

German Heralds of Holy War: Orientalists and Applied Oriental Studies

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I.

On 14 November 1914, two weeks after the Ottoman Empire had entered World War I as Germany's ally,¹ Constantinople was the scene of a series of remarkable public events. A crowd gathered in front of the German embassy in Pera. They had come from the mosque of Mehmed the Conqueror, where a recent fatwa of the *shaykhülislam* had been read, which declared participation in a Holy War (jihad) against England, France, and Britain a binding duty of all Muslims.² Several speeches had been made, and then a procession on horseback moved through the streets of the capital, allegedly in imitation of the prophet Muhammad's time and including two women to represent Muhammad's wife Aishah and her attendant. They were greeted at the Ministry of War and the seat of the grand vizier.³ At the German embassy the procession was received by members of the Committee of Union and Progress, by a Turkish-speaking member of the embassy itself, and by a Moroccan in French uniform who gave a brief speech in Arabic, in which he praised Germany for his liberation, and deplored the treatment of Muslim soldiers in the French army.⁴ The crowd cheered the German kaiser as an ally of Islam, and then moved on to the Austrian embassy for a similar reception before dispersing (not without looting some Christian shops and houses).⁵

The formal declaration of a Holy War for the entire Muslim world, in alliance with, and obviously at the request of, the Christian powers Germany and Austria-Hungary, was noted with curiosity, confusion, and some amusement by contemporary observers, and the demonstrations described only heightened these perceptions. An American report quotes rumors that the two women who represented Aishah and her attendant in their normal life sold roasted chickpeas on the bridge over the Golden Horn, as more respectable women had refused

to participate.⁶ A German eyewitness was equally skeptical: "From the balcony of the embassy a huge Moroccan, who had been taken prisoner at the Western front, addressed the crowd. I don't think that much of what he said was understood down there. People will hardly have understood his gibberish."⁷ Other reports said that the Moroccan, together with several comrades, had been brought to Istanbul disguised as members of a traveling circus.⁸ All observers, however, agreed in one respect: Germany was politically responsible for staging this show. Turkish observers are said to have sneered at the "Holy War a la franga."⁹

In this German effort to propagate a Holy War, students of Islam, Arabic, and Turkish, in short, Orientalists, were prominently involved. In this article, I want to discuss the political background and intellectual problems of this involvement. At first sight this appears to be a classical case in Edward Said's sense, inasmuch as all three constitutional elements of Orientalism were present: an academic tradition of study, teaching, and writing about the Orient; a style of thought based on an ontological and epistemological distinction made between the Orient and (most of the time) the Occident; and a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.¹⁰ But this article will complicate Said's concept of Orientalism in several ways. George Steinmetz has demonstrated that German colonialist discourses were far from unified. Instead, they differed from one colony to another, and even within the same administration.¹¹ The present case study will reveal numerous ambiguities in the service of the Orientalists to German imperial and military ambitions. On the other hand, studies of Orientalism focusing on less ambiguous colonial situations in the Arab Middle East and India have tended to neglect the position of the Ottoman Empire in relation to the colonial powers

and the Arab Middle East. In "Ottoman Orientalism" Ussama Makdisi has demonstrated that the Ottoman Empire assumed an attitude comparable to European Orientalism towards parts of its population, especially in the Arab provinces. Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi and Selim Deringil have shown that Ottomans and Iranians were not passive objects of Western representation but played an active role in their interaction with Europe.¹² The present case equally shows that Orientalism should not be construed with Said as a self-contained European discourse; it involved intellectual and political players not only in Germany but also in the Ottoman Empire and other Islamic countries. Thus, it ultimately reconfigures Orientalism to include political practice rather than as only a body of texts.

In this article I am interested in the role of Orientalists in the proper sense, academics who study Islam and the Middle East, both as they wrote about it for a domestic audience and participated in political practice. This practice required them to use their expertise to communicate directly with their "objects of study," that is, with the peoples of the Middle East. I will survey the development of German-language Oriental studies up to World War I, before describing the political developments leading to the proclamation of jihad. My point is that the project of the jihad did not originate from academic Orientalists, and was not initially supported by their academic and public writing, despite the close intellectual ties between academia and the leading diplomats. Once the project was under way, however, numerous scholars became willing accomplices even at the expense of compromising their academic standpoints. Furthermore, in the discussion of the propagandistic efforts around this proclamation I will focus on the communicative aspect manifest in the produced texts themselves. I argue that despite their linguistic expertise, the Orientalists failed to find a meaningful language in which to communicate with their Islamic audience, because the inherited historical and ethnographic discourse prevented them from finding an appropriate level of interaction. Finally, the episode of the German-sponsored Holy War had repercussions on the self-image of the field; this article tries to elucidate the ensuing debate.

It should be noted that the "German Holy War" was an initiative of the German Reich as a political entity, and Austria did not play a role in it.¹³ The academic community that was involved or felt affected, however, extended beyond political boundaries and included scholars in Austria-Hungary and the Netherlands. The origins of this network reach back before the unification of Germany, and its cohesion was based more on its members' main language, German, and scholarly approach.

II.

What were the origins of academic studies of Islam in the German-speaking lands, and how did the academic discourse relate to political interests? Inspired by Raimundus Lullus, the famous missionary, the Council of Vienna in 1311 decided that Greek, Hebrew, Arabic, and Chaldean (i.e., Aramaic) should be taught at five Christian universities. This laid the foundation for the study of Arabic as an *ancilla theologiae* in Europe to be used in apologetic debate.¹⁴ Theological interests persisted well into the Enlightenment, although the perspective shifted from apologetics to philological and comparative study of the language of the scripture.¹⁵ It was that era, however, that saw the first full-fledged German Arabists, such as Johann Jakob Reiske (1716–74).¹⁶ Collections of Oriental manuscripts in German lands were originally spoils of the Turkish wars (*Türkenbente*) of the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, but increasingly texts were also deliberately acquired in order to facilitate Oriental studies.¹⁷ These collections, together with the rise of comparative philology and linguistics, placed Arabic philology on a firm basis.

Silvestre de Sacy (1758–1838) in Paris can be considered the founding father of Arabic philology in Europe. Heinrich Leberecht Fleischer (1801–88) in Leipzig disseminated de Sacy's methods in the German-speaking countries, as teacher of a whole generation of scholars and as initiator (in 1845) of the *Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft*, the counterpart to the Royal Asiatic Society and the Société asiatique. While Fleischer himself was a dedicated philologist, interested in language and texts only, some of his students, inspired by Ranke and historicism, began to study Islamic religion, law, and society in their historical dynamics. Refinement of method and excellent (if theoretical) linguistic skills characterized Theodor Nöldeke's history of the Koran, Julius Wellhausen's study of residues of Arab paganism, and Ignaz Goldziher's history of Koran exegesis, to name only a few outstanding examples.¹⁸ Reliance on classical texts, interest in origins, and almost complete lack of concern with the modern Islamic world was typical of these generations. Theology or rabbinic studies and classical philology, together with historical reasoning and firm rationalism, informed their scholarship. Rooted in Humboldtian ideas of *Bildung*, Oriental studies was not concerned with the practical applicability of the knowledge produced.

This view is illustrated by the position assigned to the study of the Ottoman Empire and Turkish in German-speaking academia. The old German Empire had been confronted with the Turkish Menace since the fifteenth century. Reports by former captives and travelers about the Ottomans were widely proliferated and eagerly read in German. Diplomatic relations began in the sixteenth century, and in the same period a Turkish chronicle was

translated and printed in Germany.¹⁹ By the late eighteenth century, literary titles dealing with the Ottoman Empire were counted in the hundreds.²⁰ In order to satisfy the needs of diplomatic intercourse with the Ottomans the Hapsburgs established a special school for the training of interpreters, the *Konsularakademie*, in Vienna in 1754, following the examples of Poland and France.²¹ While Arabists produced rigorous grammars for the use of the philologist, Turkish was recorded first of all in conversation books aimed at travelers in political and commercial matters.²² The most impressive accomplishment of the early study of Turkish is the dictionary by Franz Mesgnien Meninski (an interpreter in Austrian service) published in 1680.²³ However, with the exception of Vienna, at no time in the eighteenth century was Turkish considered an integral part of a university curriculum. The man who without doubt made the largest contribution to the knowledge of the Turkish world, Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall (1774–1856) never held an academic position: he was trained at the *Konsularakademie*, then worked as an interpreter in Constantinople, and spent his later years in Vienna, where his official appointment as court interpreter left him much time for his studies.²⁴ Scholars of Arabic and Islam often acquired some knowledge of Turkish, and men like Fleischer occasionally published minor works on Ottoman texts, but generally Turkish culture was considered inferior to Persian and particularly Arab culture, and less worthy of scholarly attention.²⁵

Despite arguable practical needs, Turkish studies in an academic setting took off only when Armin Vambéry was given a lectureship for Turkish in Pest in 1865.²⁶ Vambéry, whose initial reputation was based on his travels in Central Asia in the disguise of a wandering dervish, defied the classical career of an Orientalist, and the lack of understanding between him and his Arabist student Goldziher seems typical for his position in the field.²⁷ Vambéry sought compensation in (mostly unsolicited) advice to the British government on Central Asia, capitalizing on his experience there and on his excellent contacts in the highest circles in Istanbul, making this a parallel career.²⁸ In Germany Turkish studies developed even later, as they were put on a solid foundation only when the Arabist Georg Jacob in Kiel turned to Turkish after a stay in Constantinople in 1895.²⁹

III.

Meanwhile the character of Oriental studies in Germany had begun to change in the context of new political developments. After the foundation of the Second Empire, Germany was powerful enough to pursue a more ambitious global strategy in the footsteps of Prussian policies in East Asia, Africa, and the Pacific. In the aftermath of the unification lobbying had begun for a

straightforward colonial policy. For this purpose a number of private companies engaged in colonial enterprises in Africa and Southeast Asia had founded the *Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft* in 1882. During a rather brief phase in 1884–5 Germany occupied several territories in Africa, East Asia, and the Pacific and established colonial rule. In the Middle East, German interests were more ambiguous. Direct colonial rule was advocated by a vocal minority, but not encouraged by the diplomats. Since the Congress of Berlin, Germany had been primarily interested in preserving the Ottoman Empire despite the ambitions of other great powers, but this attitude was far from stable. On the one hand Germany tended to give relations with the other great powers priority over those with the Ottoman Empire, and therefore to make compromises at Turkish expense. On the other hand Germany was willing to participate in the dissection of the Ottoman Empire provided it would get a fair share.

