

Engendering Post-Colonial Nuclear Policies Through the Lens of Hindutva: Rethinking the Security Paradigm of India

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On 18 July 2002, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) nominated APJ Abdul Kalam as the twelfth president of India¹—an act quite emblematic of the spirit of the Indian constitution, which describes India as a secular state. Indeed, India has had Muslim presidents in the past, Zakir Hussain and Fakhruddin Ali, both nominated when the Congress (I), now called the Congress party, was in power as the ruling party in India. However, for anyone cognizant of the Hindu revivalist background and rhetoric upheld by the BJP (although such rhetoric is currently greatly moderated for electoral purposes), its support to nominate Kalam—a Muslim—as the president of India does not quite fit the picture.² His nomination became all the more noteworthy when the *Doordarshan* (All India Television Network) as well as other media reports forwarded comments made by BJP politicians and activists saying, "Kalam is a person better versed in the *Bhagavad Gita* than a Hindu and who plays the *rudra veena* (a musical instrument sacred to the Hindu culture) better than a Hindu."³ In the phrase coined by Murli Manohar Joshi, who currently heads the Ministry of Science and Technology in India, "Kalam has never been considered a Muslim."⁴ Although several representatives from the Islamic community in India have expressed the secular sentiment, "...whether he reads the *Quran* or the *Gita* is for him to decide...(and) should not be dragged into public life...,"⁵ the BJP's support to nominate an apparently Muslim but nonreligious person who also happens to be a nuclear scientist and therefore a nonpolitical person into the presidency raises concern.

Should one assume that the BJP nominated Kalam because of his achievements at the Indian Space Research Organization or, because the BJP, following the government-sanctioned anti-Muslim carnage at Gujarat in April 2002,⁶ simply wanted to placate Muslims as a gesture towards the latter's security?⁷ Was the nomination of Kalam a political strategy adopted by the BJP to project an apparently benign and secular posture (thus consolidating its support as an electoral and social force in India) while more covertly carving out a space for supporting a communalist-nationalist agenda? Given that the Muslim threat becomes the ideological locus through which the BJP attempts to rebuild a Hindu nationalist India, does the nomination of Kalam signify at a more interpretive level a complex interrelation between ideology, religious nationalism, security, and politics? If so, what could be some of the implications of this Hindu nationalism vis-à-vis Islamic Pakistan and India's national and regional security concerns?

Of particular interest in this article are the roles of the contemporary Hindu right government in India and religious

nationalism, expressed here as Hindutva, in shaping the contemporary nuclear security problematic of India. In investigating this link, I raise the following questions: Does the recent rise of Hindu nationalism in India conflate the multicultural and secular nation of India into a monolithic Hindu nationalist identity? Does this conflation signify a conceptual merger of Hindu nationalism with the Indian state, nation, and the secular Indian nationalism? If so, what implications may this conceptual merger have on constructing Pakistan as a security threat, Other, to the supposedly Hindu India? Does it re-enforce a state-centric version of security as opposed to a people-centric view of security? Does it re-enforce Othering along communal and gender lines in terms of India's national and regional security concerns? At a broader level, if theorizing in international relations (IR) and policy implications in international security studies seek to move towards conflict resolution, then should the role of ideology in the form of religious nationalism/communalism that constructs insecurity "scapes/imaginaries," through a discursive process of Othering, be deconstructed? Finally, is it important to go beyond the observable geostrategic factors (that are so emphasized by conventional IR theorists) and delve into more intrinsic factors, such as the role of ideology, that may shape security discourses in IR?

This article represents an analytical hybrid of the critical constructivist approach as its theoretical framework and the concept of postcolonial insecurity for an interpretation of politics to re-read the role of ideology in defining the interrelations between security, gender, and politics in IR. I focus on the tensions between the realist and antinuclear groups in India as a case study to explore how the recent rise of a Hindu nationalist ideology in India, expressed as Hindutva, which primarily hinges on a Hindu-Muslim axis, may be utilized by the contemporary Indian right government to justify India's nuclearization policies. In exploring this link, this study is cognizant that conventional IR, namely realism and neorealism, have been and continue to be the dominant theoretical approach to the study of security in international relations. Further, conventional IR along with the feminists and the post-genre-scholars have also addressed the role of ideology (although the post-genre scholarship has different implications in this context). Nonetheless, I argue that the foundational ontology of these approaches, namely that of realism and neorealism, and to a certain extent that of feminism, in defining ideology have produced interpretations confined largely within the parameters of Western academia thereby revealing the epistemological inability of these approaches to read ideology from a more critical and interpretive angle. This article therefore addresses the limitations of conventional IR

through the more critical/interpretive angles of critical constructivism to explore how the interplay of religious nationalism/communalism as more intrinsic factors may guide contemporary India's nuclearization policies. It is suggested that the BJP's nationalist agenda, based on Hindutva, not only constructs an "internal" Othering vis-a-vis Islam/Pakistan thereby justifying India's nuclearization policies, but also represents a cultural rhetoric of masculinization vis-a-vis gender. The contribution of this article lies in appending the realist and the neorealist approaches to the critical constructivist perspective to understand the dynamics of contention between the realist and antinuclear groups in India and its subsequent implications on India's national security agenda—a hitherto uninvestigated area. The article suggests that the two groups broaden their interpretation of India's security paradigm from a traditional Westphalian to a more people-centric view of security, thereby contributing towards the stability of India's national and subsequently the South Asian regional security.

Security in International Relations

Classical realism stands for a pattern of political thought where real politics is defined in terms of military power. Shaped by the interests and ideals of Enlightenment and deeply involved in the global elaboration of Western reason, masculinity, and rationality, the normative conceptualization of the world order represented by the realists upholds the imaginary of state-centric, militaristic, and power-centric IR. In keeping with the Hobbesian assumption of the state of nature—where life is short, nasty, and brutal—recourse to self-help to protect a state's national security interest is seen by the realists as the most pragmatic strategy to be followed by the nation-states.⁸ According to Hans J. Morgenthau,

...since international politics is a process in which national interests are accommodated or resolved on the basis of diplomacy or war...maintaining national interest or power through military strength should become the ultimate objective of nations seeking to survive in an anarchical world of realpolitik.⁹

Apart from realism, neorealism has also been an influential approach in explaining security issues in IR. Kenneth Waltz, a prominent neorealist scholar, has tried to enrich realism conceptually by focusing on the international order/structure as the unit of analysis that shapes and is also shaped by the state. Besides, the neorealists, unlike the realists, expand the notion of power to mean not an end in itself, but rather the means to achieve an end in IR, that is security.¹⁰ Nonetheless, neorealism has been no less pre-disposed towards conceptualizing security through the lenses of state-centrism. As Robert Gilpin writes, "...the final arbitrator of things political is power."¹¹

To a great extent, the neoliberals constituted a departure from the traditional concepts of security as represented by realism and neorealism. Their recognition of multiple actors, multiple channels of communication, and multiple issues—not hierarchically arranged as highlighted by the realists—constituted a shift of emphasis from high (military) to low (nonmilitary) politics in IR.¹² Also, unlike the realist assumption of international anarchy, the neoliberal scholars saw states locked in interdependence, sensitivity, and vulnerability with regimes enhancing the possibility of interstate coopera-

tion. Nonetheless, state-centric as they were, security came to be conceptualized by the neoliberals as well through the lenses of a rational, self-seeking, and individualistic male/state. According to the prominent neoliberal, Robert O. Keohane,

...states are egoistic, rational actors operating on the basis of their own self conceptions of self-interest. Institutions are necessary only on those restrictive premises in order to achieve *state* purposes.¹³

Thus, conventional IR has focused on a state-centric, power-oriented, and militaristic discourse of security in IR. With its focus on power, politics, and anarchy as fixed—conventional IR reads narrowly into the role of ideology as manifested in the concepts of state, national interest, and nationalism. Neither does it pay attention to the ways in which anarchy/ insecurity may be constructed or how the roles of ideology, culture, history, or state practices themselves may produce anarchy in IR.

Feminist scholars in IR have shown the ways in which both conventional IR and its studies have been built as a complex of gendered practices.¹⁴ Thus, feminist IR has helped unsettle the gendered foundations of mainstream international relations and introduced gender into the analysis of key constructs in IR such as the state, sovereignty, security, and nationalism. However, the ontological commitments of feminist IR embedded within a First World feminism remain restricted in critiquing the constructs of conventional IR as representing the perspectives of a rational, self-seeking, and individualistic male. Thus, other than deconstructing the gendered nature of conventional IR and the invisibility of women in it, feminist revisions of security remain limited in developing only a gender-sensitive theory, but not a culturally-sensitive, feminist view that is capable of representing (in)security of Third World women in IR. A postcolonial feminist approach, situated within the broader parameters of the postcolonial approach, represents the perspectives of Third World women in their culturally specific contexts.¹⁵

Postcolonial scholars such as Edward Said and V.Y. Mudimbe have carried out a broad-based attack on the essentialism, foundationalism, universal rationality, and epistemological hegemony of the knowing subject that has defined conventional IR.¹⁶ They have been more radical than any of the preceding IR approaches in challenging the role of a Eurocentric ideology that constructs an Othering of the non-West in the field of knowledge production. However, there still remains an ambiguity among this group of scholars. In failing to address the issues of security in IR *per se*, the postcolonial scholars, other than Randolph Persaud, who addresses representational issues of race in the US immigration/foreign policy discourse,¹⁷ have failed to show through more critical lenses how the significance of identity construction may guide foreign policy discourses in IR.

