no. 6.

⁴⁷Compare the number of state schools in each *vilayet* as reported in the 1903 *Salname-i Nezareti Maarifi Umumiye*, 318-322, 627-650, 661-676 and 698-706. See also Jashar Rexhepagiq, *Zhvillimi i Arsimit dhe i Sistemit Shkollor të Kombësisë Shqiptare në Territorin e Jugosllavisë* (Prishtina, 1970), 151-52.

⁴⁸Hysni Myzyri, *Shkollat e para Kombëtare Shqipe* (Tirana, 1978), 32.

⁴⁹BBA YA.HUS 217/67. Report from the interior minister, number 202

dated 15 April 1880. The Ministry also speaks of subsequent Greek state lobbying in Istanbul, demanding the Sublime Porte put pressure on the Romanian autonomous government to shut the newspaper down.

⁵⁰Evidence of this can be found in the second issue of the bilingual newspaper *La Renaissance Albanaise* (Perldinja Shqiptare), published by Thoma Abrami in Bucharest. [3 July 1903].

⁵¹See for instance, HHStA, Ges. Arch Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422, authored by Zwiedinek, "Die albanesische Action des k. und k. Ministeriums des Aeussern im Jahre 1897." Dated Vienna, 11 January 1898, p. 5-8.

⁵²Italian statesman Giuliano said as much in 1903 after visiting the region. See Giuseppi Shiro, *Gli albanesi e la questione balcanica* (Napoli, 1904), 428-429.

⁵³For details of this process, see report of two recent graduates returning to their villages after receiving an education in Athens. AMAE Nantes: Constantinople Série D Correspondence avec les Echelles, Janina, 1890-1913 no. 15, 1890-1913, vice consul to Linbert, Chargé d'Affaires French Embassy in Constantinople, dated Janina, 30 July 1890 no. 22.

⁵⁴One of the more informative examples was the Sultan's "Tribal School," which was meant to incorporate the empire's "tribal" peoples (including some Northern Albanian boys) in the fold of Ottoman governance. See Eugene Rogan, "Asiret Mektebi: Abülhamid II's School for Tribes, 1892-1907," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28 (1996): 83-107.

⁵⁵Starvo Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 133-134.

⁵⁶See Bojka Sokol, "Origine sociale de l'intelligentsia albanaise à l'époque de la Renaissance," *Études balkaniques* I (1982): 113-124 and Robert Graves, *Storm Centers of the Near East* (London, 1933), 272.

⁵⁷A wide range of "professional" schools received extensive funding from the Porte during this period, including a medical school that would prove key to twentieth-century Ottoman social history. See BBA Irade-i Hususi, 133/22.S.1312 [July 1894].

⁵⁸This school was by far the most secular and important institute to Ottoman politics of the last fifty years, and many of the CUP's leaders created firm links to ideas of constitutionalism while attending the school. See Rıza Tahsin, *Mir'at-i Mekteb-i Tibbiye*. (Istanbul, 1906).

⁵⁹Mirk Piraku, "Gjurmë të veprimtarisë letrare shqipe me alfabetin arab në Kosovë," *Gjurmime Albanologjike* 9, (1978): 203-16 and Muzafer Tufan, "Makedonya Arnavutları ve Türkleri 'Case Study': Gostivar" in *Güney-Dogu Avrupa Arastirmalari Dergisi* 12 (1982-1998): 363-393.

⁶⁰He was murdered on February 12 1905, just two days after the Albanian-language sermon he performed in front of the Metropolitan. Jürgen Faensen, *Die Albanische Nationalbewegung*, (Berlin, 1980), 133-134.

⁶¹Myzyri, *Shkollat e para Kombëtare Shqipe*, 114, 137, 141, 161, 181, 218-220, 226.

⁶²HHStA PA XIV/18 Albanien XII/2. Faik Konitza, "Mémoire sur le mouvement national albanais," p. 11, dated Brussels, January 1899.

⁶³By 1892, Luarasi was able to establish Albanian schools in the villages of Luaras, Selenicë, Vodicë and Treskë with the assistance of Bucharest-based Nikolla Naço. G. Schiro, *Gli Albanesi e la questione balcanica*, 88 and Nuçi Naçi, "Shkolla shqipe ne Korçë," *Diturija* (1 March 1927), 170.

⁶⁴There is a circular letter written in Greek which is addressed to the priests and the population of Korytsa (Korçë) that outlines the threats. HHStA PA XIV/21, Albanien XIII/18 dated 20 September 1892, signed by Archbishop Philaretos. See also Adelaida Ismyrliadou, *Koritsa: expaidense, emergetes, oikonomia, 1850-1908* (Thessalonike, 1992), 27. Thanks to Dino Musa for the Greek reference.

⁶⁵Despite such pressures, the school remained open and an Albanian school for girls was even founded in 1891, reflecting a dogged belief in the merits of Albanian schools. The girls' school was established in Korçë with money raised by Gjerasim Qirias and American and English Protestant groups. The school's staff were all Albanian graduates of Robert College in Istanbul or the Samokov American School in Bulgaria. By 1898 the school, able to survive despite Istanbul's opposition because of active lobbying from the American Board of Missions in Manastir, with forty-five full-time students, provided the only educational opportunity for girls in the region. HHStA PA XIV/24, Albanien Liasse XVI/4, Prochaska to Goluchowski, dated Manastir, 9 January 1905, no. 3.

⁶⁶HHStA PA XIV/24 Albanien Liasse XIV/4, Kral to Goluchowski, dated Manastir, 6 August 1902, no. 56.

⁶⁷Nuçi Naçi, "Shkolla shqipe në Korçë," 166-169. See also HHStA PA XIV/24, Albanien Liasse XVI/4. Orhan Bey and Athanas Sina "Aperçu über die albanesische Knabenschule in Kortscha und die Notwendigkeit ihrer Weiterentwicklung," [written in November 1899] enclosed in Kral to Golu-

chowski, dated Manastir, 4 January 1901, no. 2.

⁶⁸BBA DH.ID 126/33 1320 [1902]. Interior minister report, number 356 asks the supreme council to order the closing of Albanian schools because students are reported to have been taught ideas contrary to state interests.

⁶⁹It should be pointed out again that not all Albanian speakers supported these schools. Indeed, a good number of those involved in administering the provinces, such as Görice's mayor, Mehmed Ali Pasha Delvina, actively lobbied Istanbul to crack down on the schools. See HHStA PA XIV/24 Albanien Liasse XIV/4, Calice to Goluchowski, dated Constantinople, 16 November 1898, no. 49v.