The situation was complicated by increasing economic and military engagement in the region. In 1882 the first serious military mission was (reluctantly) sent to Constantinople on the request of Sultan Abdülhamid II. This mission's main effect was to cause scandal in Constantinople and diplomatic concern in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg, rather than actually increasing military efficiency at the Bosphorus. It was, however, prestigious enough that Germany did not abandon it after the devastating defeat of the Balkan wars—instead it was upgraded considerably.³⁰ German investments in Turkey were also on the rise, with a dramatic leap in 1888 when a consortium led by the Deutsche Bank secured a contract for the first section of the projected railroad connection between the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus and the Persian Gulf.³¹ Yet German foreign policy steadfastly adhered to the increasingly fictitious claim that Germany did not maintain political interests in the Middle East.³²

The lack of coherence in German policy on Turkey and the heterogeneity of public perceptions and attitudes is well illustrated by the kaiser's famous journey to the Holy Land, a masterpiece of public relations in the display of splendor, power, and piety in the service of political and economic interests. Leaving aside those voices that consider primarily Germany's relations to the other great powers, we find several conflicting attitudes towards the Ottomans expressed in the German press. Those who still remembered the massacres of Armenians in 1895 resisted the idea of the German emperor honoring the sovereign who was responsible.³³ Similarly, Paul Rohrbach, the most influential lobbyist for German economic engagement in the Ottoman Empire, found the idea that the German empress visited—and thus legitimized—the harem of the sultan, entirely inappropriate.³⁴ Friedrich Naumann, as a Christian liberal, had strong sympathies for the Armenians

but came around to support the kaiser's visit because he saw the preservation of the Ottoman empire as a necessity of realpolitik.³⁵ A fervent (but hardly well informed) Turcophile like Hans Barth, finally, dismissed the reports about Armenian massacres as propaganda, and celebrated the Turks with a Bismarckian expression as "the only gentlemen of the Orient."³⁶ While Ernst Jäckh, another journalist, later professor of Turkish history in Berlin, proclaimed Turkification, rather than Germanization, as the goal of German policy towards the Ottoman Empire,³⁷ a German newspaper declared a different goal for German Oriental politics: "The sick man will be cured, so thoroughly, that when he wakes up from his sleep of recovery he will be difficult to recognize. One would think he has got blond hair, blue eyes, and looks quite Germanic. In our loving embrace we have injected so much German essence into him that he will be hard to distinguish from a German."³⁸

Obviously there was no unified view of the Orient at the time. Instead, a cacophony of voices representing different interests, badly coordinated and often ill-informed about political, social, and cultural conditions, characterized German Middle East politics during the later rule of Wilhelm II. Only when the economic engagement was well under way did influential networks aiming at the Middle East organize themselves. The *Deutsches Vorderasien-Komitee* (founded 1908) as well as its more successful competitor, the *Deutsch-Türkische Vereinigung* (founded 1914 with assistance from the Foreign Office) brought together journalists and representatives of industrial and financial enterprises interested in the Middle East.³⁹

German students of Islam and the Middle East played at most a minor part in the debate over Germany and the Middle East, which was dominated by journalists, political scientists, and geographers. However, Oriental studies were increasingly catching up with the needs of the day. In 1887 the *Seminar für Orientalische Sprachen* (SOS, or Seminary for Oriental Languages) was founded in Berlin to educate students from all professions in languages of the Middle East, and topics from law, trade, geography, history, and culture (*Landeskunde*).⁴⁰ Finally there was an institution explicitly dedicated to training students to engage directly with the Orient in practical matters like commerce and diplomacy. Among its outstanding teachers in Arabic was Martin Hartmann (1851–1918); his immediate experience of the Muslim world from Africa to Chinese Turkistan, his dedication to contemporary Islam, and his opinionated style made him a maverick figure in German Oriental studies. Hartmann considered the *sharia* a straitjacket restricting progress in the Islamic world.⁴¹ He had strong sympathies towards Arab nationalism, and it was only after the Young Turk revolution of 1908 that he developed greater sympathies for the Otto-

mans.⁴² Georg Kampffmeyer was another instructor particularly interested in contemporary Islam, and as initiator of the *Deutsche Marokko-Bibliothek* (Berlin and Tangier), he was actively involved in political-cultural exchange with the Islamic world.⁴³ Cross-identification with the "Orientals" in their political concerns was a conspicuous characteristic of both Hartmann and Kampffmeyer, and was often regarded as inappropriate by their colleagues.⁴⁴

Most of the faculty of the SOS, including its director Eduard Sachau, were distinguished by research on earlier periods, and thus rooted in the German philological tradition.⁴⁵ This was also true of Eugen Mittwoch, who taught Arabic and Ethiopian languages at the SOS, and after the war succeeded Sachau as its director.⁴⁶ An alumnus of the SOS important for this article was Karl Emil Schabinger von Schowingen, jurist, diplomat, and dilettante Orientalist.⁴⁷

Other academic institutions followed, reflecting the growing involvement of Germany with the modern Orient. In Hamburg, the *Deutsches Kolonial-Institut* was founded in 1908. Like the SOS it was not part of a university. Carl Heinrich Becker (1876–1933) became its first director.⁴⁸ The respect with which Becker later wrote about the SOS's Hartmann hardly conceals the political differences between them.⁴⁹ Becker considered himself part of the German philological tradition, claiming Wellhausen, Goldziher, Nöldeke, and Snouck Hurgronje as his masters. However, his historical outlook was different: he sought to locate Islam as a civilization in a global historical process. He interpreted Christianity and Islam as two offsprings of Hellenism, and deplored what he perceived as Islam's increasing world rejection and entrenchment in mysticism. For him, elements of older Near Eastern civilizations in urban settings were much stronger in shaping Islamic civilization than Arab culture.⁵⁰ After 1908 Becker dedicated much of his work to Islam in sub-Saharan Africa, to Islam in the Ottoman Empire, and to colonial politics in regard to Islam. As will be seen, Hartmann, Schabinger, Mittwoch, Kampffmeyer, and Becker all played roles in the episode of the German Holy War.

Epistemologically, the new institutions indicated the beginning of a shift from philology into anthropology, political science, and law as fields of potential interaction with contemporary Islam. In other words, academia increasingly opened up to topics in Islamic studies with a clear perspective towards practical applicability, although the delimitation remained blurred.⁵¹ This shift is reflected in the appearance of new forums of publicity. At the Kolonial-Institut a new journal was established in 1910, called *Der Islam*, the first serious competitor to the old-style *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*. Inspired particularly by Martin Hartmann, a

new association emerged in 1912, the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Islamkunde*, which soon began editing yet another influential journal dealing with the contemporary Islamic world, *Welt des Islams*.⁵² Unlike the organizations mentioned before, this one included numerous outstanding Orientalists, as its interest in the modern Islamic world was essentially academic.⁵³

IV.

The German interest in a practical dimension of Orientalism coincided with an increasingly political dimension of Islam, Pan-Islamism.⁵⁴ Attempts throughout the Islamic world to conjure up Muslim solidarity and unity (*ittihad al-Islam*) as a political force were skillfully employed by the Ottomans, and by Abdülhamid II in particular, to rally Muslim subjects at home and gain symbolic capital through recognition by Muslims in other parts of the world. The Ottoman reinvention of the caliphate as—factually—the spiritual leadership of all Muslims, akin to a Muslim papacy, was the centerpiece of this strategy.⁵⁵

Colonial powers with large Muslim populations were greatly concerned by this emerging political Islam, even more so when Germany seemed to seize it as a political weapon. Wilhelm II's famous speech in Damascus in 1898, in which he declared himself the eternal friend of the 300 million Muslims in the world, was widely considered an encouragement for Pan-Islamism, and a threat especially to Britain, with which relations were increasingly tense.⁵⁶ Journalist Friedrich Naumann seconded:

It is possible that the world war will break out before the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Then the Caliph of Constantinople will once more uplift the Standard of the Holy War. The Sick Man will raise himself for the last time to shout to Egypt, the Sudan, East Africa, Persia, Afghanistan, and India, "War against England." It is not unimportant to know who will support him on his bed when he utters this cry.⁵⁷

The German academic Orientalists, on the other hand, were not concerned by the instrumentalization of Pan-Islamism. Hartmann, unsympathetic to political Islam anyway, saw the future in Arab nationalism—at least until 1914.⁵⁸ Becker dismissed missionaries' fears about the spread of Islam in German colonies in Africa, arguing that Islamization was in fact inevitable, and would facilitate colonial rule.⁵⁹ Drawing on the historical idea of the caliphate as a political office, he cautioned, however, against the recognition of the caliph as supreme religious leader in German colonies as well as in Bosnia.⁶⁰

It might appear that the vision of Wilhelm II and Friedrich Naumann, which so forcefully blended the idea of innate Muslim solidarity, highly inflammable

fanaticism, and the air of secrecy and conspiracy, simply sprang from Western popular Orientalism, and that it should have come to an end when the pious Abdülhamid, a credible champion of Pan-Islamism, lost power to the mostly secular Young Turks in 1908. Instead, the Young Turks continued Pan-Islamist politics in practice and in rhetoric, including the declaration of jihad in the Tripolitanian war against Italy in 1911. The reconstruction of the caliphate had already been based on an internalization of Western Orientalist ideas, and thus on "Ottoman Orientalism."⁶¹ The deliberate instrumentalization of Islam by a secular Ottoman regime demonstrates that Said's stable dichotomy of Europe vs. "the Orient" has to be revised in favor of a multipolar system in which positions were continually renegotiated.⁶²

V.

The idea of a German-inspired Holy War as a powerful weapon against the colonial powers was immediately resuscitated at the outbreak of World War I in 1914. The driving force behind the idea was not an academic Orientalist, but a diplomat, amateur archeologist, and ethnographer, trained in law and in Oriental languages, Max Freiherr von Oppenheim.

In 1896 the German Foreign Office had become increasingly alarmed by the spread of Islam in Africa, and had decided that in order to observe developments in the Islamic world independently from British intelligence, it needed to have its own men on the ground. It appointed the young Oppenheim to Cairo, where he quickly established intimate contacts with local notables and intellectuals, and turned the notion of an Islamic threat to German colonies into a large-scale scheme to use Pan-Islamism and jihad as weapons against England and, secondarily, France and Russia.⁶³ Oppenheim soon reported to Wilhelm II directly, and the emperor fell back on this idea numerous times over the next years.⁶⁴ His original goal of keeping Islam in check was replaced by the goal of instrumentalizing Islam.