The critical constructivists address the above concern. Problematizing the conventional assumption that IR is in a state of perpetual anarchy, the critical constructivists instead view security as what David Campbell calls "representations of danger."¹⁸ For the critical constructivists, objects of insecurity and insecurities are not ontologically separate things. Rather, they are mutually constituted in a variety of ways that may privilege a certain conception of identity over others.

Operating within a framework of meanings, assumptions, and distinctive social identities, the representation of the Other, their identities and what constitutes insecurity "scapes/imaginaries" are left open to the dynamics of interpretation, whereby relations of identity may also be produced, enforced, and reified in a conflictual manner.¹⁹ Further, construction of identities influencing security dynamics may not simply be confined to rigid interstate dynamics, but may also be mediated by a "complex network of social relations, cultural traditions, and political structures..." involving state security elites themselves.²⁰ Thus, critical constructivists assume that all social (in) securities are culturally produced.²¹ Critical to the concept of postcolonial insecurity is what Sankaran Krishna calls postcolonial "anxiety," defined as an ideological drive of postcolonial state leaders to achieve successfully the "modern enterprise of nation-building."²² Central to the metaphor of creating a nation as something "ever in the making but never quite reached," is the idea of nationalism.²³ It involves what Derrida calls the act of "*différence*." This act situates a postcolonial state at "the dangerous interstice of the domestic and the foreign" and simultaneously utilizes the "discursive hegemony of nationalism" to secure space for autonomous action by their state leaders—sometimes by subordinating the needs of a civil society—to fulfill their historical pursuit of nation building.²⁴ Because the formation of a nationalist identity is in conflict with the politics of difference, there is an attempt on the part of the post-colonial state leaders to construct nation-states on the basis of "exclusionary narratives" of the past and "uni-vocal visions" of the future. Any divisiveness in providing support to the postcolonial state leaders in performing this historic role is perceived to delay the national journey.²⁵

In his study of the Tamil-Sinhala ethnic conflict, Krishna explicates how the postcolonial Sri Lankan state's ideology to achieve the modern enterprise of nation-building (i.e., a unified Sri Lankan state) has led the state to construct the identity of the Tamil ethnic minorities vis-a-vis itself by forming categories, such as "insider-outsider," "safety-danger," "domestic-foreign," which juxtaposes the Tamil ethnic minorities as Other against the Sinhala-dominated Sri Lankan population, thereby rendering "a politics of identity formation through a discursive process of Othering."²⁶ This Othering, usually manifested along religious, linguistic, and ethnic divisions in relational terms with those culturally dominant, creates a hierarchy of belonging within the nation by empowering some while marginalizing others. This parallels the Orientalist discourse of Othering the non-West. As Krishna explains, "The fixation with producing a pulverized and uniform sense of national identity (usually along majoritarian lines) has unleashed a spiral of state...violence...that appears endless."²⁷ In this article, I utilize the critical constructivist perspective, albeit not given mainstream status in the discipline of IR, to explore how the interplay of religious nationalism/ communalism as more intrinsic ideological factors may guide contemporary Indian nuclearization policies. In exploring this link it is important to take the world as it is. Thus, the article accepts the realist claim that India has and continues to face "real" geostrategic threats directly from China and Pakistan and indirectly from the US. It is also not unusual that states will pursue nuclear weapons for their national security (although it may be highly questionable whether nuclear

weapons serve as the best guarantor of security). This article will therefore not address this aspect of the debate. The phenomenon that this article seeks to explain is how these "real" geostrategic threats to India may be perpetuated by the Indian right along communal lines, by reconstructing certain forms of postcolonial insecurities through a discursive legitimization of Islam/Pakistan as a demonic Other to the supposedly virtuous Hindu India. Additionally, it explores how certain communal underpinnings of Indian nuclearization policies, sustained by Hindutva, may discursively legitimize male/state domination over Indian women and Othering among women. Thus, what is new and unusual in the context of India is "how" under the Indian right threats to national security are calculated with implications of a cultural masculinity (that such constructions of national security may bear) on gender. The theoretical contribution of this article lies in offering a more interpretive set of explanations to understand an ongoing ideological phenomenon in India that I suggest calculates the country's national security, that cannot be comprehended by the structural parameters of conventional IR.

Historic Background and Geostrategic Consideration

The history of nuclear proliferation is a strategic chain reaction based on the realist logic of threat perception, spun off by an initial threat perception. As Scott D. Sagan claims, "every time one state develops nuclear weapons to balance against its rival, it creates a nuclear threat to another state in the region, which then must secure its nuclear program to maintain its own national security interests."²⁸ Seen from this perspective, certain geostrategic threats faced by India from its immediate regional rivals, China and Pakistan, and the indirect global hegemony, the US, account for India's decision to detonate. According to the realist logic, India has been one of the main sponsors of nonproliferation since the early 1950s. It was the first to call for a test ban on nuclear testing in 1954, for a non-discriminatory treaty on non-proliferation in 1965, for a treaty on the non-use of nuclear weapons in 1978, a nuclear freeze in 1982, and a phased program of complete elimination of nuclear weapons in 1988. India even maintained a posture of nuclear ambiguity till 1998. However, following China's acquisition of nuclear power, alleged Sino-Pakistani nuclear transactions, and a special American tilt towards China and Pakistan—representing a Washington-Beijing-Pindi nexus in India's vicinity—it became imperative for India to redefine its nuclear security parameters. Categories developed hereby reflect an interplay of the realist and the neorealist perceptions on the basis of which India's realist lobby justifies India's nuclear detonation and its subsequent nuclear deterrence.

The demise in the 1990s of the Soviet Union, which had provided India with military and nuclear technological assistance and thus a military counterweight against China and Pakistan, left New Delhi feeling isolated. With uneasy relations with the surviving super power, the US, India started experiencing a sense of perennial strategic insecurity because of certain regional developments. This came from the individual nuclear and military build-up of Pakistan and China as well as China's encirclement of India through its military alliance with Pakistan. Efforts to this end included the transfer of nuclear and missile-related technology from China to Pakistan, aiding Pakistan to acquire missile and fissile components, providing it with M-9 and M-11 ballistic missiles, and so

forth.²⁹ As asserted by the CIA, China sold 5000 ring magnets to the Q.A Khan Research Laboratory in Kahuta, Pakistan in 1995. Further, Indian intelligence sources believed that China was supplying technicians and equipment for a plutonium processing plant at Chasma, Pakistan.³⁰ Despite Chinese efforts to justify its military links with Pakistan as a part of normal trade relations, India remained unconvinced and was left with a feeling of encirclement.

Besides the alleged Sino-Pakistani ties, there were reports of nuclear developments within Pakistan itself. Pakistan's unremitting concern for the last five decades has been to correct the imbalance of power in South Asia, especially with reference to India, proved by internal and external balancing adopted by Pakistan as a counter-strategy to India. Since the 1960s, Pakistan's defense budget representing its internal balancing strategies vis-a-vis India has remained at a high of six percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in comparison with India's three percent. Pakistan's external balancing efforts were mainly focused on establishing alliances with the US and China, with a primary focus on the US. The Mutual Defense Assistance Treaties (1954 and 1959) which Pakistan signed with the US, receiving \$522 million in military hardware and other defense supports, was an early initiative to counter India.³¹ US-Pakistani military engagements continued in the 1980s, when the emergence of Pakistan as a frontline state in the aftermath of the Soviet entry into Afghanistan necessitated a strategic compulsion on the part of the US to appease Pakistan. In 1981 and 1986, aid packages of \$3.2 and \$4.02 billion were approved by the US administration to Pakistan.³² Transfer of American surveillance aircrafts and anti-ship missiles to Pakistan continued in the 1990s. Disregarding Pakistan's nuclear inclination, in 1996 under the Hankbrown Amendment Act, the US confirmed the passage of American arms worth \$368 million to Pakistan.³³ Such US aid helped Pakistan to compensate for India's qualitative military superiority, which appeared ominous to India in view of the fact that relations between the two traditional adversaries had both historically and more recently not been very cordial.³⁴

Against this backdrop India continued to watch with trepidation as China's power and international clout continued to grow enormously since the 1960s. Ever since China's detonation in 1964 China's modernization program had been in full swing. The program included the acquisition of modern fighters, submarine destroyers, sophisticated air defense missiles, airborne warning and control systems aircraft (AWACS), and so forth. Further, with China's emphasis on acquiring tactical nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles submarines, (SSBNS) the gap between China and India widened.³⁵ Further, China's latest nuclear explosion of a thermonuclear magnitude of 6.6 at its Lap Nor test site could not be ignored by India.³⁶ Indeed, India's defense policy analysts argue that China is also an important concern in determining India's nuclear policy.

Equally oppressive to India was the special American tilt towards Pakistan and China implying a tripartite (Asian) regional coalition against India. Apart from the US-imposed sanctions on China in 1993, which temporarily halted the Chinese transfer of M-11-related technology to Pakistan, the Clinton administration, which aimed to put nonproliferation at the top of the US foreign policy agenda, was silent over Sino-Pakistan nuclear and missile cooperation. From 1995

onwards, the US administration had strong evidence of Chinese shipments of complete M-11 missiles to Pakistan but ignored the fact to avoid triggering sanctions. Although most American intelligence officials believed that more than thirty complete missiles were stockpiled at Pakistan's Sargodha Air Force Base since November 1992, the US took the view that China had supplied only components rather than complete missiles to Pakistan.³⁷ To be noted here is the fact that the shipment of complete M-11 missiles was an outright violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).³⁸ Also, beyond acquiescing to the Sino-Pakistani nuclear and missile cooperation, the US actually stepped in to approve the first export of satellite and advanced nuclear technology to China. By aiding China's modernization, the US heightened the paranoia within India that the American nuclear and missile technology that went to China would also seep into Pakistan.³⁹ Equally disturbing to India was the fact that instead of rebuking China, the US was actually embracing an alliance with China, which entailed the potential for a Sino-US nexus in Asia. Confronted with this possibility, India had two options: either forswear nuclear power in return for protection by an extended US deterrence as granted to Japan and Australia, or exercise its nuclear option. Given an historical preference for pursuing an independent foreign policy and its past experience of being refused an extended deterrence by the US,⁴⁰ the second option seemed more logical to India. According to the ex-Indian Army Staff General V. P. Malik, "the situation called for acquiring a strategic deterrence capability for India to encounter the emerging nuclear and missile challenges to India's security."⁴¹ This article accepts the realist claim that India does face "real" geo-strategic threats. Nonetheless, this study merits attention to append the realist logic with a critical constructivist perspective to analyze how these geostrategic threats perceived by India vis-a-vis its adversary Pakistan gets perpetuated in terms of certain postcolonial insecurity imaginaries reconstructed by the BJP through the lens of Hindutva. In seeking to analyze the construction of postcolonial insecurities and its implications vis-a-vis the Indian nuclear policy, this article accepts the following premises: First, that in post-independent India the decision to create a nuclear infrastructure and acquire nuclear weapons capability (which was in fact achieved in 1974) was undertaken by the Congress government. Second, that the threats posed to India by China and Pakistan were/ are "real." Pakistan has fought two wars against India and since the 1980s has sought to follow an India-centric defense economy. So is it with China, which, backed by the US since 1959, has sought to develop a Washington-Beijing-Pindi nexus in South Asia. Third, it is also true that although the actual Indian detonation was conducted by the BJP in 1998, the country had been within a hair-breadth of conducting the same test in 1995, when, interestingly, the Congress party under the prime ministership of Narasimha Rao was in power.⁴² This article, therefore, accepts that India's decision to acquire nuclear weapons is not a function that may be associated only and specifically with the BJP. The Indian right's decision to pursue nuclear weapons capability is, in a way, a continuation of similar nuclear options considered earlier, though not tested by prior Indian governments. Furthermore, like the earlier governments, the BJP's decision to detonate was also a function of the country's "real" geostrategic and national security calculations. What conven-

tional IR cannot comprehend, however, are those unobservable factors; hence a nonconventional type of explanation may account for more intrinsic variables in explaining the contemporary nuclear security problematic in India. Seen from this perspective, this article finds the critical constructivist perspective, although at the margins of mainstream IR, pragmatic in appraising the role of ideology in understanding the complexities of India's contemporary nuclear security dilemma.

In the following section, I explore through an interpretive analysis the BJP government's approach to Indian nuclearization. I suggest that the use of a Hindu nationalist ideology to construct Islam/Pakistan as a stereotypical danger to the supposedly Hindu India, may also become an important variable in explaining security discourses in IR.

Hindutva: A Gendered Perspective

The rise of the BJP as the national government of India since 1998 represents the revival of a Hindu nationalism in India, the origins of which can be traced to the Indian nationalist struggle for independence in early nineteenth-century India.⁴³ Addressing an exclusively Hindu audience, the early Hindu revivalists identified the British and the Muslim rulers as disrupting the blissful Hindu life and provided the intellectual justifications for reconstructing the classic roots of the Hindu civilization in India. Militant in their ideology, the revivalists, represented an ethno-nationalist/ Hindu concept of nationhood in India and more often than not interpreted *dharma* (an ancient code of life emphasized in the *Rig Veda* that upholds stability of society, the maintenance of social order, and the general well-being and progress of society) to substitute the larger Hindu nation as the primary group identification for India.⁴⁴ The recent rise of the BJP represents the most logical outcome of the contemporary Hindu revivalism in India. In this section, I explore how the BJP's attempt at reconstructing a Hindu *rashtra* (state) or *punyabhoomi* (holy land), on the basis of Hindutva, not only represents a nationalist/communalist agenda, but also gets linked to the discursive legitimization of India's nuclear agenda. I argue that the BJP representing the most dominant segment of India's realist lobby, not only justifies India's detonation on the grounds of certain historical and contemporary geostrategic threats, but also continues to build strong support for India's nuclear deterrence by reconstructing certain postcolonial insecurities perceived by contemporary India. Thus, the BJP goes beyond the traditional logic of realism to define India's geostrategic threats and further politicizes the ideology of Hindutva to accentuate such threats.

Hindutva, what the BJP has called cultural/ Hindu nationalism, and what the anticommunalists see as a clarion call for establishing a Hindu India, rose into prominence in the writings of Veer Savarkar. Identified as one of the architects of the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak (RSS), Savarkar defined the boundaries of Hindutva in a rather communal manner and further circumscribed its usage in defining the parameters of a modern India. *Pitrabhoomi* (Fatherland), *jati* (bloodline), and *sanskriti* (culture) were identified as the three principles of Hindutva, of which *jati* became the most critical in establishing the basis of communalism in modern India.⁴⁵ This is because the concept implied that only those whose sacred land (sacred to their religion) lay within their fatherland (India) actually had the moral basis for claiming citizenship of India,

thereby privileging a cultural/religious rather than a territorial concept of Indian citizenship, which subsequently became the basis of cultural nationalism in India.⁴⁶ Under it, "Muslims, Christians, Jews, and others whose holy lands lay outside the territorial boundaries of *punyabhoomi* (India) were by implication excluded from both Hindutva and from their citizenship of the fatherland India... The 'insiders' or those who are able to equate their land of birth with the sacred land of their religion are 'appropriate citizens', where as the 'outsiders' or those whose Fatherland is not the same as their sacred lands are suspect in terms of their civic status and patriotism."⁴⁷

Such communal sentiments are echoed in the writings and campaigns of the BJP, which sees Hindutva as a unifying force that will create a national identity and ensure social cohesion for India. A prominent espousal of this ideological/communal bias in building a nationalist India is visible in the BJP's Election Manifesto (1996). In the introduction, which spelled out the "vision, faith, and commitment" of the BJP, the Manifesto declared: "The present millennium begun with the subjugation of our ancient land. Let a re-invigorated, proud, and prosperous India herald the next millennium."⁴⁸ It ended with an appeal to all patriotic Indians to assist the BJP in the task of reconstructing a nationalist Hindu *rashtra* (nation). More communal in implication is the section in the 1996 Manifesto entitled "Indian Immigration: A Democratic Invasion," which construed the Muslim immigrant refugees of Bangladesh as democratic threats to India unlike the Buddhist immigrant refugees to India from the Chakma district of Bangladesh. By the same token, the BJP's adoption of the "justice for all and appeasement for none" policy is motivated by the communal goal to restore a sense of Indianness within the Hindu *rashtra*, perceived to have been ruptured by the pseudosecularism of the Nehruvian legacy. According to the BJP President, L. K. Advani,

Democracy and liberalism as preached by Nehru are denounced of their Indianness.... I believe that India is what it is because of its ancient heritage—call it Hindu, or call it *Bharatiya* (India). If nationalism is stripped off its Hinduism, it would lose its dynamism.⁴⁹

However, the BJP specifies that the concept of Hindutva as the underlying basis of a Hindu *rashtra* does not mean religion. Rather, it means a pan-Indian identity. Similarly, in a recent decision given by the Supreme Court of India, *dharma*, which is now called Hindutva, "is not a religion but a way of life..."⁵⁰ Yet, the success of the BJP in establishing the discourse of Hindutva as the nationalist identity of India forces one to use the terms Hindutva, Hinduism, and the Indian national identity synonymously. Perhaps the most recent illustration of this is the assurance given by the then chief minister of the state of Maharashtra Murlī Manohar Joshi that he would declare Maharashtra a Hindu state if the BJP ally Shiv Sena were voted to power in the 1995 State Assembly Elections of Maharashtra. Not only are these gestures devoid of any secular identity, but they are also ominous in their obliteration of the non-Hindus from the framework of the Indian nationalist identity. In the communal rhetoric of the BJP, patriots and traitors continue to be defined in terms of their religious affiliations. Following are some illustrations to suggest such constructions on the basis of religious identity: An early architect of the RSS, K. B. Hedgewar, claims that "Indian Muslims have proved themselves Muslims first

and Indians secondarily...."⁵¹ Similarly, a VHP woman member, Sadhvi Rithambara, supports the Hindus in the Ram Janmbhoomi-Babri Masjid Riots of 1992 as "a fight for the preservation of a civilization, for an Indianness, for national consciousness...."⁵² and BJP spokeswomen, Sushma Swaraj, suspects alleged treachery on the part of the Muslims against India because the former "rooted for Pakistan during the two Indo-Pakistan wars...."⁵³ The BJP claims that its nationalism is based on "one nation, one people, one culture." Thus the concept of *Hindu rashtra* becomes virtually essential to Hinduism as the dominant religion in India. Muslims are constructed as "invaders and foreign transplants."⁵⁴

The portrayal of the Muslims as inherently violent is historically incorrect. It rests on the "fallacious" assumption that the Hindu and Muslim identities are monolithic and homogenous.⁵⁵ Equally erroneous is the depiction of the Hindus and Hinduism as inherently nonviolent. Islam in India is as old as it is in Turkey. Further in Indian history and culture, Islam has deep roots and represents its characteristic capacity to adopt to its environment.⁵⁶ Yet, the idea that Islam is foreign to India is axiomatic among the BJP nationalists. This article suggests that the ideology of Hindutva, resting on the historical and religious reconstructions of the Hindu and the Muslim communities on the basis of communal identities, may be manipulated by the BJP to mobilize upper and recently lower caste Hindus to support a dominant Hindu nationalist agenda—representing a Hindu India as opposed to the demonizing, Muslim Pakistan. This ideologically constructed dichotomy between the Hindu/Self and the Muslim/Other, collective or otherwise, may be utilized by the BJP to reconstruct and sustain certain postcolonial insecurities by stereotyping Islam/Pakistan as a danger to India. This assumption is further substantiated by the fact that despite the BJP's identification of both Pakistan and China as external threats to India, its perception towards China, unlike Pakistan, is not colored by a communal hue, evidenced in one of the resolutions passed by the Bharatiya Jana Sangh in 1965, an ideological predecessor of the BJP, by the culturally biased comment:

Religious and cultural links have played an abiding role in the relations between nations. Cultural links are more abiding and lasting than the economic and political pacts, which are made from time to time to meet particular situations. *It is therefore imperative that India must be clear about the area of her cultural affinities and take all possible steps to revive and strengthen her cultural ties....*⁵⁷

The implications of the above quote when situated in the context of India's contemporary nuclear policy and its suggested implications becomes all the more controversial because the present Prime Minister of India, Shri Atal Vohari Vajpayee, happened to be the then leader of the Jana Sangh parliamentary party from 1957-1977. Although the BJP in its more moderate and humanistic guise has made deliberate efforts to distance itself from the extreme Hindu nationalism, the historical links of the BJP to the RSS and Jana Sangh and the depth of its commitment to Hindu fundamentalist rhetoric can hardly be minimized. As claimed by Tathagatha Roy, vice-president of the West Bengal BJP's State Working Committee "the very existence of Pakistan rests on nurturing the destruction of India." Similar comments ridden with communal/ anti-Pakistani sentiments were expressed by the West

Bengal State Secretariat members/ executives of the BJP, namely Hemen Guha Roy and Ashim Sarkar, as well as female politicians of the BJP *Mobila Morcha* (Women's Wing) such as Gouri Chowdhry, Krishna Bhattacharya, Rita Mukherjee, and Neela Goswami.⁵⁸

This article also assumes that communal ideologies interweave gender into the (re)writing of communal histories to serve national identities. The following are a few examples to suggest the gendered as well as the communal underpinnings of the Sangh Parivaar's discourse, with Islam being depicted in inherently violent ways: First, in the Sangh Parivaar's narrative the Muslim male is depicted as a threat to the honor of the Hindu women (especially, the specter of Hindu women repeatedly raped and threatened by Muslim men); second, Muslims are depicted as a demographic threat to India; and finally, the pathetic state of the Muslim women articulated as a consequence of their immutable oppression by Muslim men is subsequently condoned by the Nehruvian politics of appeasement.⁵⁹ In contrast, peace loving and humble as they are, rape and violence by Hindu men are discounted as aberrations and rare acts of weakness. The BJP's discourse concerning the formulation and implementation of a Universal Civil Code (UCC) is a more recent illustration of how it utilizes the issues of gender justice to reconstitute the identity of the Hindu community against the Muslim community.⁶⁰ Critical of the move made by the Rajiv Gandhi government following the Shah Bano case to introduce and support a Muslim women's bill in the Indian parliament, which would hinder progress on a universal civil code for the citizens of the country, the BJP, in seeking to implement a UCC, has conferred a semblance of equal rights in terms of marriage, property, and divorce to women in India.⁶¹ However, what goes unnoticed in this whole schema of providing gender justice via a UCC is the singling out of the Muslim community and raising of questions about the latter's patriotism in achieving India's national integration. A Delhi-based BJP observer expresses the following concern:

While the Hindus along with the Sikhs, Buddhists, and Jains have supported the cause of national integration, some other communities (who reside in India and still believe in the two-nation theory) do not support (though the Constitution enjoins) the establishment of a UCC for the whole of India.... In contrast, we (meaning the Hindu right/BJP) aim at achieving a UCC that will help in the cause of national integration by removing disparate loyalties to personal laws.⁶²

Representing the Muslims as a backward community opposed to the formulation of a UCC is not born out of reality.⁶³ Yet, the debate over a UCC has enabled the Hindu right to create a discourse of "uncivil" Muslim practices to undermine the Muslim culture, contrast the privileged Hindu women against the inferior Muslim women, and finally, uphold a dualistic juxtaposition of the Hindu and the Muslim communities—where the Hindu men/community are portrayed as models for the backward Muslim men /community. However, what remains camouflaged in the BJP's progressive and liberal efforts at providing gender justice through a UCC is its acceptance of Hindu family law, thereby positioning Hindu women as *pativrata* (obedient Hindu wives, who enjoy certain rights, privileges, and securities as long as they stay within the limits prescribed by their husbands) vis-a-vis the

Hindu male/community.

In this article, I suggest that the patriarchal and communal underpinnings of the Hindu right's nationalist agenda, sustained by Hindutva, may also shape a masculinist bias in India's nuclearization policy. A communal version of masculinity undergirding the Hindu right's communal agenda is based on the fictitious assumption that "Hindu men can do no wrong to women...whether Hindu or Muslim by religion."⁶⁴ The BJP's efforts at formulating a UCC with gendered and communal implications as discussed earlier is a case in point. Legitimizing a Hindu/Brahmanical image of Indian women through the UCC not only constitutes a reformulation of patriarchy vis-a-vis the Hindu women in India, but is also communal in externalizing the Islamic community, especially its men, as a danger to India. It provides the Hindu right with a space to discursively utilize the image of Hindu women as an authentic tradition of India, to establish Islam as an outsider/ threat to India, and bestow upon the Indian state as a patriarchal institution the task of protecting the rights and status of women in India. According to the opinions expressed by several BJP politicians, the Indian nuclearization is justified not only to protect (the Hindu) India, but also (the Hindu) women who constitute an important segment of the Hindu culture as *snehamoyee patni/mata* (nurturing wives and mothers).⁶⁵ Interestingly, some women politicians of the BJP too have provided communal and gendered justifications for Indian nuclearization. Claiming that "violence is in Muslim blood," Rita Mukherjee, General Secretary of the *Mohila Morcha* (Women's Wing) of the West Bengal BJP's State Working Committee, justified India's nuclearization as "a necessary defense strategy to protect India from Pakistan." However, according to her, "protecting Hindu women as an authentic tradition of the Indian/Hindu culture, also becomes an integral part of this security agenda." Mukherjee underscores her comment by citing examples from the history of the Indo-Pakistan partition where "Hindu women have been subject to the lust and violence of *only Muslim men and not* from any other community."⁶⁶ Emphasizing the danger faced by (the Hindu) India and (Hindu) women from (the Islamic) Pakistan not only enables the Hindu right to obfuscate many of the structural locations of injustice faced by women from within the Hindu male/community itself, but has also enabled it to utilize a discursive legitimization of women as *nari shakti* (women power), as traditional pillars of the Hindu/Indian family and society, to support its nationalist as well as the nuclear agenda. This fosters militaristic and communal Othering between national (in this case between India and Pakistan) and gender identities, as well as within the category of women themselves. The latter is evidenced in the communally violent speeches made by the most outspoken women ideologues of the BJP, Uma Bharati and Sadhvi Rithambara, in addressing the complicity of the Muslim women in the gang rape of Hindu women during the partition of India.⁶⁷ Interestingly, these female ideologues of the BJP, like their male counterparts, have served as powerful orators of Hindutva in communalizing danger.

Thus, Hindutva is not only used by the BJP to serve as a cultural marker in Othering Islam, but also signifies the celebration of a Hindu/cultural masculinity in discursively utilizing feminism to serve its nationalist/ communalist, and subsequently its nuclear agenda. This form of masculinity

underlying the BJP's nationalist project and by implication its nuclear agenda, is different from the Western feminists' construct of a rationalist, self-seeking, and individualistic male. It is specific to the norms of cultural nationalism, projected by Hindutva, thereby making the implications of Indian nuclearization not simply an issue of masculinity, but a matter of cultural sensitivity experienced by women in this particular context.⁶⁸

In highlighting the linkage between the BJP's nationalist ideology and Indian nuclearization, this study is cognizant that Pakistan was created out of a two-nation theory. Since then, it has been an autocratic state and has pursued an anti-Indian policy. Thus, Pakistan itself has historically constructed India as a demonizing Other. What this article draws attention to is how the BJP is utilizing this historical demonization to support its concept of Hindu *rashtra*, reinforcing it by adding a communal hue to the country's nuclearization policy. In this context, I reiterate that both Pakistan and China have been historically contentious neighbors of India, and from that perspective the realist logic in explaining the Indian detonation is well accepted. However, despite several concerns from strategic analysts regarding the "true/ominous" intentions of Pakistan against India, especially since the 1980s, India did not experience any immediate escalation of threats from Pakistan in the eve of its 1998 detonation. Besides, Sino-Indian relations had improved in the 1990s through bilateral agreements, confidence building measures, etc.⁶⁹ The immediate but non-militant threat that India had faced during the eve of its detonation was from its own militant and chauvinist ideology, which linked communalism with nationalism to "calculate" the nation's geostrategic security, thereby making the 1998 detonation one of a *post-facto* exercise of power. Viewed from this perspective, the BJP's perception of India's national security does not constitute a faulty or unjustifiably expanded set of ideological convictions. Rather, it represents a conscious effort that utilizes communalism to serve the purposes of nationalism and thus in some sense a realist measure, one of state-craft redesigned for electoral purposes, to justify the rationales of a nuclear India—which are now reinforced along communal lines. Is it then valid to go beyond a structuralist explanation and claim that the BJP guided by its communal ideology has utilized Hindutva to single out Islam/Pakistan as a relatively greater threat to India?