At the outbreak of the world war Oppenheim, who had briefly pursued archeology, returned to the Foreign Office. Now he saw the chance to press for the realization of his old idea, and he was confident that the Turkish side, desperate to use any means at hand, would cooperate. Again his plans dovetailed with the fantasies of Wilhelm II, who during the crisis of July 1914 expressed his hope to "set the entire Muhammadan world aflame in a wild uprising."⁶⁵ Oppenheim wrote a number of memoranda regarding action to be taken in regard to Islam and the Ottomans. Of central importance is a lengthy memorandum entitled "Die Revolutionierung der islamischen Gebiete unserer Feinde" [Revolutionizing the Islamic Possessions of Our Enemies], dated October 1914, which presented a vast range

of ideas as to how a jihad proclaimed by the Ottoman sultan qua caliph of Islam could be used against the colonial powers. It is a blueprint for a concerted effort of propaganda to be disseminated by the Ottoman authorities and by German specialists, and of Turkish and German military action, including covert activities like inciting local rebellions and terrorism.⁶⁶ This policy must have been further encouraged when, after the Turkish jihad proclamation of November 1914, the Shi'ite *mujtahids* of Najaf and Kerbela followed suit with a call for the Shi'ite world.⁶⁷

Oppenheim's memorandum reveals a number of closely intertwined notions on Islam and the Islamic world. Although much more differentiated than those of his emperor, they reveal important stereotypes and prejudices informed by contemporary ethnographic discourse. Germany would have to maintain close control of all activities, given its superior financial and military means, as well as (implicitly) cultural superiority, while the "Oriental mentality" was considered to be a serious threat to the project. In his contempt for Turkish organizational skills Oppenheim was no different from Hartmann. He regularly argued that certain conditions had to be created in order to make the population in particular areas comply with the call for insurrection; however, in general the notion prevails that once these conditions are met Germany will be able to restrain or unleash those forces at will.⁶⁸ Oppenheim's assessment of the different ethnic and social groups reflects ethnic stereotypes then current in the Middle East: he believed the urban population weak and degraded, while he counted on the militant spirit of the Bedouins. Regarding sub-Saharan Africans Oppenheim was unashamedly racist. And his view of Oriental Christians was everything but favorable: "The other inhabitants, Armenians and Christian Georgians, in all likelihood deserve their reputation in the orient as being cowards, and great at plotting and scheming." He considered the Oriental Christians, many of whom worked for the French-operated railroads in Syria, as degenerated, and potentially dangerous for Ottoman rule, as they tended to favor French or British rule: "They will be able to cause railroad incidents, and large blockades of traffic, and commit all kinds of treason. Militarily, however, this bunch of cowards will not dare to rise against Turkey."⁶⁹

These stereotypes are more or less the same as those found in older travel literature on the Middle East, and it comes as no surprise that they correspond to those found in Karl May's *Orientzyklus* of popular adventure novels.⁷⁰ In his insistence on a declaration of jihad from the sultan, to whom he throughout referred as the "Sultan Khalifa," Oppenheim was entrenched in the classical legal concept of a caliph as the political authority of all Muslims. Other manifestations of Islam, like the dervish orders, for him had the flair of secrecy and

fanaticism, which he associated especially with the uneducated masses. On the other hand, Oppenheim was much less skeptical about Pan-Islamism than his academic colleagues, most likely guided by professional interests and lack of a historical outlook comparable to Becker's.⁷¹

VI.

The immediate outcome of Oppenheim's initiative was the establishment of an informal office under the roof of the Foreign Office, headed by Oppenheim himself, called Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient (NfO).⁷² It was intended to coordinate propaganda efforts and operations in relation to the Islamic world, friend and foe alike. Although its operations had military relevance, all its staff members were civilians. Oppenheim directed the NfO until March 1915, to be followed by Schabinger von Schowingen and then by Eugen Mittwoch in February 1916.⁷³ It was Schabinger who prompted the speech of the Moroccan on the balcony of the German embassy in Constantinople. That scene constituted the first action noted by a larger public, which fostered hopes for more, and with greater impact.⁷⁴

The NfO entertained a rather small permanent staff, a random mix of journalists, academics, and diplomats, and recruited additional collaborators for individual projects, along with unpaid volunteers as was seen fit. It never had a statute regulating its work.⁷⁵ Besides Oppenheim, Schabinger von Schowingen, and Mittwoch, its staff included the Indologist Helmuth von Glasenapp, and Oskar Mann, a specialist on Iranian and Kurdish languages, as academic Orientalists. Knowledge of Oriental languages can be assumed for dragomans Dr. Pröbster and Schröder, and Dr. Buka, an Arabist. Other Orientalists affiliated with the NfO, in varying degrees and durations, were Martin Hartmann, Islamologists Rudolf Tschudi and Georg Kampffmeyer, dialectologist Hans Stumme, and Gotthard Jäschke, a future expert on modern Turkish law and politics.⁷⁶ In addition the NfO employed up to twenty foreign workers.⁷⁷ Among the Muslims who cooperated with the NfO and who have received some attention in the literature, many were recruited with the help of the Turkish authorities, and had been affiliated with Enver Pasha's notorious secret service, the *Teshkilat-i Makhfusa*. This holds true for Salih ash-Sharif at-Tunisi, Ali Bash Hamba from Tunis, and Abdalaziz Chawish from Egypt, while the Druze notable Shakib Arslan had been a member of the Turkish parliament. Of these only Salih ash-Sharif worked directly for the NfO, where he was a prolific propaganda author, while the others kept close contact while pursuing their own (or Enver's) agenda. The second important Muslim collaborator of the NfO, and the only one with no link to the Turks, was Rabah Boukabouya, a French officer from Algiers

who had switched sides in April 1915. It is clear, however, that within the NfO none of them worked without close supervision.

Although the numerous activities of this ad hoc institution included many efforts to influence the German public, I will focus on those directly addressing Muslims, since the interest of this article is the communication of the German propaganda to Muslims especially by Orientalists. The Oriental target groups of the NfO were three: 1) Muslim soldiers, mainly French soldiers from North and sub-Saharan Africa, Indian Muslims, and Russian subjects from Central Asia, at the front or as POWs; 2) the population of the Ottoman Empire; and 3) the Muslim populations of the colonies of Germany's adversaries. The intentions of the NfO regarding these three groups ranged from recruiting potential fighters for the Holy War and instigating acts of insurgency against the allies, to creating a general mood of sympathy for Germany's cause in the war. Over time, it may be said here, ambitions became more realistic, and the focus turned towards the latter goal. The means applied were manifold. The NfO coordinated numerous efforts to send secret missions to several Muslim countries in order to provoke uprisings, commit or solicit sabotage, and secure alliances or at least the benevolent neutrality of Muslim rulers. Several of these missions were spectacular (enough so to inspire a highly popular novel, John Buchan's *Greenmantle*, a forerunner of T. E. Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*), and several failed most embarrassingly, but hardly any of them had a military impact.⁷⁸

The NfO had to work closely with the army and the Foreign Office to achieve its goals in reaching the Muslim POWs. This part of the NfO's activities is documented best. The NfO took great pains to see them treated well, to separate them from other POWs, and to unite them in two special camps. The camps in Wünsdorf and Zossen, not far from Berlin, one of them dubbed Halbmondlager (Camp Crescent) and featuring a little mosque, became symbols of the German desire to forge a Muslim unity among the POWs.⁷⁹ Turned into institutions to educate the prisoners, and to study them, the camps resembled colonies in miniature, in which a certain type of "native policy" was applied.⁸⁰ These men were interesting for the NfO as long as they were defined as Muslims, and the special treatment was entirely designed to enhance this perception of them. It was meant to increase the willingness of the prisoners to cooperate with German and Turkish authorities,⁸¹ and it was to be showcased in the Middle East as a token of the famed German-Muslim friendship supposedly dating back to Damascus in 1898. Again, the operation of November 1914 was the first visible utilization of this relationship.

The curious intersection of academic studies and the war effort that pervades the NfO activities resulted in the POWs being used as informants or material for academic studies.⁸² Ethnographer Leo Frobenius (after his unsuccessful career as an agent for jihad in Africa) praised the camps as a useful way to access "human material."⁸³ Others studied the racial anthropology of the Indian prisoners.⁸⁴ Orientalists in Camp Crescent collected linguistic and anthropological information, or simply used their time in the camp for other academic work.⁸⁵ Ethnographic photographs of prisoners, however, were also used for openly racist propaganda in Germany against the governments who employed these men as soldiers.⁸⁶ During the first two years of the war the NfO and the Foreign Office tended to refuse permission for such ethnographical work with the prisoners, out of fear that it could be depicted as racist by French propaganda, but this resistance largely ceased over time.⁸⁷

Most work that was not only inspired but actually carried out by the NfO was press activity and dissemination of propagandist writings in the Middle East. The German paper published in Constantinople, *Der Osmanische Lloyd*, founded in cooperation with the Foreign Office and German industry, was more or less openly turned into a mouthpiece of the German government. In addition, articles were planted in Constantinople papers that were sympathetic to Germany (such as *al-Adl* and *Jihan-i Islam*).⁸⁸ The NfO also set up numerous newspaper reading rooms (*Nachrichtensäle*) throughout the empire—Oppenheim claimed there were as many as seventy-five—in which the local population could study recent reports on the war and obtain background information on Germany and its war efforts. This network was coordinated by an outpost of the NfO in Istanbul, established in March 1915 and headed by Oppenheim.

Meanwhile, the main office in Berlin produced countless propaganda leaflets and brochures for distribution in North Africa and Egypt, in the Ottoman Empire (including the news reading rooms), and at the front wherever Muslim soldiers were deployed. Propaganda material in six different languages, including a special biweekly entitled *al-Jihad*, was also distributed among the POWs in Camp Crescent.⁸⁹

VII.

The goals and target groups of German propaganda were thus clearly defined, yet the business of producing this propaganda turned out to be difficult. In discussing these difficulties, I do not intend to launch a new explanation of why the German jihad failed. Instead, I want to analyze the propagandistic effort, as it is graspable in the form of printed material, as a communicative task

for the Orientalist: he is supposed to be not only linguistically but culturally proficient, to be familiar with the Islamic culture, and thus able to communicate with an Oriental other about what he had learned to consider the most essential part of this other's identity, his religion. The task faced by experts and non-experts at the NfO was how to persuade Muslims to take up arms (in the colonies of the allied powers) or to lay down arms (at the Western and Eastern fronts) and side with Germany and Turkey against the Triple Alliance. The extant products of the NfO, together with internal debates about propaganda strategies, give us a good idea of how they went about this.⁹⁰ Unfortunately, the existing texts cannot be attributed to any individual collaborator of the NfO, so that they have to be discussed as a collectivity rather than individuals with diverging back grounds.

The default argument rested on Islamic law. The purest expression of this argument was in the fatwas by the *sheykhülislam*, which constituted the official declaration of Holy War. They were distributed, along with a speech by Enver, by the National Defense Committee in the Ottoman Empire. The NfO intended to use them especially at the Western front.⁹¹ I am not aware of any wider distribution of the Shiite fatwas issued shortly after those of the *sheykhülislam*.⁹²

The legal argument, however, is susceptible to counterarguments on the same grounds. Thus the French and British colonial authorities made sure to obtain fatwas from local legal experts declaring obedience to colonial powers lawful and binding on all Muslims in their jurisdiction. Since there is no unified jurisdictional hierarchy in Islam, this was a simple and efficient antidote.⁹³ The legal declaration of jihad named the caliph as "commander of the faithful" and thus leader of the Muslim community: he was described as attacked by the Triple Alliance, and Muslims were called to defend him and the community. If the legitimacy of the caliph was disputed, however, his call for jihad would be obsolete. The campaign of Sharif Husayn in Mecca to establish himself as the legitimate heir to the caliphate instead of the Ottoman sultan, who lacked descent from the prophet's tribe, was another legalist assault on the jihad project, backed by the British.⁹⁴ The NfO worked hard to defend Ottoman legitimacy. Schabinger wanted to avoid a legal debate because he considered it an internal Islamic problem, but felt compelled to respond to allied statements.⁹⁵

In the popular views of Islam as held for instance by Wilhelm II and the War Ministry,⁹⁶ the legal argument alone should have sufficed: an essentialist image of Muslims sees them as fundamentally guided by the norms of the scripture.⁹⁷ Accordingly, instruction on scriptural Islam was also part of the instruction of the POWs in Camp Crescent, carried out by Muslim col-

laborators of the NfO and intended to turn prisoners—presorted into three categories, Francophile, luke warm, and willing—into fervent participants in Holy War.⁹⁸