This study acknowledges that currently the communal rhetoric of the BJP has been moderated to great extent for electoral reasons. Yet, given the historical, ideological, and alleged contemporary linkages between the BJP and the RSS, the underpinning of communalism within the BJP cannot be minimized. In this context, one may argue that the so-called secular governments of India were also to a certain extent communal and have also used class, caste, and gender for electoral politics.⁷⁰ This argument is well taken. This study is also cognizant that in India, as in any other country, elite perceptions/ ideologies have historically played an important role in defining national security and that the psychological theories in IR., although with limitations when applied to study the postcolonial security dynamics in India, have addressed it as well.⁷¹ However, what this article draws attention to is the more explicit discourse evidenced within the BJP that not only conflates the Indian nationalism with Hindu communalism, but also manipulates/ politicizes Hindutva to justify the

launching of India's nuclear program, and further mobilize it as a "Hindu" defense strategy to protect India by stereotyping Islam/Pakistan as an enemy of India. Thus, what is unique in the context of the Indian right is its underlying communal posture vis-a-vis Pakistan, which may well serve as an ideological indicator in calculating the parameters of India's nuclearization policies.

It may be noted here that although India did acquire nuclear capability in 1974, it had retained a high moral ground and had opted to keep its nuclear option open and not escalate. Moreover, India's policy of nuclear ambiguity until before the 1998 detonation was also supported by almost the entire spectrum in the country. However, the BJP took recourse to the policy of nuclear ambiguity as well as the national consensus that had opposed India from signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to change India's nuclear posture. The 1998 nuclear tests were not only emblematic of the jingoistic BJP's quest for a more virile and a culturally chauvinist India, but also intended to consolidate its electoral agenda.⁷² In doing so, it has also successfully roped communalism and gender in a much larger degree than any prior Indian government to suit its nationalist and nuclear agenda. However, the BJP has also successfully managed to win over security analysts, who, quite ambiguous or even reluctant to address issues of communalism under contemporary Indian politics, support the BJP's nuclear policy because of their realist understanding of world politics.⁷³ From their perspective, the Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) released by the National Security Council of India under the BJP government in 1999 is justified.⁷⁴ Should we then claim that the Hindu bomb detonated by the BJP was made to serve both as a strategic rationale as well as add a religious grandeur to the supposedly Hindu India?

Although as part of its DND India promises "no first use" against nuclear weapons states and "no use" against non-nuclear weapon states, except when the latter is aligned with nuclear weapon states, the very option of pursuing a nuclear deterrence reinforces the classic realist logic of threat perception between states that can cause an escalation of arms. In this context several questions may be raised. For instance, what is the definition of national interest? Who defines national interest and at whose cost? Can such a traditional definition of national interest based on military security be sustained in the present eras of globalization? And finally, can such a definition of national interest contribute towards sustainable development at India's national and the South Asian regional level? Along the above dimensions, there is a sharp polarization between the supporters (the realists) and the opponents (the anti-nuclear groups) of India's nuclearization policy.

The Emerging Anti-Nuclear Movement in India

The anti-nuclear movements in India have built a strong case against Indian nuclearization. They have based their argument on three major premises. First, that nuclear weapons are strategically irrational instruments of mass destruction and cannot provide security—no matter who possesses them. Second, that the concept of nuclear deterrence must be categorically rejected on moral, political, legal, and cultural grounds; and third, that the present Indian government's nuclear policy is inseparably linked to a belligerent and male-supremacist notion of militarized nationhood, which is not

only anti-pluralist, communal, and masculinist, but also creates an unacceptably dangerous situation in escalating an arms race in South Asia. The anti-nuclear group claims that India must never make or deploy nuclear weapons and must adopt complete nuclear disarmament. Based on the above premises, one can identify various voices within India's anti-nuclear groups—including but not limited to politicians, citizens' movements, environmentalists, feminists, and progressive activists—who have put forward different rationales for supporting a non-nuclear India.

The centrist stand in Indian politics, which includes segments of the Congress party, takes a critical view of India's nuclear deterrence as being too simplified and universal because India has never really faced any perceived nuclear threats from other nuclear powers—such as Russia, France, or Britain—the universal stance of its deterrence does not hold good. For instance, the ex-spokesman of the Congress party Kapil Sibal has argued, "to keep deterrence at a minimum is to leave ourselves vulnerable to a first strike leaving us nothing to retaliate against."⁷⁵ The centrists also argue that the minimum deterrence has a possibility of escalating the arms race in South Asia because it is unrealistic to believe that India, Pakistan, and China will be pragmatic in their approach to minimum deterrence. To this extent, the centrists are tacitly in support of President Clinton's view that the Indian desire to develop a nuclear arsenal also militates against the security interests of the world.

The Indian left represented by the Polit Bureau of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) as well as scholarly activists like Aijaz Ahmed claim that nuclear weapons cause a substantial diversion of resources away from productive and socially important uses. For instance, the budget presented by the BJP government for the fiscal year 1998 through 1999, immediately following India's explosion, involved a fourteen-percent increase in the country's defense budget over the previous year's estimates. This consequently curtailed governmental allocations in non-defense areas. For that fiscal year's budget, the total outlay for the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare was only Rupees 1,366 crores (approximately US \$ 28,458), well below the increase in defense expenditure. By contrast, the budgetary allocation to the Department of Space and Atomic Energy was Rupees 3,684 crores (approximately US \$ 76,000), which was nearly three times greater than the increase in the outlay for health, fifty-two percent higher than the increase in the outlay for central education, and seventy-two percent higher than the increase in allocation for rural employment and poverty alleviation.⁷⁶ The leftists allege, "the state can no longer educate the people, it has to make nuclear weapons."⁷⁷ While the left wants a permanent end to any future testing in India, like the realist lobby, they continue to oppose the CTBT.

A sector of the Indian population perceives India's nuclear deterrence as a complete departure from the national consensus that has violated the global norm of non-proliferation. This group claims that a national consensus stands in favor of elimination of nuclear weapons, which has been breached to meet the narrow, political, and fundamentalist goals of the BJP government. They express concern that a narrow consensus supporting nuclear weapons is now being manufactured in the Indian parliament to support Indian nuclearization.⁷⁸ To this extent, India's nuclear weapon is con-

sidered a very "political bomb."⁷⁹ It is also important to mention here that despite the Indian government's propaganda to justify the country's nuclear deterrence, cross-territorial movements in the form of children's groups, people-to-people movements, etc. exist between the Indian and the Pakistani civilians condemning both governments' nuclearization policies. These movements, however, go completely unpublicized by the mainstream media.

Environmentalists like Saleem H. Ali, Satyajit Rath, and others oppose India's nuclearization on the grounds that nuclear testing pollutes the environment. The radioactive dust from nuclear explosions contaminates the environment, thereby affecting not only innocent people, but also unborn children of the next generation. Environmentalists claim that it is essential to condemn the hypocrisy of the nuclear weapon states, including India, which while maintaining a nuclear arsenal hypocritically propagate the idea of a global non-proliferation regime. This hypocrisy can only be corrected by the nuclear weapon states themselves, by returning to an ethical and consistent position on global disarmament.⁸⁰

The anti-nuclear movement represented by the feminists claims that India's decision to become nuclear adversely affects Indian women. They assert that the BJP's ideology of Hindutva, underpinned by a communal bias, combines well with its masculinist rhetoric of nuclearization. This legitimizes male oppression and breeds the idea that nuclear explosions give virility to the nation, which men as individuals can also somehow share. This affects women and more critically women of lower socioeconomic status insofar as nuclearization gives rise to new militaristic meanings of national identity and reinforces Othering towards women—as gendered category vis-a-vis men. For instance, in a recent move the University Grants Commission (UGC) of India, which finances universities, has progressively cut back maintenance and other grants to such institutions. As governmental funding for improving women's economic, educational, and health conditions continue to diminish—crimes against women continue to increase. This is because crimes against women including domestic violence, which are fundamentally linked to the issues of women's backwardness in the Indian society because of economic dependence and illiteracy, are perpetuated as increasing governmental expenditures for defense diminish allocations for women's developmental policies. As Kumkum Sangari *et al* write: "...the masculinist rhetoric of nuclearisation has been combined with a false patriotism and Hindutva ideologies.... It affects women from minorities even more since they become the explicit and implicit targets of chauvinism."⁸¹ Progressive activists like Praful Bidwai, Achin Vanaik, and others claim that the BJP's nuclear policy is inseparably linked to a belligerent, male-supremacist, hate-driven, beggar-thy-neighbor nationalism. It maintains the notion of a Hindu nationhood juxtaposed against constructed notions of a demonized Islam, which is communalist and militaristic. Underlying it, is opposition to disarmament and peace. The BJP's subordination to the Sangh ideology not only castigates Gandhi's *ahimsa*, but also de-secularizes the Indian state in substantiating a communal and anti-democratic concept of nationhood.⁸² Seen from this perspective, the BJP's utilization of the ideology of Hindutva to justify the rationale of a nuclearized India represents a culmination of the "cultural" politics of nuclearization.⁸³

The anti-nuclear peace groups in India are small, but they have made a conscientious and brave effort to justify their arguments against the Indian proliferation, mobilize public opinion, and call for a roll back on India's nuclear deterrence. They question the accountability of the Indian government concerning issues like nuclear policy making, possessing nuclear weapons command, and defining India's national security through the Draft Nuclear Doctrine. They ask: how democratic or rational is it for the Indian government to seek military security through nuclear weapons, which otherwise degrades the security of its citizens through excessive military spending? In a democracy, can a government unilaterally set the parameters of its nuclear policy while taking no responsibility for achieving sustainable human development within the nation? By following the BJP's nuclear deterrence, can India contribute to promoting security in its regional and national spheres? In contrast to the argument forwarded by the government and the defense strategists that the 1998 tests would lead to a nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan (since more nuclear parity would be achieved between them), the peace activists had apprehended otherwise. Indeed the Kargil war and the events of May 2002 between India and Pakistan have proved that the latter was right. Nonetheless, the influence of these anti-nuclear groups has been limited given the government's efforts to deny them any voice in the mainstream media, marginalize them, and even call them anti-national. Yet their activism continues. From their perspective, India's real security lies in a world free of nuclear weapons. This requires a rethinking of the concept of India's security paradigm from a traditional state-centric to a more people-centric one.