But the NfO did not rely on the legal argument alone. In the propaganda leaflets available to me, it appears usually only to boost other arguments.⁹⁹ The NfO was aware that normative commands like the rules of jihad are always filtered through social realities, that is, that a call for jihad would not be obeyed purely because of its legal authority, but only if it promised direct social or political gains. Therefore, fighting against colonial powers was probably the strongest incentive mustered by the Germans. This was addressed directly in the propaganda, in which anticolonialism looms large. Descriptions of atrocities committed by colonial powers were thus a logical topic. Most of the leaflets and brochures I have seen have only text, but pictures occur in materials highlighting brutal oppression.¹⁰⁰ Other texts accused the French army of discrimination against Muslims, or the British of causing the impoverishment of India.¹⁰¹

Colonial powers were denounced as anti-Islamic. From this vantage point, it was easy to connect to the declared jihad for the defense of Islam: fight for the French, or fight with your brethren in jihad, was the alternative.¹⁰² Statements from prominent British and French politicians were often quoted, either to refute them politically in great detail, or to expose the authors' alleged hatred of Islam. An open letter addressed to the Moroccan puppet king Mulay Yusuf implicitly delegitimizes his rule and encourages resistance against him and his French overlords, while another letter addresses the Sanusis and celebrates their resistance against the Italians in Tripolitania, with the tacit intention of encouraging emulation in Tunisia and Algeria.¹⁰³ In other cases, international law is mustered against the colonial powers, as in one open letter written by an exiled Egyptian politician.¹⁰⁴ In a rather academic fashion, a treatise in Persian by a Dr. M. M. Rifat argues against comparisons of the British occupation of Egypt and the German violation of Belgian neutrality.¹⁰⁵

It is worth noting that texts with a mainly anticolonial thrust were mostly written by Muslim collaborators (as far as our sample of propaganda texts goes), although certainly approved by the German authorities at the NfO. German officials occasionally voiced objections against outright anticolonial arguments, because in case of victory Germany had no intention of granting freedom to its own colonial subjects.¹⁰⁶ When compared to the more legalist argument mustered by the Orientalists (and Salih ash-Sharif, to be sure) it is hard to avoid the impression that the Muslims had the better sense of their compatriots' real concerns.

Another dominant strain of argument in the propaganda of the NfO is certainly primarily inspired by the German side. Oppenheim's memorandum already revealed an almost paranoid fear of allied propaganda. In fact a great part of the German propaganda effort was to set German success in the right light and to correct what allegedly was misstated and distorted in British and especially French war reports. This insistence makes sense in terms of propaganda, as it acknowledges that even the most legalistically thinking Muslim might abstain from jihad if that meant siding with the losing party in the war. Thus the motifs of victorious Germany and Germany as a true friend of Islam appeared side by side.¹⁰⁷ But many leaflets and brochures treated this topic only in the form of statistics on captured soldiers, destroyed ships, and seized artillery. Some of them appeared as regular bulletins with a few pages,¹⁰⁸ others were booklets of sixty or more pages that included a complete chronology of the war.¹⁰⁹ The meticulous listing of the "truth" from the battlefield was not unproblematic. Continual reports of victory contrasted in the long run with the fact that the war was not yet over. Moreover, where the most recent reports from other sources were available, as in Camp Crescent, it was noted that the reports in the POWs' languages were often outdated, and the discrepancy often revealed unfavorable developments, in stark contrast to the wording.¹¹⁰

All war reports I have seen so far essentially focus on events in the European war theater, while developments from the Ottoman fronts in the Caucasus and in Mesopotamia were passed in silence. In a sixty-page booklet, for example, the declaration of jihad is worth one and a half lines, and the failed naval attack against the Dardanelles of 18 March 1915 no more than seven lines.¹¹¹ Critics within the NfO held that including a vast array of names and figures in such material would only cause confusion, and ultimately boredom, in a non-European audience far from the theater of war.¹¹² In an attempt to make information more palatable, illustrated albums were distributed, originally designed for a European audience, and later expanded by pages with captions in Turkish, Arabic, Persian, and Urdu.¹¹³

Germanocentrism even went a step further. In a brochure entitled "The Moral and Military Power of the German Nation," the author compared German community-oriented idealism against English individualism. Such moral superiority would bring about military superiority.¹¹⁴ The directive given by Oppenheim that Germany should have the lead in all propaganda seems to have been taken too literally. Oppenheim insisted that advertising Germany as the greatest economic power was in the German interest, while other diplomats feared to arouse suspicions about German postwar designs.¹¹⁵

All these reports assumed a well-informed public with regular access to information, and especially to maps, in order to make sense of the data provided. The individual refutation of reports and comments by French and British papers, for example, would be meaningful only to readers of these papers. The naïve assumption that truth would assert itself is also at the bottom of the clumsy attempt to showcase the treatment of Muslim POWs. Desperately seeking useful material, the NfO seized upon correspondence between a prisoner and his father in Algeria. The result of a painstaking editing process once again revealed the dilemma of the NfO: aside from the focus on the treatment of POWs, the mention of the father's farm and the use of Algerian dialect that give the letters an air of authenticity also make them sound very civil. Two added letters use fervent rhetoric and phrases from the Koran for a call for Holy War, but for the same reason are far less credible as personal documents.¹¹⁶

The NfO also made use of literary forms in its propaganda efforts. It distributed a poem in Arabic that was composed in 1915 on the anniversary of the Egyptian khedive Abbas Hilmi II's ascension to the throne by a member of the Young Egyptian National Committee in Berlin. It called for Islamic unity and the jihad, and expressed hope for a return of Abbas Hilmi under an Ottoman caliph.¹¹⁷ Three poems in Persian cast their praise of German arms in the form and language of Persian epics, especially the *Shahnamah* and Nizami's *Layli va Majnun*.¹¹⁸ Again it is hard to imagine that these exercises could have any impact beyond the educated *litterateurs* in urban coffeehouses, who would find their German sympathies confirmed. Preserving those seems to have been enough of a goal for the NfO, although such work would certainly not help win over former enemies. At the same time, these poems resonate with a widespread European idea of the Oriental, in particular the Persians, as susceptible to classical or classicist poetry. Ironically, critics of the NfO had objected that it would especially incite the fanaticism of the uneducated masses: this was certainly not the case with these efforts.

To sum up, the NfO leadership seems to have had an idea what it wanted—fanatic mujahideen—but it had hardly any idea of how to inspire fanaticism. Fanaticism was the prevailing notion associated with Islam, at least with Pan-Islamism. The word appears regularly in the context of active practice of Islam, to the extent that one might assume that in popular perception "active Muslim" and "fanatic Muslim" were the same. Wilhelm II thought of the "sultan-caliph" as a key to Muslim fanaticism.¹¹⁹ The Dutch Orientalist Snouck Hurgronje distinguished between the educated (read: Europeanized) elite and the masses "among whom fanaticism can be easily aroused."¹²⁰

Contemporary observers were bewildered by the effect of Salih's preaching among Muslims taken prisoner on the western front, describing "the captured Muhammadans whom our sheikh was able to fanaticize to a degree that two of them, overflowing with tears, bade farewell to their brethren, in order to return to the English trenches to instigate their comrades. Unfortunately both of them, and the sergeant who led them through our lines, were killed by our troops as they tried to cross over."¹²¹ Aside from the cynicism, this passage illustrates the perceived cultural gap between Germans and this "fanatic Islam," a gap that even the Orientalist expertise rallied around the NfO was not able to bridge. The suggestion of an NfO member, Pröbster, that the captives in Camp Crescent should be made to read the medieval chronicle of Ibn Khaldun in order to arouse their warlike spirits through the memories of their glorious past, is just one more example of how helpless and unrealistic attempts to instigate Islamic fanaticism actually were.¹²² It is no wonder, then, that when the NfO felt a need to make its propaganda more efficient, which meant more inflammatory,¹²³ it fell back to giving the Muslim collaborators more of a free hand, so that they could work their way.¹²⁴

On the other hand, in the fall of 1915, after severe criticism of the newspaper *al-Jihad* within the NfO, orders were given to take more topics into account that were brought up by the POWs themselves.¹²⁵ This indicates another, competing approach to the function of a propaganda paper. Instead of a top-down policy of indoctrination, *al-Jihad* would become a paper by POWs for POWs, and thus a document of German-Islamic friendship. A closer reading of the extant issues would be necessary to verify whether there was any serious attempt to create a German-Muslim "we-group" within Camp Crescent.

The NfO's potential association with Islamic fanaticism was a cause of considerable concern. The documentation available does not indicate that these concerns led to changes in the way the NfO addressed its Muslim audience, although it may be suggested that the emphasis in the output of the NfO on war reports and accusations of colonialist oppression resulted from the qualms of authors and officers. The dispute is evident only in the numerous works defending the alliance with Pan-Islamism to the German public.

VIII.

The German public debate is relevant to this article inasmuch as it reflects issues of professional ethics and self-understanding among the scholars involved. The NfO took pains to disseminate favorable items in the German press, and to subdue criticism of the "alliance with Islam," as the expression went.¹²⁶ Several scholars from the circle of the NfO published small treatises,

while a similar flood of pamphlets appeared on the side of the allies.¹²⁷ In fall 1914 Becker published *Deutschland und der Islam* in Ernst Jäckh's series entitled "Der deutsche Krieg," in which he defended German policy towards Islam (Becker, it may be recalled, was one of the most influential men in the field, but not directly involved with the NfO).¹²⁸ Of all the booklets and pamphlets published at the time, this one drew a vehement response in *Internationale Monatschrift* from C. Snouck Hurgronje, the Dutch scholar and longtime colonial administrator, to which Becker responded in the same journal.¹²⁹ Snouck, who was in close contact with many German colleagues, accused Becker of complicity in an endeavor he feared would endanger what he saw as the civilizing mission of the Netherlands in Southeast Asia. Moreover, he deplored Becker's advocacy of the jihad, which revoked earlier critical German assessments of Pan-Islamism. Becker responded by defending the "alliance with Islam" as legitimate in times of war, while he admitted that this form of jihad had no precedent in Islamic history. Moreover, he went to great lengths to play down the potential impact on Dutch colonies.

Both scholars saw the natural political component of their academic work. Neither of them advocated to return to the ivory tower that Orientalists had just begun to leave. (This is obvious for Snouck, but holds also true for Becker.)¹³⁰ Moreover, both Snouck and Becker believed that academic study would reveal truths that would inform the process of political decision making. The reliance on such objective truths corresponds to their initial belief in belonging to a transnational community of scholars working on the same project. If the far-reaching correspondence of Snouck can be taken as an indication, the inner core of this community was located in the Germanophone world, including Goldziher in Budapest as well as Snouck in Leiden. At the same time, Louis Massignon, Duncan McDonald, and Manuel Asín Palacios appear regularly in Snouck's letters as part of this community. The first *Encyclopedia of Islam*, initiated shortly before the war, is an impressive document of their cooperative work.¹³¹

The highly emotional tone of the debate can—in my opinion—be explained by the fact that this sense of community had been shattered by the interference of politics. Snouck linked the alleged barbarism of the call for jihad to the German violation of Dutch neutrality at the beginning of the war. Becker pretended not to believe that the Dutch flinched in their solidarity with Germany in what he saw as a desperate struggle for national survival. Still, both opponents had more in common than they were likely to admit. Both wanted to maintain an academic monopoly for authoritative interventions in the public sphere, and assured each other of their respective contempt for all the non-academic writing about the German jihad. Moreover, both ad-

hered (explicitly or implicitly) to a professional ethic that valued the upholding of a scholarly opinion more highly than the political obligations of the day. Snouck's strength in the debate lay in the fact that he was able to identify as a scholar with the colonial policy he defended (as he had decisively contributed to it), while Becker in his letters to Snouck had to admit that his public stance was different from his academic stance before the war. This implied that he had not had influence on German policy, but felt obliged to support it, and thus exposed him to accusations of compromising his academic credibility. Snouck stated explicitly that it had been Becker's position as a scholar that had caused Snouck to intervene in the debate in order to defend professional ethics, and Becker's response implies that he felt indebted to the same standards.

The reception of this debate is a piece of the modern historiography of Oriental studies, but also a continuation of the self-reflection of the field, and as such is relevant to this article. Peter Heine has cast the debate in terms of the problematic relationship between academic Oriental studies (and, for that matter, all academic study) and political enterprise. In emphasizing the danger of compromising standards of academic work, he seems to be subscribing to a similar epistemological self-understanding as that present in the debate itself.¹³² In a detailed response to this implication, Hanisch attempted to further problematize the position of academia in society, by shifting the emphasis from the maintenance of epistemological standards to the social responsibility of academic work.¹³³ In this respect, the guiding aspects of both contributions are not specific to Oriental studies but are pertinent to all kinds of academic work. Therefore, both of them discuss the entire case without reference to the Orientalist problematic, although Edward Said's book had appeared shortly before.

The question of the representation of the "Oriental" was briefly taken up by Thomas Scheffler. Scheffler argues that German Oriental studies, inasmuch as the field was occupied with the contemporary, was not concerned with representing the Oriental as the eternal "other." This point is correct in several respects. In particular, the image of the effeminate Orient was absent; instead the image of the Turk was regularly associated with masculinity. On the other hand, racist notions, the denigration of Islam as a religion of fanaticism, and a sense of Western civilized superiority pervade much of the discourse of German Orientalists. Therefore, Scheffler's point that German engagement in the Orient was more concerned with partnership than with colonial hegemony needs qualification.¹³⁴ It can be argued that this was not a matter of choice, but dictated by the political situation: as mentioned above, Germany was not without colonial ambitions regarding Ottoman territories. In any case, the lack of symmetry in the partnership

is obvious. Scheffler's argument about the particular German transition from Oriental philology to modern political science neglects the structural parallels to other cases of Orientalism.

Thus, in place of a conclusion, we can state that the German jihad project was initiated outside of the academic field, but found willing accomplices among the representatives of a new type of scholar interested in direct interaction with the contemporary Middle East and Islam. While classicist scholarship continued, the political relevance of "presentist" studies was now openly acknowledged and embraced in the field. Connections to colonialist discourses were manifest, albeit to widely varying degrees. The work of the NfO largely consisted in the impossible task of advertising the jihad, which had originated in political circles not directly in contact with academic experts. The search for convincing arguments on all levels shows the degree to which scholars were not only working within the Orientalist discourse, as they were indebted to essentialist notions of Islam, but also willing to explore arguments more related to the social realities of day-to-day life in the Muslim world. In particular, however, the present case demonstrates the lack of authority granted to the experts, whose expertise was not sought after, and who were mostly employed as subaltern executioners of a policy conceived elsewhere. This was expressed by Friedrich Rosen, a high-ranking official in the Foreign Office and respected Orientalist, who in his memoirs sarcastically asked whether—with respect to the Holy War of 1914—the novelist Karl May should be called the father of German Oriental politics.¹³⁵

This characterization speaks to the fundamental disconnect between current academic knowledge and the ideas that informed literature, arts, and political decision making. Snouck Hurgronje had diagnosed a certain tension between the academic work of German Orientalists like Becker and their involvement in the German Holy War, and we have found more related ambiguities. This leads me back to a programmatic statement by Said, which I believe has not received due attention. Said states that his study did not establish "a hard-and-fast rule about the relationship between knowledge and politics." Rather, he continues, "each humanistic investigation must formulate the nature of that connection in the specific context of the study, the subject matter, and its historical circumstances."¹³⁶ This article supports Said's postulate by demonstrating how complex this connection was, and also how in authoritarian Germany it was so easily overturned by the change in political circumstances in 1914.

NOTES

The title of this article is inspired by an article by Peter Heine, "C. Snouck Hurgronje versus C. H. Becker. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der angewandten Orientalistik," *Welt des Islams* 24 (1984). Thanks are due to the German-Turkish Studies Group at the University of Michigan, and to Klaus Kreiser (Bamberg), Gerhard Höpp (Berlin), Jennifer Jenkins (Toronto), and the anonymous reviewer for their suggestions and critique.

Throughout this article, I am using the term *Turkish* primarily as a political denomination synonymous to *Ottoman*. I use *Istanbul* and *Constantinople* interchangeably, without implying any irredentist thoughts. Transcription of Turkish names has been simplified. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

¹On the events leading the empire into the war see Gotthard Jäschke, "Zum Eintritt der Türkei in den Weltkrieg," *Welt des Islams* 19 (1979). I do not intend to reopen the discussion of whether the empire as a whole or members of the government were tricked into war by the Germans or their collaborators in the Young Turk government. On the military and diplomatic aspects of the German-Turkish alliance see Ulrich Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1918* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968); Frank G. Weber, *Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria, and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance, 1914–1918* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, [1970]); Veli Yilmaz, *1nci Dünya Harbi'nde Türk-Alman İttifaki Ve Askeri Yardımlar* (Istanbul: Veli Yilmaz, 1993).

²The fatwas are published in Geoffrey Lewis, "The Ottoman Proclamation of Jihad in 1914," *Islamic Quarterly* 19 (1975): 157–63; and Gottfried Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg: Flugblätter und Flugschriften in arabischer, persischer und osmanisch-türkischer Sprache aus einer Sammlung der Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg eingeleitet, übersetzt und kommentiert*, Heidelberg Orientalistische Studien 15 (Frankfurt: P. Lang, 1990), 67–9. For a contemporary publication for the German public, see *Welt des Islams* 3 (1915): 10–18. For a photograph see Gerhard Höpp, *Muslimen in der Mark: Als Kriegsgefangene und Internierte in Wünsdorf und Zossen, 1914–1924* (Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 1997), 167.

³One of the rare photographs of the event known to me shows the crowd in front of the Ministry of War: Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, 259. On the visit to the grand vizierate see C. Snouck Hurgronje, *The Holy War "Made in Germany," with a Word of Introduction by Richard J. H. Gottheil* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1915), 49.

⁴Höpp, *Muslimen in der Mark*, 32, quoting Schabinger von Schowingen.

⁵This outline of events is mostly based on Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire*, 118, and Snouck Hurgronje, *Holy War "Made in Germany,"* 48ff. Edgar Stern-Rubarth, a participant in the journey, indicates that the ceremony at the Fatih mosque took place after the reception at the German embassy, but this is less likely (quoted in Höpp, *Muslimen in der Mark*, 36).

⁶Mary Mills Patrick, *Under Five Sultans* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1930), 289f.

⁷Anna Grosser-Rilke, *Nieverwehte Klänge* (Leipzig: Otto Beyer, 1937), 236. Grosser-Rilke, originally a pianist and a student of Franz Liszt, was the head of the Agence de Con-

stantinople, the local partner of the Wolffsche Telegraphenbüro. On this see Irmgard Farah, *Die deutsche Pressepolitik und Propagandatätigkeit im Osmanischen Reich von 1908–1918 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des "Osmanischen Lloyd,"* Beirut Texts and Studies 50 (Beirut: In Kommission bei Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart, 1993).

⁸Herbert Landolin Müller, *Islam, Gihad ("Heiliger Krieg") und Deutsches Reich: Ein Nachspiel zur Wilhelminischen Weltpolitik im Maghreb, 1914–1918*, Europäische Hochschulschriften, reihe 3, Geschichte und ihre Hilfswissenschaften 506 (Frankfurt: P. Lang, 1991), 228, quoting Stern-Rubarth.

⁹Patrick, *Under Five Sultans*, 290. "A la franga," as opposed to "alla turka," was the common expression for all kinds of cultural import from Europe. A more partisan observer, the American Henry Morgenthau, put the blame for the ensuing anti-Christian violence squarely on the German ambassador. Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1918).

¹⁰Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 2–3.

¹¹George Steinmetz, "'The Devil's Handwriting': Precolonial Discourse, Ethnographic Acuity, and Cross-Identification in German Colonialism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45:1 (2003): 41–95.

¹²Ussama Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," *American Historical Review* 107:3 (2002): 768–96; Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, *Refashioning Iran: Orientalism, Occidentalism, and Historiography* (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998).

¹³The only Austrian marginally involved, Alois Musil, coordinated his expedition to the Arab tribes in 1914 with the German military, and sent his reports to the German Foreign Office. See Georg Sauer, "Alois Musil's Reisen nach Arabien im Ersten Weltkrieg. Ein Beitrag zu seinem Lebensbild aus Anlaß seines 100. Geburtstages am 30. Juni 1968," *Archiv Orientalní* 37 (1969): 243–63.

¹⁴Johann Fück, *Die arabischen Studien in Europa bis in den Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1955), 21.

¹⁵On Johann David Michaelis, the well-known theologian-Orientalist, who, among other things, provided the questionnaire for the famous Arabian expedition of Carsten Niebuhr and his companions, see Ulrich Hübner, "Johann David Michaelis und die Arabien-Expedition 1761–1781," in *Carsten Niebuhr (1733–1815) und seine Zeit. Beiträge eines interdisziplinären Symposiums vom 7.–10. Oktober 1999 in Eutin*, ed. Josef Wiesehöfer and Stephan Conermann, *Oriens et Occidens* 5 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2002), 363–402.

¹⁶Fück, *Die arabischen Studien in Europa*, 108ff. On Riese's teacher Schultens and his theological background see pp. 105–7.

¹⁷The collection of Heinrich von Diez, former minister at the Prussian representation in Constantinople (Franz Babiniger, "Die türkischen Studien in Europa bis zum Auftreten Josef von Hammer-Purgstalls," *Welt des Islams* 7:3–4 [1919]: 129) is now in the Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin; that of Count Wenzeslaus Rzewusky, the sponsor of Hammer-Purgstall's *Fundgruben des Orients*, is in Vienna's

Österreichische Nationalbibliothek. While these were private enterprises, collecting manuscripts was an official part of the Niebuhr expedition. See, e.g., Gottfried Hagen, "Unter den 'Tyranen seiner Araber' – Carsten Niebuhr über Konstantinopel, Türken und Osmanisches Reich," in Wiesehöfer and Conermann, *Carsten Niebuhr*, 302. It was most successfully accomplished by Ulrich Jasper Seetzen, who sent about 3,500 manuscripts to the duke in Gotha before he was assassinated in Yemen in 1811. See *Ulrich Jasper Seetzen (1767–1811): Leben und Werk. Die arabischen Länder und die Nabostforschung im Napoleonischen Zeitalter* (Gotha: Forschungs- und Landesbibliothek, 1995).