What Is To Be Done?

While it is true that under the current geostrategic conditions of the South Asian region maintaining a nuclear deterrence for India is a pragmatic requisite, the case of the Indian nuclearization raises concern in relation to the Hindu nationalist discourse of the BJP. As noted by the Indian security analyst, M. S. Rajan, although, the issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity continue to form the fundamental basis of India's national security interest, the term national security interest in the context of India today has become "imprecise in usage." This is because it is "undefined and indefinable" depending upon "who defines national interest, in whose interest, and at what time?"⁸⁴

A textual analysis of India's contemporary national security discourse will reveal that not only has India's nuclear policy been justified on the grounds of Hindu nationalism, but it has also been conflated with the essence of a paternalistic chauvinism. Further, the Hindu nationalist discourse continues to define, justify, and enforce Indian nuclearization as something indispensable to maintain the militarized versions of India's national security interests. The nationalist discourse of the BJP apparently guiding India's nuclearization policies becomes so monolithic that it leaves little or no scope for the realist lobby to evaluate the consequences of this nuclearization. Neither does it enable them to analyze other possible alternatives—other than the ongoing process of nuclearization—to solve India's security concerns. For instance, thinking beyond realpolitik and entering into a multilateral dialogue with China, Pakistan, and the US to comprehend a national, regional, and nondiscriminatory global disarmament

is not seriously contemplated by the realist lobby.⁸⁵ Furthermore, a communal hue guiding contemporary India's post-colonial insecurities vis-a-vis Islam/Pakistan precludes possibilities of a fruitful dialogue between the two. Joseph Nye Jr. states:

In a democracy, national interest is a set of shared priorities regarding relations of the country with the rest of the world.... It includes not only issues of military but also non-military forms of security such as human rights, democracy, gender, poverty, environment, and population.... Thus national interest is too important an issue to be left solely at the whims of the geo-politicians. It should also incorporate legitimate needs as forwarded by an informed public opinion.⁸⁶

This is relevant especially in the case of India. Beyond the publicized consensus on the need to protect India's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity through nuclearization, there has been considerable debate within India's anti-nuclear groups concerning what is the definition of India's national security and what should be the parameters guiding India's security policy? As explained by Rajan, "a continuing problem concerning the content of national interest in India is that it is continually changing for a variety of reasons and circumstances. Among these are: changing policies of successive governments, changing aspirations of the people, technological developments (including nuclear arms), and the impact of the globalization on international relations."⁸⁷ The realities of India's security dilemma too necessitate a re-configuration of India's traditional concept of national interest. India has transformed its nuclear posture from one of nuclear disarmament in the 1950s to an active nuclear power in the 1990s. Currently India must be ready to rethink its nuclear deterrence program in light of a broader, national and regional security agenda. An active anti-nuclear movement in India reveals the presence of a well-informed public opposition to Indian nuclearization on political, social, economic, environmental, cultural, and gender grounds.

Thus to deconstruct the Westphalian concept of a nationalistic/militaristic security discourse, which has traditionally defined India's national interest, and to re-construct it along a more humanistic line is the most pragmatic need for India's realist lobby. However, this humanistic approach does not surrender altogether the needs for military power. Rather, it redefines the concept of India's national security beyond its militaristic focus, to make it meet the sustainable well-being of humans in economic, cultural, and political terms. Primarily, this requires that the present BJP government redefine its version of the national security discourse which is undergirded by communal versions of postcolonial insecurities, sustained through the politics of Hindutva, upholds a traditional definition of the security paradigm in India. Seen from this perspective, this article finds the critical constructivist perspective pragmatic in providing a more nuanced and complex interpretation of India's contemporary nuclear security dilemma. Rethinking India's national security agenda may help to settle tensions between the realist and the anti-nuclear groups within India's domestic politics and subsequently to reconfigure India's national interest in terms of a broader regional security agenda.

NOTES

¹The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) appeared in the forefront of Indian politics during the parliamentary elections of 1999, when the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) decided to contest the elections, mainly against the centrist Indian National Congress. The BJP, however, decided to contest the election through an alliance, the NDA, the other minor allies of which were the Samta Party, the Lok Sakti, and the Janata Dal. Although, since then, the composition of the NDA has changed, the BJP has remained the leading partner of the alliance.

²The BJP is the contemporary right-wing government of India. The ideological roots of its formation can be traced to the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak (RSS) formed in 1925, as a Hindu revivalist movement in India. The Jana Sangh (1951), the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (1964), and the Bajrang Dal were formed subsequently under the broader umbrella of the RSS. The Jana Sangh, which had formed an alliance with the Janata Dal after the 1977 elections to form a coalition government at the center, broke from the Janata party in 1980 and emerged independently in Indian politics as the BJP. The BJP, currently called the Sangh Parivaar, maintains ideological connections with its master organizations, the RSS and the VHP. It upholds the Sangh ideology manifested in the concept of Hindutva, which seeks to reconstruct Indian nationalism on the basis of a unified Hindu culture, as "one nation, one culture, and one people."

³Syed Shahabuddin, "Why No Muslim is Cheering on Kalam," *The Indian Express*, Thursday, 18 July 2002.

⁴"Kalam's Choice Not Due To His Muslim Background," *The Rediff Special*, Friday, 14 June 2002. Also see Nalini Verma, "Believe It Or Not: Kalam is a Hindu," *says RSS*, *The Bihar Times*, 2002, <<http://www.bihartimes.com>> (30 December 2002).

⁵"Kalam Can Hardly Do Anything For the Muslims," *The Rediff Special*, Friday, 12 July 2002.

⁶On the 27 February 2002, India witnessed one of the most severe communal massacres in the course of its post-independence history. The communal outrage ignited when a train, named the Sabarmati Express, was set on fire as it entered Gujarat. Among the passengers were *Brahmins* (priests) transporting *shiv lingas* (idols of the Hindu deity Shiv), the latter to be laid in some temples in the state of Gujarat. The situation sparked fury among the local Hindu fundamentalist leaders allied to the BJP, such as the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and the Bajrang Dal, who blamed the Muslims for instigating the arson. What followed was a rash of violence against the Muslim community of Gujarat and subsequently Baroda. Although Prime Minister Vajpayee made voluminous press releases condemning these anti-Muslim acts of violence, nongovernmental reports testify that the arson was "instigated" by the Hindu fundamentalists themselves, seeking to thus consolidate their Hindu nationalist agenda by portraying Muslims as traitors to India. For details see Kunal Chattopadhyay, ed., *The Genocidal Program in Gujarat: Anatomy of Indian Fascism* (Baroda: An Inquilabi Communist Sangathan Publication, 2002).

⁷"With Him At the Helm there is Hope that Things Might Change," *The Rediff Special*, Thursday, July 11 2002.

⁸Thucydides, *History of Peloponnesian War*, ed. M. I. Finley,

trans. Rex Warner (England: Penguin Books, 1972), 49; Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. with an introduction by George Bull (England: Penguin Books, 1981), 19-24; Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (England: Basil Blackwell, 1946), 64; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle For Power and Peace* (New York: Knoff, 1946), 16.

⁹Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 47.

¹⁰Kenneth Waltz, Man, *State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 5-6. Also see Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 615-628.

¹¹Robert Gilpin, "The Richness of The Tradition of Political Realism," in *Neo-Realism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 318.

¹²Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, eds., *Power and Interdependence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 15-32.

¹³Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in The World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 245.

¹⁴See Spike Peterson, ed., *Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of International Relations* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press, 1992), x-xi, 1-24; Also see Jan Jindy Pettman, *Worlding Women: A Feminist International Politics* (New York: Allen and Urwin, 1996), vii-xiii; Cynthia Enloe, *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at The End of the Cold War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 1-9; Ann J. Tickner, *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives in Achieving Global Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 1-15; Christine Sylvester, *Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Post-Modern Era* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1-14.

¹⁵A major contribution of the postcolonial feminists lies in deconstructing the homogeneous Western representation of Oriental women. They take issue with Western feminists by claiming that they render a discursive homogenization of the Third World women as an "average" and "passive" Other by replaying the assumptions of ethnocentric universality where they are unable to understand the "real" contextual specificities of the Third World. This singular and composite representation of Third World women as "powerless, exploited, and sexually harassed"; leading essentially "truncated and oppressed" lives; and by implication being "the White Women's Other burden" is incorrect. Rather, women in the Third World, as elsewhere, form a heterogeneous group differentiated by their respective class, ethnic, or racial locations. For details see, Chandra Mohanty Talpade, Ann Russo and Lourdes Torres, ed., *Third World Women and The Politics of Feminism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 1-10.

¹⁶Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1978), 1-28. Also see V.Y. Mudimbe, *The Intervention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 1-23.

¹⁷Randolph B. Persaud, "Situating Race in International Relations: The Dialectics of Civilizational Security in American Immigration," in *Power, Post-Colonialism and International Relations*, ed., Geeta Chowdhry and Sheila Nair (New York: Routledge, 2002), 56-81.