¹⁸On all of them see Fück, *Die arabischen Studien in Europa*, and the obituaries by Carl Heinrich Becker assembled in vol. 2 of Carl Heinrich Becker, *Islamstudien. Vom Werden und Wesen der Islamischen Welt* (Leipzig: Quelle and Meyer, 1924–32). On Goldziher see also Jean Jacques Waardenburg, *L'islam dans le miroir de l'occident; comment quelques orientalistes occidentaux se sont penchés sur l'islam et se sont formé une image de cette religion: I. Goldziher, C. Snouck Hurgronje, C. H. Becker, D. B. Macdonald, Louis Massignon*, (Paris: Mouton, 1963).

¹⁹Babinger, "Die türkischen Studien in Europa." See also Asli Çirakman, *From the "Terror of the World" to the "Sick Man of Europe": European Images of Ottoman Empire and Society from the Sixteenth Century to the Nineteenth*, Studies in Modern European History 43 (New York: P. Lang, 2002).

²⁰Helga Fischer, "Das Osmanische Reich in Reisebeschreibungen und Berichten des 18. Jahrhunderts," in *Das Osmanische Reich und Europa 1683–1789: Konflikt, Entspannung und Austausch*, ed. Gernot Heiss and Grete Klingenstein (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1983). Instructive are the collective reviews published in Christoph Wilhelm Lüdeke, *Beschreibung des türkischen Reiches nach seiner Religions- und Staatsverfassung in der letzten Hälfte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts*, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1771–89).

²¹Klaus Kreiser, "Unfeierliche Beiträge zu 100 Jahren Orientalistik in Deutschland," in *Türkische Studien in Europa*, *Analecta Isisiana* 31 (Istanbul: Isis Verlag, 1998), 87. Cf. Babinger, "Die türkischen Studien in Europa," 125.

²²For a convenient overview see Klaus Kreiser, ed., *Germano-Turcica. Zur Geschichte des Türkisch-Lernens in den deutschsprachigen Ländern. Ausstellung des Lehrstuhls für türkische Sprache, Geschichte und Kultur der Universität Bamberg in Zusammenarbeit mit der Universitätsbibliothek Bamberg*, in *Türkische Studien in Europa*, 65–84.

²³Babinger, "Die türkischen Studien in Europa," 114–15. Meninski's *Thesaurus* is still considered useful, so much so that it was reprinted in Istanbul in 2000 (Simurg).

²⁴Fück, *Die arabischen Studien in Europa*, 158–66, reproduces the academic contempt for the non-academic scholar in dismissing Hammer's efforts in Arabic and Persian. In fact, Hammer was not a philologist. But his monumental history of the Ottoman Empire until 1774 still holds a place of pride among the great narratives of Ottoman history in Western languages, and his information on Ottoman administration may still be useful. See Klaus Kreiser, *Der Osmanische Staat 1300–1922*, Oldenbourg Grundriss der Geschichte 30 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2001), index, s.v. "Hammer-Purgstall."

²⁵Klaus Kreiser, "Haben die Türken Verstand? Zur europäischen Orient-Debatte im Napoleonischen Zeitalter," in *Ulrich Jasper Seetzen*. Fleischer's preface to Behrner's translation of the *Tales of the Forty Viziers* states that comprehensive study of the Middle East's daily and intellectual life is not possible without knowledge of Turkish, but this has to be taken with a grain of salt (quoted in Kreiser, *Türkische Studien in Europa*, 68).

²⁶See Klaus Kreiser, "Hermann Bamberger und die Turkologie," in *Türkische Studien in Europa*, 111. The lectureship had been established in 1850, but had been vacant since 1855.

²⁷Kreiser, "Hermann Bamberger und die Turkologie," 115.

²⁸Lory Alder and Richard Dalby, *The Dervish of Windsor Castle: The Life of Arminius Vambery* (London: Bachman and Turner, 1979); Kreiser, "Hermann Bamberger und die Turkologie."

²⁹Fück, *Die arabischen Studien in Europa*, 320.

³⁰Jehuda Lothar Wallach, *Anatomie einer Militärhilfe: Die preussisch-deutschen Militärmissionen in der Türkei 1835-1919*, Schriftenreihe des Instituts für Deutsche Geschichte, Universität Tel Aviv 1 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1976), 121–35.

³¹Gregor Schöllgen, *Imperialismus und Gleichgewicht: Deutschland, England und die orientalische Frage 1871–1914* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1984), 38–49. As a matter of fact German investment in the Baghdad Railroad took a long time to catch on, since its risks seemed disproportionately high compared to other railroad projects at the time.

³²The dilemma is found in a nutshell in a note by the secretary of the German Foreign Office stating that Germany was not bound by any political interests in the Middle East, to which the head of the Oriental section, Zimmermann, added, "although we have to take our economic interests into account." Quoted in Wilhelm van Kampen, "Studien zur deutschen Türkeipolitik in der Zeit Wilhelms II." (PhD diss., University of Kiel, 1968), 28.

³³Jan Stefan Richter, *Die Orientreise Kaiser Wilhelms II. 1898: Eine Studie zur deutschen Aussenpolitik an der Wende zum 20. Jahrhundert*, Studien zur Geschichtsforschung der Neuzeit 9 (Hamburg: Kovac, 1997), 99–105.

³⁴van Kampen, "Studien zur deutschen Türkeipolitik," 170.

³⁵van Kampen, "Studien zur deutschen Türkeipolitik," 160.

³⁶Hans Barth, *Türke wehre Dich*, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Rengersche Buchhandlung, 1898). Many thanks to my colleague Rudi Lindner for providing me with a modern Turkish reprint of this lengthy pamphlet.

³⁷I am grateful to Klaus Kreiser for referring me to this claim.

³⁸*Welt am Montag*, Nov. 21, 1898, quoted in van Kampen, "Studien zur deutschen Türkeipolitik," 149. This is one of the very rare instances when an openly sexualized vocabulary is used in regard to Turkey.

³⁹The Deutsches Vorderasien-Komitee was founded by geographer Hugo Grothe, but never found enough financial support to extend its activities beyond minor publications for a German audience. Jürgen Kloosterhuis, *Friedliche Imperialisten: Deutsche Auslandsvereine und auswärtige Kulturpolitik, 1906-1918*, Europäische Hochschulschriften, Reihe 3, Geschichte und ihre Hilfswissenschaften 588 (Frankfurt: Lang, 1994),

573–9. The Deutsch-Türkische Vereinigung originated from a committee for the establishment of a German university in Konya. Its *spiritus rector* was journalist Ernst Jäckh, who had landed his first success in Oriental politics when he organized a study tour for Turkish politicians and journalists through Germany in 1911 – hence his nickname Türken-Jäckh. Ibid., 589–93, 579–84; Klaus Kreiser, "Damenbäder und Kanonengiessereien. Zur Osmanischen Studienreise nach Deutschland (Juni/Juli 1911)," in *Das Osmanische Reich in seinen Archivalien und Chroniken. Nejat Göyünç zu Ehren*, ed. Klaus Kreiser and Christoph K. Neumann, Beirut: Texte und Studien 65, Türkische Welten 1 (Beirut: Franz Steiner in Kommission, 1997): 85–112. Its roster reads like a who's-who of German banking (Kloosterhuis, *Friedliche Imperialisten*, 595–657). Its primary project was a privately funded German school in Anatolia, but plans for cultural activities reached much farther. The greatest of them, a House of Friendship in Istanbul (*Dostluk Yurdu*, or *Haus der Freundschaft*) was never realized. German politics in Qingdao had provided an important example. Jäckh's excellent contacts with high-ranking Turkish politicians (established after 1908; see van Kampen, "Studien zur deutschen Türkeipolitik," 285) guaranteed the continuing interest of the Foreign Office. Jäckh became professor of Turkish history in Berlin in 1916 (another indication of the peculiar status of Turkish studies in German academia), and emigrated to the United States after 1933.

⁴⁰Kreiser, "Unfeierliche Beiträge," 89–90. The success of the SOS is illustrated by the fact that several important administrators of German colonies in the Far East were trained there. Steinmetz, "The Devil's Handwriting," 83.

⁴¹Hartmann's contempt for Islam as a religion is documented in his letters to Ignaz Goldziher. See Ludmila Hanisch, "Machen Sie doch unseren Islam nicht gar zu schlecht". *Der Briefwechsel der Islamwissenschaftler Ignaz Goldziher und Martin Hartmann 1894–1914*, Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur Mainz, Veröffentlichungen der Orientalischen Kommission 45 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2000).

⁴²On Hartmann see Martin Kramer, "Arabistik and Arabism: The Passions of Martin Hartmann," *Middle Eastern Studies* 25:3 (1989): 283–300, with further literature. Hartmann's antipathy for political Islam later manifested itself when he vehemently opposed plans by his "colleague" in propaganda, Salih ash-Sharif, for an Islamic institution of higher education in Germany. Müller, *Islam, Jihad*, 276.

⁴³Kloosterhuis, *Friedliche Imperialisten*, 571–2.

⁴⁴On cross-identification see Steinmetz, who points out that several colonial administrators who identified in this way with their subjects had been trained at the SOS (Steinmetz, "The Devil's Handwriting," 83). For Becker's criticism of Hartmann see Ludmila Hanisch, "Gelehrtenelbstverständnis, wissenschaftliche Rationalität und politische Emotionen," *Welt des Islams* 32 (1992): 107–23, at 116, and Becker's necrology for Hartmann in Becker, *Islamstudien*, vol. 2. In 1926 Kampffmeyer was accused of having more contact with "Orientals living here [in Berlin] or coming through" than was appropriate. Gerhard Höpp, "Orientalist mit Konsequenz: Georg Kampffmeyer und die Muslime," in *Religionswissenschaft in Konsequenz. Beiträge im Anschluss an Impulse von Kurt Rudolph*, ed. R. Flasche, F. Heinrich, and C. Koch (Hamburg: 2000), 38.

⁴⁵Sachau worked on al-Biruni and on Syriac. On the faculty, Friedrich Giese, for example, was mainly occupied with early Ottoman chronicles.

⁴⁶Peter Heine, "Wiederentdeckte Gemeinsamkeiten," *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung* 95:4–5 (2000): 371–3.

⁴⁷Höpp, *Muslimen in der Mark*, 32; Kreiser, "Unfeierliche Beiträge," 88–9. Schabinger's memoirs, distributed in 1967 in a few private copies, were not accessible to me during the preparation of this article. His translation of Nizam al-Mulk's famous eleventh-century treatise on statecraft, the *Siyasat-name*, is still available.

⁴⁸Becker is briefly mentioned in Said, *Orientalism*, 209, but based on a highly tendential rendering from Waardenburg, *L'islam*. The same is true for Said's assessment of the other scholars studied by Waardenburg, such as Goldziher, Snouck Hurgronje, Massignon, and MacDonald.

⁴⁹Kramer, "Arabistik and Arabism," 286ff.

⁵⁰Waardenburg, *L'islam*, 121 and passim.

⁵¹Criticizing Heine's notion of "applied Oriental studies," Hanisch insists that Orientalism is never detached from political significance. It is clear, however, that the intentional involvement in "real life" marks a qualitative change. Hanisch, "Gelehrtenelbstverständnis," 110ff.