¹⁸David Campbell analyzes the representations of Japan

and the Japanese in the US foreign policy. He explores the construction of the Japanese cultural identity through the lens of racism and shows how it enables a particular formulation of the US foreign policy. See David Campbell, *Writing Insecurity: US Foreign Policy and The Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 1-13.

¹⁹Himadeep Muppidi, "Post-Coloniality and The Production of International Insecurity," in *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and The Production of Danger*, ed. Jutta Weldes (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis, 1999), 124.

²⁰Steve Niva, "Contested Sovereignties and Post-Colonial Insecurities in the Middle East," in *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger*, ed. Jutta Weldes et al (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis, 1999), 152.

²¹Jutta Weldes, ed., *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and The Production of Danger* (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis, 1999), 1.

²²Sankaran Krishna, *Post-Colonial Insecurities: India, Sri Lanka and The Question Of Nationhood* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), xvii-xix.

²³Krishna, *Post-Colonial Insecurities*, 17.

²⁴Krishna, *Post-Colonial Insecurities*, 17-18.

²⁵Krishna, *Post-Colonial Insecurities*, xvii and 18.

²⁶Krishna, *Post-Colonial Insecurities*, xix, 4.

²⁷Krishna, *Post-Colonial Insecurities*, xix-xx.

²⁸Scott D. Sagan, "Re-Thinking The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation: Three Models in Search of a Bomb," in *The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, US Interests, and World Order*, ed. Victor A. Udgaff (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), 18.

²⁹However, in August 1993 the US imposed sanctions on China's Ministry of Air Space Industries because of the sale of M-11 components to Pakistan. This was lifted in October 1994 after China agreed to a ban on the sale of missiles inherently capable of carrying a 500-kilogram payload to a distance of 300 kilometers or more, a ban to further Chinese export of M-11s to Pakistan, which was never enforced.

³⁰Jasjit Singh, *Nuclear India* (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998), 183.

³¹Rajesh Rajagopalan, "Neo-Realist Theory and The Indo-Pakistani Conflict-I," *Strategic Analysis* 22, no.9 (1999): 1261-1272.

³²Although there was a temporary suspension of such aid to Pakistan (following the passing of the Pressler Amendment), the aid continued to be dispatched despite Congressional acknowledgement that Pakistan possessed enriched uranium amounting to more than 5% of its (then) estimated nuclear weapon producing technology.

³³The Hankbrown Amendment Act had been adopted by both houses of the US Congress as part of the congressional report on foreign operations regarding military/nuclear arms and weapons. This act was signed by President Bill Clinton on 16 January 1996.

³⁴Owing to the Indian military exercise Operation Brass-Tacks at the Indo-Pakistani border over Kashmir in 1987 and the testing of the 1500 kilometer range Ghauri missile by Pakistan, in the early 1990s, Indo-Pakistani bilateral relations were not very cordial in the the 1990s.

³⁵ Mohan J. Malik, "India Goes Nuclear: Rationales, Benefits, Costs, and Implications," *Contemporary South-East*

Asia 20, no.2 (1998): 191-215.

³⁶Gregory van der Vink, Jeffrey Park, Richard Allen, Terry Wallace and Christel Hennes, "False Accusations, Undetected Tests and Implications for the CTBT," *Arms Control Today* 28, no.4 (1998): 7-13.

³⁷Singh, *Nuclear India*, 182.

³⁸The cornerstone of the US missile non-proliferation treaty is the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) formed in 1987 by the US, Britain, Japan, Italy, France, and the then West Germany. The purpose of the MTCR was originally to restrict the proliferation of missiles, unmanned nuclear vehicles, and related technology for systems capable of carrying a payload of 500 kilograms for 300 kilometers or more. The MTCR, which originally focused on nuclear capable delivery systems, was extended in January 1993 by the partners to cover the delivery systems of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Because the M-11 missiles belong to the category of the WMD, the shipment of these by China to Pakistan was seen as a violation of the MTCR.

³⁹There was a deep-seated perception within India that many of the nuclear missile technology that was supplied to China from the US could seep into Pakistan and be used against India. This threat perception was not unfounded because many of the military arms and weapons supplied to Pakistan by the US during the Cold War were used by Pakistan against India in the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971.

⁴⁰Following the defeat of India in the Sino-Indian war of 1962, Vikram Sarabhai, the then Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Committee, and the Secretary of the Indian state L. K. Jha visited Moscow, London, Paris and Washington to request that Western powers provide India with a security umbrella. Despite the military vulnerability of a newly independent and war-devastated nation, the US refused India any such security guarantee.

⁴¹Chintamani Mahapatra, "Pokhran II and After: Dark Clouds Over Indo-US Relations," *Strategic Analysis* 22, no. 5 (1998): 711-720.

⁴²When the US surveillance satellites picked up the evidence of these preparations, the then US Ambassador to India, Frank G. Winsor, confronted the Indian P.M concerning these preparations. Rao, perennially indecisive, called off the tests.

⁴³Two broad movements emerged in early nineteenth-century India as a struggle against colonial rule: the moderates and the revivalists. The moderates accepted the model of social change and progress based upon Western patterns and the revivalists to the renewal of Hindu ubiquity. The roots of the RSS, from which sprang the Jana Sangh, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, and the BJP, can be traced to the revivalists. For details see Walter K. Anderson and Shridhar D. Damle, ed., *The Brotherhood in Saffron: The Rashtriya Swayam Sevak and Hindu Revivalism* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 10-20.

⁴⁴Anderson and Damle, *The Brotherhood in Saffron*, 10-16.

⁴⁵Satish Deshpande, "Communalizing The Nation-Space: Notes on Spatial Strategies of Hindutva," *Economic and Political Weekly* 30, Issue 50 (1995): 3220-3227.

⁴⁶Deshpande, "Communalizing The Nation-Space."

⁴⁷Geeta Chowdhry, "Communalism, Nationalism and Gender: Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and The Hindu Right in

India," in *Feminist Approaches To Contemporary Debates*, ed. Sita Ranchod-Nelson and Mary Ann Tetreault (London: Routledge, 2000), 97-102.

⁴⁸Bharatiya Janata Party, *For a Strong and Prosperous India: Election Manifesto 1996* (New Delhi: BJP Central Office, 1996), 6.

⁴⁹Yogendra Malik and V.B. Singh, *Hindu Nationalists in India* (Boulder: Westview, 1996), 41.

⁵⁰Rama M. Jois, *Supreme Court Judgement on "Hindutva": An Important Landmark* (New Delhi: Suruchi Prakashan, 2000), 56.

⁵¹Gyanendra Pandey, *The Construction of Colonialism in Colonial North India* (New Delhi: Viking, 1993), 92.

⁵²The Ram Janmbhoomi-Babri Masjid riot occurred on 6 December 1992 in a small town in Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh. The riot was the result of a religious dispute centering around the Hindu fundamentalist claim that the Babri Masjid (mosque) built at Ayodhya in 1528 for the Mughal king Babur was actually constructed on the site of a temple commemorating the birthplace of Ram. Following communal instigation by the Hindu right, thousands of Hindu fundamentalist agitators called "kar sevaks" destroyed the masjid. For details see Sudhir Kakkar, *The Colors of Violence: Cultural Identities, Religion and Conflict* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 157.

⁵³Chowdhry, "Communalism, Nationalism and Gender," 98-100.

⁵⁴Chowdhry, "Communalism, Nationalism and Gender," 115.

⁵⁵Mushirul Hassan, "Muslim Intellectuals, Institutions and the Post-Colonial Predicament," *Economic and Political Weekly* 30, Issue 47 (1995): 2995-3000.

⁵⁶David Ludden, "Introduction: Ayodhya: A Window on the World," in *Contesting The Nation: Religion, Community and The Politics of Democracy in India*, ed. D. Ludden (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 5.

⁵⁷Bharatiya Jana Sangh, "Resolutions Passed by The Bharatiya Karya Samiti and The Twelfth Session," *Resolutions: Bharatiya Jana Sangh* (21-26 January 1965): 4 (emphasis added).

⁵⁸I interviewed the above-mentioned BJP party leaders and activists from 10 through 23 July 2002 at the West Bengal BJP State Working Committee Office, at 6 Muralidhar Sen Lane, Calcutta.

⁵⁹Chowdhry, "Communalism, Nationalism and Gender," 108-114.

⁶⁰Article 44 of the Constitution of India states that "...the State shall endeavor to secure for all its citizens a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) throughout the territory of India." (Chowdhry, "Communalism, Nationalism and Gender," 109). However, a UCC is not listed in the constitution as a fundamental right (which can be reenforced in a court of law), but rather as a directive principle of state policy, which means that it can only be recommended. The difficulty of mandating a UCC is based on the potential conflict that may arise with the different personal laws of the minorities in India (referred to as personal law in India). Because Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India guarantee freedom of religion, and Article 29 guarantees minorities the right to conserve their culture—it was decided that mandating a UCC would violate such guarantees. However, a Hindu Code was passed by the Parliament in 1956, which despite making significant

departures from traditional minority laws did confer a semblance of equal rights on Hindu women in spheres of marriage, property, and so on. Muslim women and women of other religious minorities were left under the umbrella of personal religious laws because the difficulty of ensuring cultural and religious autonomy to already threatened minority groups led the state to adopt a secular non-interference policy with regard to personal laws of minority communities.