⁵²Peter Heine, "Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Islamkunde," in *Islamstudien ohne Ende. Festschrift für Werner Ende zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. Rainer Brunner, Monika Gronke, Jens Peter Laut, Ulrich Rebstock (Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft; Würzburg: Ergon, 2002), 175–81. See also Kloosterhuis, *Friedliche Imperialisten*, 584ff. These three journals continue to constitute the major forum of German Oriental studies. Becker's programmatic article "Der Islam als Problem" in the first issue of *Der Islam* has been celebrated as a founding document of modern Islamic studies by Mark Batunsky, "Carl Heinrich Becker: From Old to New Islamology – Commemorating the 70th Anniversary of 'Der Islam als Problem,'" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 13 (1981): 287–310. It is difficult, however, to agree with several important points of Batunsky's apologetic, e.g., his denial of racism in Becker's thought.

⁵³See Kloosterhuis, *Friedliche Imperialisten*, 584–9.

⁵⁴Cf. Jacob M. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization* (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 2.

⁵⁵Kemal Karpat's recent attempt to play down this political dimension and to reduce Abdülhamid's pan-Islamist policies to acts of Islamic solidarity is not convincing, and contradicted by Karpat's own findings. Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*, Studies in Middle Eastern History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 233.

⁵⁶Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 47; cf. Richter, *Die Orientreise Kaiser Wilhelms II.*, 86–92.

⁵⁷Quoted in Stephen Casewit, "Background to the Holy War 1914. Towards an Understanding," *Islamic Quarterly* 29:4 (1985): 220. For similar statements from Wilhelm II as early as 1896, see van Kampen, "Studien zur deutschen Türkeipolitik," 58.

⁵⁸Heine, "C. Snouck Hurgronje versus C. H. Becker," 380. On Hartmann's change of mind after the beginning of the war, see Kramer, "Arabistik and Arabism," 296ff.

⁵⁹Throughout, Becker employed a notion of a hierarchy of civilizations, tainted with racism. For a blatant example see Becker, *Islamstudien*, vol. 2, 188–9.

⁶⁰Becker, "Ist der Islam eine Gefahr für unsere Kolonien?" (1909), in *Islamstudien*, vol. 2, 156ff.

⁶¹Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," 2ff., following suggestions by Deringil, *Well-Protected Domains*.

⁶²It may be pointed out that hardly any part of the Ottoman Empire came as close to de facto colony status as Tripolitania. For an analysis of Ottoman rule in Yemen in similar terms see Thomas Kühn, "An Imperial Borderland as Colony: Knowledge Production and the Elaboration of Difference in Ottoman Yemen, 1872–94," *Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies* 3 (2003): 5–17; and Selim Deringil, "'They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery': The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45:2 (2003): 311–42. Salih ash-Sharif at-Tunisi, to whom we will return below, a cleric from Tunis and since the Tripolitanian campaign a close ally of Enver, the Young Turkish minister of war, is said to have issued the fatwa that declared the jihad. Peter Heine, "Salih as-Sarif at-Tunisi, a North African Nationalist in Berlin during the First World War," *Revue de l'Occident Musulman et de la Méditerranée* 33 (1982): 89–95.

⁶³Fritz Fischer claims that a memo from Oppenheim inspired the emperor's infamous Damascus speech, in *Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/18*, special ed. (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1967; reprint, 1977), 109, but this is rejected by van Kampen, "Studien zur deutschen Türkeipolitik," 10, who points out that similar ideas circulated in Germany anyway. Unfortunately Richter, *Die Orientreise Kaiser Wilhelms II.*, analyzes Wilhelm II's trip to the Middle East only from the perspective of short-term political effects within the European balance of power, while the Ottoman Empire at no point is considered a political player in its own right. On the political aspects of the visit, in particular the idea of an alliance of Germany and the Ottoman Empire, which was voiced in the Arab press at the time, see the contributions by Abderrauf Sinno and Thomas Scheffler in Hélène S. Sader, Thomas Scheffler, and Angelika Neuwirth, eds., *Baalbek: Image and Monument, 1898–1998*, Beirut Texte und Studien 69 (Beirut: In Kommission bei Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart, 1998).

⁶⁴Examples of this theme in published documents are in Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, 31ff.; see also van Kampen, "Studien zur deutschen Türkeipolitik," 74ff. A study of the emperor's attitude towards Islam, in relation to his religious ideas and as a factor in German foreign politics, remains a desideratum in the vast literature on Wilhelm II.

⁶⁵"Die ganze muhammedanische Welt in wildem Aufstand zu entflammen," quoted in Müller, *Islam, Gihad*, 239, following Karl Kautsky.

⁶⁶The text has been published by Tim Epkenhans, "Geld darf keine Rolle spielen," parts 1 and 2, *Archivum Ottomanicum* 18 (2000): 247–50; 19 (2001): 121–63.

⁶⁷Werner Ende, "Iraq in World War I: The Turks, the Germans, and the Shi'ite Mujtahids' Call for Jihad," in *Proceedings of the 9th Congress of the Union Européenne des Arabisants et Islamisants, Amsterdam 1.–7.9.1978*, ed. Rudolph Peters (Leiden, Brill: 1981), argues that the Shi'ite scholars were cautious enough not to see their most prominent men involved, while Nasrollah Salehi, "Les fatwas des ulémas persans de Najaf et Kerbala," in *La Perse et la grande guerre*, ed. Oliver Bast, Bibliothèque Iranienne 52 (Tehran: Institut Français de Recherche en Iran, 2002), 157–76, unaware of the presence of German envoys in the holy cities, strongly argues that the call for jihad was in no way exceptional to Shi'ite religious politics of the time.

⁶⁸"Gegen Aden wären die Leute des Imam Jehia und andere Stämme von Yemen loszulassen." Oppenheim quoted in Epkenhans, "Geld darf keine Rolle spielen," part 2, 135.

⁶⁹Quoted in Epkenhans, "Geld darf keine Rolle spielen," part 2, 136–7, 34.

⁷⁰For ethnic stereotypes regarding Turks and Oriental Christians in the work of the famous traveler of the Enlightenment, Carsten Niebuhr, see Hagen, "Unter den 'Tyranen seiner Araber.'" On the stereotypes in Karl May, see Nina Berman, "Orientalism, Imperialism, and Nationalism: Karl May's *Orientzyklus*," in *The Imperialist Imagination: German Colonialism and Its Legacy*, ed. Sara Friedrichsmeyer, Sara Lennox, and Susanne Zantop (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 51–67.

⁷¹On the other hand, Oppenheim's views could equally well have directed him to the diplomatic career. A class distinction, like that found by Steinmetz among colonial administrators in China and Samoa, is not supported by the information available to me.

⁷²On the organization of the NfO, and its partners and supporters in the Foreign Office and the military administration, see Müller, *Islam, Gihad*, and more comprehensively, Höpp, *Muslimen in der Mark*. Immediately after the outbreak of the war the Foreign Office had turned down suggestions for propaganda among the Arabs submitted by two Orientalists, Enno Littmann and Eugen Mittwoch. While Mittwoch is well attested later as a member of the NfO, I don't have further information about Littmann. Sauer, "Alois Musil's Reisen," 244.

⁷³Höpp, *Muslimen in der Mark*, 22. The leader of the political section of the Foreign Office, Nadolny, worked closely with the NfO. Ibid.; Müller, *Islam, Gihad*, passim.

⁷⁴The question of to what extent this operation served diplomatic ends, whether to indicate to the Turkish government that Germany was counting on the Holy War or to boost pan-Islamic support for Turkey's entry into the war, will not be discussed here.

⁷⁵Müller, *Islam, Gihad*, 204. A list of the early staff is on p. 207. Internal quibbles, insufficient funding, and a considerable amount of amateurism were permanent features of NfO activities.

⁷⁶On Stumme see S. Brauner, "Die Entwicklung der Afrikanistik an der Universität Leipzig (zum Wirken von Hans Stumme und August Klingenberg)," *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Karl-Marx-Universität Leipzig* 28 (1979): 131–44. On Jäschke see Klaus Kreiser, "Gotthard Jäschke

(1894–1983): Zur Entstehung der türkischen Zeitgeschichtsforschung," in *Türkische Studien in Europa*. A 1915 leaflet by Tschudi is mentioned by Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 30. On Kampffmeyer see Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, passim, and Höpp, "Orientalist mit Konsequenz: Georg Kampffmeyer und die Muslime." Hartmann was not allowed to join officially since "he could be exploited in the future as well without closer association" (quoted in Müller, *Islam, Gihad*, 205). Several of these men were in the early steps of their careers, and probably simply seeking a job opportunity. This is certainly true for Jäschke. The fate of Karl Süssheim, eminent expert on medieval Turkish history, illustrates the alternative: besides a few official occasions when Süssheim was employed as translator or liaison for Turkish delegations, he spent the entire war as a postal censor in Munich. See Barbara Flemming and Jan Schmidt, eds., *The Diary of Karl Süssheim (1878–1947): Orientalist between Munich and Istanbul*, Verzeichnis Der Orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland, Suppl. Bd. 32 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2002).

⁷⁷Müller, *Islam, Gihad*, 207. For collaborators working with Muslim POWs in Camp Crescent, see Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 71.

⁷⁸The military aspect of the "deutsche Expeditionsmanie" (Hans von Seeckt, quoted in Wallach, *Anatomie einer Militärhilfe*, 168) shall not be dealt with here. A good overview with further literature is given by Martin Kröger, "Revolution als Programm. Ziele und Realität deutscher Orientpolitik im Ersten Weltkrieg," in *Der Erste Weltkrieg: Wirkung, Wahrnehmung, Analyse*, ed. Wolfgang Michalka (Munich: Piper, 1994), 366–91. It would be a worthwhile project for the student of Orientalism to analyze the dozens of memoirs of participants in these expeditions, and their legacy in books like Peter Hopkirk, *On Secret Service East of Constantinople: The Plot to Bring Down the British Empire* (London: Murray, 1994), with regard to Orientalist discourse in the wake of Karl May. For example, an interesting mixture of literary Orientalism, scholarship, and economic penetration is found in a brochure distributed by a manufacturer of trucks, H. Büssing in Braunschweig, to its customers in 1914 or shortly later, with contributions by all the usual suspects (Jäckh, Hartmann, Becker), and a highly Orientalizing short story by journalist Edgar Stern-Rubarth. He had been part of the group that escorted the first POWs to Istanbul in fall 1914, and later part of the expedition to Najaf to obtain a jihad fatwa from the Shi'ite *mujtabids*. Georg Krotkoff, "Büssing, Burchard und Bagdad," in *Islamstudien ohne Ende*, 261–6.

⁷⁹Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*; Margot Kahleyss, *Muslime in Brandenburg – Kriegsgefangene im 1. Weltkrieg. Ansichten und Absichten* (Berlin: Staatliche Museen Preussischer Kulturbesitz, 1998).

⁸⁰In particular, the education in Islamic values and beliefs corresponds closely to the goal of "native policy" as producing a stable "other." Steinmetz, "The Devil's Handwriting," 47.

⁸¹POWs who were actually sent to Turkey were often treated so badly that diplomats had to interfere with the Turkish authorities. Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 78–90; Kahleyss, *Muslime in Brandenburg*, 26–30.

⁸²Anthropological work with POWs is described, without specific reference to Camp Crescent, in Andrew D. Evans, "Anthropology at War: Racial Studies of POWs during World War I," in *Worldly Provincialism: German Anthropology in the Age of Empire*, ed. H. Glenn Penny and Matti Bunzl, Social History, Popular Culture, and Politics in Germany (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 198–229.