⁶¹A debate concerning the discrepancy between a UCC and the Muslim personal law erupted in India with respect to the Shah Bano case. This case was brought before the Supreme Court in the mid-1980s, when Shah Bano, a seventy-three-year-old Muslim woman, sued her husband, Mohammad Ahmed Khan, for maintenance under the Criminal Procedure Code. The code guarantees the maintenance of wives, children, and parents who are destitute. Challenging the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (that ruled that Mohammad Ahmed Khan pay Bano a modest maintenance), the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court. In his appeal, Khan claimed that he had repaid Bano's dowry and also had maintained her during the *idda* period (three months following divorce) as was required by the Muslim personal law. In April 1985, the Supreme Court upheld the judgement of the High Court and awarded Bano a the sum of Rs 179.00 (approximately fourteen US dollars). Interpretations of the Muslim personal law and scholarly interpretations of the Qur'an were used by the Supreme Court to justify its decision. The government of Rajiv Gandhi initially hailed the Supreme Court's decision, but reversed its position because of losses in the 1985 by-elections and Muslim "fundamentalist" uprisings against the Supreme Court decision. Opposition to the Bano decision also led the Rajiv government to introduce a Muslim Women's Bill in the Parliament, which in essence denied Muslim women the right to avail themselves of the Criminal Procedure Code in maintenance proceedings. The government explained its introduction and support of the Muslim Women's Bill by saying that Muslims were not ready for change (clearly revealing the apprehension that continued support of the Supreme Court's decision would further alienate Muslim supporters from the Congress party).

⁶²I interviewed several Delhi-based BJP activists and observers (namely Kailashpati Mishra, Tarun Vijay, Ramkripal Singh, Ashwini Kumar, and others) at the BJP party office located at 11 Askoke Road, New Delhi, from 29th July through 5th August 2002.

⁶³During the Shah Bano case, progressive activists within the Muslim community demonstrated all over India to declare their support of Muslim women's right to maintenance under the Criminal Procedure Court. A large percentage of Muslim women, academicians, journalists, film personalities and experts in the *Sharia* law signed a memorandum indicating that providing support to divorced women in no way interfered with the personal law. The Committee for the Protection of the Rights of Muslim women was formed with members from Trivandrum, Delhi, and Calcutta. This reveals the existence of multiple progressive voices within the Muslim community in support of women's rights. However, ignoring these positions and placing the blame for India's fragmented law regime on the Muslim community enables the Hindu right to manipulate gender justice to establish cultural, religious,

and larger communal nationalist identities.

⁶⁴Chowdhry, "Communalism, Nationalism and Gender," 107.

⁶⁵I posed open-ended questions concerning gender and Indian nuclearization to some Delhi-based (Tarun Jethli, Venkaih Naidu, etc.) as well as some West Bengal-based (Ashim Sarkar, Tathagatha Roy, Pratap Banerjee, Ashim Sarkar, etc.) politicians/activists. Although, the interviewees agreed that the Indian nuclearization is necessary primarily to protect India from Pakistan, they did also reveal (some explicitly and others more implicitly) a link between nuclearization and gender. They all agreed that Muslims had committed heinous crimes: the pillaging of Hindu temples during the Muslim invasions in the early nineteenth century; the rape of Hindu women during these early invasions, during the partition of India, and more recently during the Ram Janmbhoomi-Babri Masjid riots; and the forced conversion of Hindus to Islam. Often, Muslim women also participated in such crimes against the Hindu women.

⁶⁶I interviewed Rita Mukherjee on 23 July 2002 at the West Bengal BJP State Working Committee Office at 6, Muralidhar Sen Lane, Calcutta.

⁶⁷Chowdhry, "Communalism, Nationalism and Gender," 106-107. Also see Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin, "Recovery, Rupture, Resistance: Indian State and Abduction of Women During Partition," *Economic and Political Weekly* (Review of Women's Studies) 28, no. 17 (24 April 1993): 2-11.

⁶⁸In determining the masculinization of Indian nuclearization, I accept that patriarchal regimes the world over have used women as markers of cultural identity to serve their nationalist projects. The BJP does this as well. I am also cognizant that this masculinity does not affect all Indian women. Besides, there are a host of other social and cultural processes that determine the working of patriarchy, with regional, caste, and class variations. Yet, I consider it important to explore the symbolic connections between a Hindu/cultural patriarchy (as a continuation of both colonial/Western and the traditional/Indian masculinity—manifested currently under the Hindu right) and Indian nuclearization—a theme to be investigated more elaborately in my dissertation.

⁶⁹For details see Han Hua, "Sino-Indian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control," in *Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in South Asia After The Test Ban*, SIPRI Research Report No.14, ed. Eric Arnett (NY: Oxford University Press, 1998), 37-41.

⁷⁰Atul Kohli claims that after years of quiet on the communal front following India's independence, communalism erupted as a major political force in India in the 1980s. The Congress party, which had been the dominant party of India since 1885, lost its strong hold over Indian politics in the 1970s and the 1980s as discrepancies between public promise and party performance began to emerge. As Kohli explains, utilizing "pro-Hindu and communal sentiments" became the most apt strategy for the then contemporary Congress party leaders to regain their electoral strength. See Atul Kohli, *Democracy and Its Discontents: India's Growing Crisis of Governability* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

⁷¹Psychological traits as explanatory variables in IR have been studied by the psychological theorists of IR. See James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of*

International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey (New York: Harper and Row, 1997), 279-283. Yet, I argue that there are differences between the ways in which ideology is interpreted in the psychological and the postcolonial insecurity perspectives. This is because whereas psychological theories claim that much of the contradictions in IR are produced as a result of images by state leaders, who view social reality as being categorized in neat dichotomous realities of good-bad; black-white; friend-foe, etc. and to this extent may overlap with the postcolonial insecurity interpretations. However, the postcolonial insecurity interpretations more specifically analyze how ideological attributes of the postcolonial state leaders may be manifested in the nation's quest for modernity and nation-building and how this may lead to the construction of post-colonial (in)security perceptions to suit the identity politics of postcolonial nationhood.

⁷²Eighty-six percent of those polled in 1998 supported the test, and forty-four percent stated that they were more likely to vote for the BJP in the upcoming elections. "Solid Support," *India Today*, 25 May 1998.

⁷³Security analysts of the Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis (IDSA), India including Udai Bhaskar and V. Santhanam were reluctant to address issues of communalism in the context of contemporary Indian politics, still less any link between communalism and Indian nuclearization. The climax, however, came from the ex-IDSA analyst, K.K. Subrahmanyam, who, sitting in his Times of India office, claimed, "The BJP is not communal." These responses are understandable given the fact that the IDSA, despite claiming autonomy, is a government-funded institution. I interviewed the above-mentioned security analysts in their respective offices from 30 July through 1 August 2002.

⁷⁴Formulated by the National Security Council (NSC), the Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) is pushing India towards an open-ended, triadic (land, air, and sea-based) nuclear force of enormous lethality. The DND marks an extremist/maximalist standpoint of the country's realist lobby. However, it has not yet been adopted by the NSC or the Union Cabinet of India. For details see "India's Nuclear Draft Doctrine: A Critique," in *Movement in India For Nuclear Disarmament*, 1999, <<http://www.angelfire.com/mi/MIND123/index.html>> (3 February 2001).

⁷⁵P.K. Kamath, "Indian National Security Policy: Minimal Nuclear Deterrence," *Strategic Analysis* 23, no. 8 (1999): 1257-1274.

⁷⁶Jayati Ghosh, "Why Women Must Reject The Bomb," in *Out Of Nuclear Darkness: The Case For Indian Disarmament*, ed. KumKum Sanghari, Neeraj Malik, Sheba Chhachhi, and Tanika Sarkar (New Delhi: Movement in India For Nuclear Disarmament, 1998), 17-24.

⁷⁷Jayati Ghosh, "Why Women Must Reject The Bomb," 18.

⁷⁸Vinay Lal, "The Cultural Politics of Nuclearism," *The Los Angeles Times*, 19 May 1998.

⁷⁹Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik, "A Very Political Bomb," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 54, no. 4 (1998): 50.

⁸⁰Satyajit Rath, "Why Are Nuclear Weapons Objectionable: A Scientist's Perspective," in *Out Of Nuclear Darkness: The Case For Indian Disarmament*, ed. Kumkum Sanghari (New Delhi: Movement in India For Nuclear

Disarmament, 1998), 25-34. Also see Saleem H. Ali, "The Environmental Impact of Nuclear Explosion," *Movement in India For Nuclear Disarmament*, 1999, <<http://www.angelfire.com/mi/MIND123/index.html>> (10 February 2001).

⁸¹Kumkum Sanghari, Neeraj Malik, Sheba Chhachhi and Tanika Sarkar "Why Women Reject Nuclearisation," in *Out of The Nuclear Shadow*, ed. Smitu Kothari and Zia Mian (London: Zed Books, 2001), 156.

⁸²Aijaz Ahmed, "The Hindutva Weapon," *Frontline*, The Hindu, Online Edition of India's National Newspaper, 23 May -5 June 1998 <<http://www.hinduonline.com>> (10 March 2001).

⁸³Praful Bidwai, "Seeking A Paradigmatic Shift," *Frontline*, The Hindu, Online Edition of India's National Newspaper, 14-24 April 1998 <<http://www.hinduonline.com/>> (15 March 2001).

⁸⁴M.S. Rajan, "National Security and National Interest: A Conceptual Framework," *Man and Development* 20, no.3 (1998): 103-113.

⁸⁵Realist scholars from India, like Jasjit Singh and others, have argued, however, that although India continues to remain an enthusiastic supporter of the CTBT, it will not sign the treaty unless it is linked to a complete nuclear disarmament and a universal and nondiscriminatory Fissile Missile Cut-Off Convention.

⁸⁶Joseph Nye Jr., "Re-Defining The National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no.4 (1999): 22-35.

⁸⁸Rajan, "National Security and National Interest," 103-113.