⁸³Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 56f. On Frobenius as secret agent, see Peter Heine, "Leo Frobenius als politischer Agent," *Paideuma* 26 (1980): 1–5.

⁸⁴Kahleyss, *Muslime in Brandenburg*, 33–41.

⁸⁵Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 57, mentions Indologists H. Lüders and W. Schulze, Arabist Gotthold Weil, and Ottomanist Oskar Rescher. The last was mainly employed as censor for the correspondence of the prisoners.

⁸⁶Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 57, 67. Kahleyss hesitates to take the images out of the personal context in which they were made. However, this context is not evident to any recipient in the public realm, and thus mostly irrelevant to the historian. Kahleyss, *Muslime in Brandenburg*, 57.

⁸⁷Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 56.

⁸⁸Farah, *Die Deutsche Pressepolitik*, passim.

⁸⁹Oppenheim did not succeed in having the paper distributed at the front and in Muslim countries, because the military was very concerned to keep it secret as long as possible. Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, 101. See also Peter Heine, "Al-Gihad – Eine deutsche Propagandazeitung im 1. Weltkrieg," *Welt des Islams* 20:3–4 (1980): 197–9.

⁹⁰Some examples are preserved in the archive of the German Foreign Office, and have been utilized by Müller, *Islam, Gihad*. Müller and Höpp, *Muslime in der Mark*, also deal with discussions in the NfO. The following analysis is based on a collection in the university library in Heidelberg, entitled *Die Türkei im Weltkriege* (henceforth cited as TW, with folder and document numbers), partly edited and translated in Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*. This collection comes from a former member of the NfO. Due to the limited sample, quantitative statements about the use of arguments have to be made with great caution. The collection also includes specimens of allied propaganda, such as TW 12.11.

⁹¹ See TW 8.4 or Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, 55–9, for an Arabic version, and Kahleyss, *Muslime in Brandenburg*, 14, for a Persian version, both printed by the Turkish National Defense Association and obviously sent to Berlin. The official character of the National Defense Association is evident from Snouck Hurgronje's protest against one of its publications: C. Snouck Hurgronje, "Een belangrijk document betreffende von den Heiligen Oorlog von den islam (1914) en eene officieel correctie," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië* 73 (1917), 255–84.

⁹²Ende, "Iraq in World War I"; Salehi, "Les fatwas des ulémas persans."

⁹³Rudolph Peters, *Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History*, Religion and Society 20 (The Hague: Mouton, 1979), 94.

⁹⁴William L. Cleveland, "The Role of Islam as Political Ideology in the First World War," in *National and International Politics in the Middle East: Essays in Honour of Elie Kedourie*, ed. Edward Ingram (London: F. Cass, 1986), 84–101, points out

that Husayn's campaign originated from the same pan-Islamist ideology.

⁹⁵Müller, *Islam, Jihad*, 358. Salih ash-Sharif wrote – among many other things – a leaflet in which he refuted Lloyd George's dismissal of the legitimacy of the Ottoman caliphate. Farah, *Die Deutsche Pressepolitik*, 258–9; TW 8.30; Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, 105, 214 (text in Tatar). Largely legalistic is the argument in Salih ash-Sharif's treatise *The Truth about the Holy War*. The book was published in German, Arabic, French, and Italian, and possibly other languages; I am using the French edition, Schaich Salih Aschcharif Attunisi, *La vérité au sujet de la guerre sainte* (Berne: Ferd. Wyss, 1916). This book also has a function in the Snouck Hurgronje–Becker controversy, discussed below.

⁹⁶When the Turkish side planned to settle volunteers from among the Muslim prisoners in Anatolia, the War Ministry outright rejected the proposal because it did not speak about the jihad. Höpp, *Muslimen in der Mark*, 81.

⁹⁷Even in hindsight the responsible officer in the Foreign Office, Nadolny, explained the failure to himself as follows: "We were not very lucky in propagating Holy War. The Islamic people did not care although it had been declared by the Turkish sultan." Quoted in Kahleiss, *Muslimen in Brandenburg*, 30.

⁹⁸Höpp, *Muslimen in der Mark*, 70ff.

⁹⁹See for instance TW 8.1, 8.28, 8.31, 8.48; Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg* 51ff., 100f., 106ff., 138ff.

¹⁰⁰For example, a brochure by Salih ash-Sharif shows a photograph of severed heads of Moroccan Muslims (TW 8.62). A booklet of photographs shows the executions after the so-called Denshawai incident in Egypt in 1906 (TW 11.7 in Arabic, Turkish, and Urdu; the incident is also mentioned in TW 8.29(b); Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, 212). In Denshawai, a small town in the Nile delta, villagers had attacked British soldiers on a shooting party, without harming anybody. Still the British reacted with massive repression, including execution of four men, prison sentences, and public flogging. The incident later served as a catalyst for the national movement in Egypt. One attempt to improve the efficiency of the POW paper *al-Jihad* as a propaganda tool was to include more images (Müller, *Islam, Jihad*, 222). I don't know whether the previous lack of images was due to practical reasons or (less likely) adherence to Islamic prohibition of images.

¹⁰¹On the French, see TW 9.8; Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, 255. On the British, see TW 11.8, TW 8.29(b); Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, 210ff. On the author of the latter, an Indian-born journalist in Istanbul, see Höpp, *Muslimen in der Mark*, 113.

¹⁰²TW 8.62, Persian version TW 10.12. See also TW 8.31 and 8.32; Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, 106–13.

¹⁰³On Morocco, see TW 8.24. On Tripolitania, see TW 8.26; Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, 87ff., 200ff.; Müller, *Islam, Jihad*, 356, identifies the author of the latter work as Muhammad al-Khidr.

¹⁰⁴TW 8.27.

¹⁰⁵TW 12.3. This act had provided ample material for allied propaganda that was hard to reject. In this way, this text is addressing German concerns rather than Muslim ones.

¹⁰⁶Often the promise of freedom is expressed in rather cryptic terms, and very rarely spelled out explicitly. See TW 8.1, 8.31; Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, 51–4, 106–10.

¹⁰⁷TW 8.32; Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, 220.

¹⁰⁸TW 8.33, 8.46, Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, 114ff., 26ff.; Müller, *Islam, Jihad*, 363. Müller mentions one more issue in the Foreign Office archives.

¹⁰⁹See TW 12.6 or 12.7, leading up to 31 July 1915 (in Tatar; Ottoman version entitled *Harbin bidayetindenberi geçen mühim vekayi-i harbiye*, n.p., n.d., in my collection).

¹¹⁰Höpp, *Muslimen in der Mark*, 103.

¹¹¹*Harbin bidayetindenberi geçen mühim vekayi-i harbiye*, 20, 41.

¹¹²Müller, *Islam, Jihad*, 363.

¹¹³*Album de la Grande Guerre*, Édition pour l'Orient (Berlin W: Deutscher Überseedienst Transocean, G.m.b.H., and Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient). TW 13.4–7 has issues 17, 10, 21, and 5. The design is the same as that of the brochure on Denshawai (TW 11.7) and an album of ships destroyed at the Dardanelles (TW 12.8).

¹¹⁴TW 9.1. The author is named only in Arabic characters, which can be transcribed as "Paul Kreuzinger," and denoted a retired lieutenant colonel. Maybe he is Paul Creuzinger, author of an unfinished multivolume work, *Die Probleme des Krieges* (vol. 1–3.1 Leipzig, 1906–10; not available to me). This brochure is not a direct product of the NfO. It was published in Constantinople by Ali Ihsan, a close friend of the "Türkenjäckh."

¹¹⁵Farah, *Die Deutsche Pressepolitik*, 273, 83.

¹¹⁶See the internal discussion in Höpp, *Muslimen in der Mark*, 59f. Undoubtedly, the final result is TW 8.45. Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, 120–5.

¹¹⁷TW 8.48; Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, 138ff.

¹¹⁸TW 8.58–60; Hagen, *Die Türkei im Ersten Weltkrieg*, 147–61. At the same time in Iran, traditional epic forms were used by poets to celebrate German heroes; see Ali Mir-Ansari, "La grande guerre dans la poésie épique persane," in *La perse et la grande guerre*, ed. Oliver Bast (Tehran: Institut Français de Recherches en Iran, 2002), 237–59.

¹¹⁹See the famous "Sylvesterbrief" of 1905, discussed in van Kampen, "Studien zur deutschen Türkeipolitik," 66. Another famous example is a statement by British prime minister Grey, which caused a sharp response by Ottoman grand vizier Said Halim (Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, 28). Cf. also American ambassador Henry Morgenthau's account of the outbreak of war (Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*).

¹²⁰C. Snouck Hurgronje, "Deutschland und der Heilige Krieg," *Internationale Monatschrift* 9 (1915): 290; Snouck Hurgronje, *Holy War "Made in Germany"*, 75.

¹²¹From the diary of Kronprinz Rupprecht von Bayern, quoted in Müller, *Islam, Jihad*, 274.

¹²²Höpp, *Muslimen in der Mark*, 73.

¹²³Müller, *Islam, Jihad*, 225.

¹²⁴Höpp, *Muslimen in der Mark*, 82; allegedly the Tatar agents in particular were quite successful.

¹²⁵Höpp, *Muslimen in der Mark*, 103f.

¹²⁶Müller, *Islam, Jihad*, 214ff.

¹²⁷See the list of titles in Höpp, *Muslimen in der Mark*, 29.

¹²⁸Becker left academia for a political career in 1916, and became minister of culture in 1921, and again from 1925 to 1930. He never joined a political party. He died a few days after Hitler had come to power, a development he considered "finis Germaniae." Waardenburg, *L'islam*, 29f.

¹²⁹Carl Heinrich Becker, *Deutschland und der Islam* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1914); C. Snouck Hurgronje, "Deutschland und der Heilige Krieg," *Internationale Monatschrift* 9 (1915), 1025–34. Becker's responses to Snouck are reprinted in Becker, *Islamstudien*, vol. 2. Becker had hoped to skip this episode when editing his collected papers, but since Snouck had included his in his collected writings, he could not do this. See C. Snouck Hurgronje and A. J. Wensinck, *Verspreide Geschriften van C. Snouck Hurgronje, Bibliographie en Registers door Dr. A. J. Wensinck* (Bonn and Leipzig: K. Schroeder, 1923–7). The writings on Germany and the Holy War are in vol. 3.

¹³⁰Hanisch, "Gelehrtenselbstverständnis," 111, notes the resentment against officials-turned-professors in German academia.

¹³¹See Hanisch, "Gelehrtenselbstverständnis," 114, who also sees the *Encyclopedia of Islam* as an expression of European feelings of superiority over the peoples of the contemporary Middle East.

¹³²See Heine, "C. Snouck Hurgronje versus C. H. Becker."

¹³³Hanisch, "Gelehrtenselbstverständnis."

¹³⁴Thomas Scheffler, "Orientalisten und Orientkenner als Väter der deutschen Politikwissenschaft?" in *Annäherung an das Fremde. XXVI. Deutscher Orientalistentag*, ed. Holger Preissler and Heidi Stein (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1998), 63–70. The notion of partnership had been strongly argued by Becker.

¹³⁵Friedrich Rosen, *Aus einem diplomatischen Wanderleben. Vol. 3–4. Aus dem Nachlass herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Herbert Müller-Werth* (Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1959), vol. 3, 50f.

¹³⁶Said, *Orientalism*, 15.